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Abstract 
Profound changes are taking place in the nature of international business, both in terms of the 
drivers of trans-border transactions and the strategic orientation of the firms that engage in 
these transactions. While the dynamic forces of globalisation and regionalisation, acting in a 
dialectical manner, form the umbrella under which international business activities take place, 
it has been the impact of technological change that has enabled firms to act both globally and 
locally. Companies are searching for partners all over the globe, even to the point of 
collaborating with current or former competitors. New MNCs from Newly Industrialised 
Countries (NIEs) have recently emerged with new forms of investment and motivation, 
demonstrating that FDI can no longer be analysed in the classical manner as a flow of extra 
capital into a country where all else is held constant, with the static effects evaluated 
according to the tenets of orthodox marginal productivity analysis. Nor is it any longer a 
simple hierarchical process from capital rich to capital poor countries. There is growing 
concern that traditional theories of investment have largely been ineffective in explaining 
recent trends of flows of FDI, especially in the context of recent changes in the transitional 
once-socialist economies. There especially has been a need to identify the causes of recent 
changes in inflow of FDI to post-communist countries. 
This thesis presents a detailed investigation into the recent changes in the patterns and 
determinants in inflows of FDI to transitional economies in the light of FDI experiences in the 
economies of China and Poland. China and Poland provide ideal subjects for a case study 
since both have attracted quite sizeable amounts of FDI, once their reform programs had been 
introduced, despite both countries adopting quite different approaches on the road of 
transition to a market economy. It is found that patterns and determinants of FDI in a given 
country depends crucially on the degree of industrial advancement and the stage of 
entrepreneurial development of the country, changes in the process of internalisation of 
production, geography of the country and the nature and timing of policy shifts. There is a 
significant diversification of FDI in terms of the total number of source countries'. In both 
countries there are differences between developed- and developing- country firms in terms of 
the size, strategy and form of their investments. The most common form of investment in 
both countries initially was joint ventures with increasing shareholding by foreign partners, 
but recently the wholly foreign-owned enterprises are becoming the main driving force of 
investment. Foreign firms indicate a much higher intensity for exports than local firms. As 
for the economic effects, FDI in China has so far been heavily concentrated in product lines 
characterised by high import intensity, limited backward linkages and limited diffusion of 
vi 
technology. In Poland FDI has been concentrated in mix product line characterised by some 
import intensity and by export orientation, stronger backward linkages and increasing 
diffusion of technology. These characteristics need not, however, to be treated as intrinsic 
features of FDI in these countries. Rather, they are mostly a reflection of the early stage of 
FDI participation and the nature of prevailing investment climate. Moreover, despite the 
shallowness of new product lines, their development impact in terms of employment 
generation and knowledge spill over effects appears to be considerable. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
Since the late 1970s, foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and in Central and Eastern 
Europe has attracted considerable attention from both the business and academic worlds. 
However, very little systematic research has so far been carried out to examine the trends and 
determinants of FDI in these transitional economies. Most literature published on FDI trends 
in Eastern Europe and China is of a rather general nature. There is growing concern that the 
traditional theories of investment have largely been ineffective in explaining recent trends in 
the flow of FDI, especially with regard to recent changes in these and other transitional 
economies. No longer can FDI be analysed in the classical manner as a flow of extra capital 
into a country within which all else is held constant, with the static effects evaluated 
according to the tenets of orthodox marginal productivity analysis (MacDougall, 1960: 35). 
Empirical identification of recent changes in the inflows of FDI to post-communist 
countries and their changing trends is needed in order to determine what factors, influence the 
inflow of foreign capital into these countries. The present study attempts an investigation into 
the trends, patterns and determinants of FDI in the light of recent changes in the investment 
climate of China and Poland. It first develops, a framework for analysing the patterns and 
trends of FDI, through a survey of existing literature and then, use this framework to 
examine the recent experiences of China and Poland in testing these new forms of FDI, in 
order to seek out the lessons to be learnt in policy terms from each of these countries. In 
particular, the aims of the study are four-fold: 
1 
(1) To examine key aspects of the changes in FDI trends and determinants 
through a close investigation into the distribution of FDI 
(2) To delineate links between these determinants and each country's 
incentives for investment, as well as each country's progress with economic 
reform. 
(3) To identify emerging trends of FDI and their implications for future 
economic changes. 
(4) To discuss policy issues arising from the experience of FDI. 
During the past two decades, stimulated by pioneering work by Hymer (1960) and 
Vernon (1966), and more recently by Dunning (1980), a considerable amount of empirical 
investigation has been undertaken in this field. The overwhelming majority of these studies 
has been conducted within Dunning's three-dimensional paradigm framework: ownership 
advantages, location advantages and internalisation advantages (OLI). 
There are several major limitations that should be taken into consideration when using 
the OLI paradigm as a policy guide. In general, economic theory suggests that MNCs have 
clear objectives when investing abroad. It lists a considerable number of factors which may 
influence the decision, but it actually explains only a few of them. It falls short of 
encompassing all the factors involved. The OLI paradigm, so far the most widely accepted 
and most comprehensive approach which incorporates several factors, only identifies the 
conditions which are sufficient or which fail to be sufficient for FDI to be profitable, as well 
as the conditions under which FDI is superior to other modes of servicing foreign markets. It 
does not directly refer to the motives for investing abroad. MNCs are global players operating 
affiliates all over the world. Each one can be considered as a spider spinning a world-wide 
web. The literature suggests that the value and size of this web may be affected positively by 
a number of geographically dispersed locations that can be used and served. The rationale for 
hypothesising such a positive relation is derived from the fact that global players can benefit 
from lower variable costs due to economies of scale and economies of scope realised in 
networks. Against this background we can assume that the FDI by MNCs is motivated by a 
whole host off actors which are closely connected. 
The traditional literature claims that only the combined attractiveness of each of the 
ownership, location and internalisation advantages (OLI paradigm) would provide the 
conditions required for FDI to occur. More recently it has been demonstrated that FDI may 
also be undertaken even if the potential host country's locational advantages are large enough 
2 
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to compensate for only small or even negligible firm-specific advantages (Stehn, 1992). This 
argument has important implications for economic policy towards FDI, as within the OLI 
paradigm locational attractiveness is the variable which is most perceptible to economic 
policy. The OLiparadigm postulates only the preconditions to be fulfilled (Agarwal, 1985). 
These aspects should not be confused. A firm may want to penetrate a foreign market, thus 
providing the motive for FDI. However it faces a choice. It can serve this market either from 
its domestic production base or from a foreign base closely located to the market which it 
wants to penetrate. The OLI paradigm only allows the most effective strategy to be decided 
once the motivation has been given. On the other hand, Casson (1987, pp. 32-33) has argued 
that Dunning' s ownership (0) advantage is really an internalisation benefit and that 
ownership advantages are not necessary for FDI. In so doing, he effectively rebutted the 
validity of the Hymer postulate. The Hymer postulate is still relevant for some young firms 
with ownership advantages that allow them to compete in niche markets, but for the well-
established MNCs that now dominate international production in well-defined industries and 
product lines, it is no longer relevant. Furthermore, in view of the differences between 
countries, motives differ considerably between different markets in which foreign investors 
are engaged (Agarwal, Gubitz, Nunenkamp, 1991), thus limiting the validity of the OLI 
paradigm as the comprehensive approach for foreign firms investment analyses. These 
considerations highlight the necessity for undertaking case studies of individual countries in 
order to build a sound and meaningful empirical foundation for policy discussions on this 
important issue. 
China and Poland provide interesting subjects for a comparative case study of patterns 
and determinants of FDI in transitional economies on several counts. Both countries offer a 
particularly illuminating case study for analysing the new FDI structures, given the richness 
and breadth of the reform experiences. In the framework of the new economic geography, 
China and Poland also offer ideal sites for new clusters of industrial activity, and 
consequently for the inflow of FDI: China, as the biggest market in the world with a 
population of over 1 billion, and an emerging "Panda" in the fast growing East Asian region, 
has the potential to shakeup existing patterns of investment and trade more than any other 
recent regional development. Some FDI flows have shifted from ASEAN countries to China. 
In a setting of high factor mobility, these shifts may be amplified by investors rushing to join 
new centres of economic activity (Petri 1994). Poland with its strategic location in central 
Europe acting as a bridge between West and East as well as the gateway to Russia and former 
Soviet Republics is also well poised to make an impact. Noteworthy too is the fact that these 
two countries have a chosen completely different approaches in the transition to a market 
3 
economy. China has followed the gradualism approach while Poland has embraced the "Big 
Bang" approach. 
Both countries have made concerted efforts to join the world economy in order to gain 
access to the international flow of trade, capital and technology which is critical to their 
economic transformation. However, the issues relating to the promotion and monitoring of 
FDI exemplify the differences between the two countries. These differences and similarities 
create a lot of argument and policy debate about the structure of FDI in transitional 
economies. This feature is particularly important because in recent discussions of the role and 
trends of FDI in transitional countries, the motives of MNCs have become the most 
controversial issue dealt with (Gatling, 1993, Rojec and Svetlicic 1994; Jermakowich and 
Bochniarz 1995 and Dunning, 1996). 
The Chinese and Polish transition processes provide excellent examples of the new 
economic structures implied in the a priori theorising on the patterns and determinants of FDI 
in the context of recent changes in the inflow of FDI. Of course no two countries are alike, 
and the economic and political context of each policy reform differs. These contrasts make 
this study even more interesting. The insights gained from an in-depth case study of each 
country is useful to policy makers in other transitional countries in identifying critical issues 
that may come up in the process of transition to a market economy. The relevance of the 
study, however, extends well beyond its potential use as a policy document. It can be 
regarded as a model for other countries in transition, especially those which can use the 
Chinese and Polish findings as a policy-guiding tool in their economic transformation. 
Therefore, insights gained from this case study would be of value in assessing the relevance 
and usefulness of these transition models. As Pomfret has noted, China provides the "most 
extensive experience of investing in a communist country" (Pomfret, 1991). Furthermore, 
China's recent experi~nce with FDI may serve as a barometer of likely future FDI patterns 
and changes in inflows to transitional economies. In spite of the emphasis placed on the 
issue, no in-depth empirical investigation has so far been undertaken to identify its various 
dimensions. All of these issues are analysed in the following chapters, together with their 
policy implications. 
4 
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1.2 Methodology 
The research of the study comprised two key elements: (a) a study of policy reforms in China 
and Poland since 1979 and 1989 respectively through a study of policy document, academic 
literature review, World Bank, OECD and IMF reports and other government publications 
and; (b) a detail survey of FD I-based firms operating in China and Poland. The firm-level 
study involved a questionnaire-based interview of management personal from FDI-based 
firms. Questionnaire was prepared based on research done prior to field work. The 
questionnaire was translated into Chinese and Polish and the translation was subsequently 
adjusted to correct unclear statements. The data collected from interview were supplemented 
by analysis of firms annual reports and official governments investment records. 
A comprehensive list of foreign firms and its affiliated is available from investment 
agencies and Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Relation in China, and Polish 
Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ) and the Department of Privatisation in Poland. List 
can be easy updated using official records of the Board of Foreign Investment. Board of 
Foreign Investment maintains the records on foreign investment approval (with a clear 
distinction between approved and implemented projects) with details on key variables such as 
capital starter, home country, investment size, employment and export value. In analysing the 
patterns and determinants of FDI, the study covers the period from 1978 to 1996 in China 
and from 1986 to 1996 in Poland. The differing starting dates signal the year in which each 
country embraced the economic reform process and opened its economy to the competition of 
foreign firms 
1.3 Structure 
The study is organised in nine chapters: 
Chapter 2 reviews of the existing literature on FDI to provide a perspective for the 
present study and the methodology adopted. 
Chapter 3 provides a descriptive picture of the economy of each country during the 
transition process, with special reference to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies in achieving the goals of utilising FDI in general and promoting 
manufactured exports in particular. 
Chapter 4 focuses more particularly on the investment and trade policies pursued 
throughout their differing transitional phases of development towards a market-oriented 
economy. Ensuing incentives and disincentives for FDI, if any, and the regulations of FDI 
are also discussed, with an emphasis on the national policy of each country. 
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Chapter 5 analyses general trends and determinants ofFDI in each country in order to 
establish the background required for a comparison by survey. The changing patterns of FDI 
structure are closely studied with special reference to the source countries of investment and 
their sectoral distribution. Determinants of FDI inflow into each country are analysed, with 
particular attention given to import-substitution measures associated with other major factors 
affecting FDI inflows. 
Chapter 6 describes the survey methodology which has been used in the study. 
Characteristics of the sample are also discussed and the problems with it are analysed. 
Chapter 7 investigates the trends and determinants of FDI-based firms in the survey 
data. A locational factors are analysed for each country and comparison with general trends is 
discussed. Particular attention is given to any changing patterns and motives affecting FDI 
inflows to each country. 
Chapter 8 examines the performance of foreign investment projects in each country 
with particular reference to technology, employment and export creation. A comparison 
between the two countries is also presented. 
Chapter 9 presents the major conclusions of the study followed by a brief discussion 
of the policy implications of the findings. Limitations of the study are also addressed and 
their implications for the references are discussed. 
Throughout the study the structure of each country analysis follows the same pattern 
to make each case more comparable. In most cases the closest comparative approach is 
adopted. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF FDI: THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE 
2.1 Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of a sizeable body of literature dealing 
with various dimensions of the trends and determinants of FDI flow. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present the a priori view of the issue and to review the related empirical work in 
order to place the present study in perspective. It is pertinent to mention at the outset that the 
coverage of the chapter has been deliberately selective, the major criterion being the relevance 
of the material to the purpose and scope of the present study as outlined in the Introduction. 
Informal FDI has been omitted due to a lack of data. 
In a world of varied market imperfections and constant changes in government 
policies, advice based on traditional models of pure competition and conventional theories of 
FDI is not persuasive (Helleiner 1976 and 1988). There is, therefore, a need for more 
analysis of emerging new investment trends in East Asia and other developing countries. 
Theories of FDI can be evaluated in terms of several different criteria. One is whether 
each theory is logically consistent. A second is how well each theory predicts out-of-sample 
observation and especially how well each theory provides an explanation for the sharp 
changes in the country patterns of FDI. Most theories of FDI are under-determined and deal 
only partly with observed trends, which limits the possibility of explaining new trends and 
limits the tested validity of each hypothesis. 
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Profound changes are taking place in the nature of international business, both in terms of the 
drivers of trans-border transactions and the strategic orientation of the firms that engage in 
these transactions. A number of factors account for the changes taking place in the overall 
environment for international business. The forces of globalisation and regionalisation have 
been two of the paramount factors responsible for the transformation taking place in the way 
firms behave with respect to their foreign operations (Yongwook and Simon 1994). 
While the dynamic forces of globalisation and regionalisation, acting in a dialectical 
manner, form the umbrella under which international business activities take place, it has 
been the impact of technological change that has been the enabling factor that has allowed 
firms to act both "globally and locally" (Petri 1994, Yongwook and Simon 1994). 
Technological changes have not simply altered the ways firms conduct their overseas 
business activities, but it has made possible the creation of a new infrastructure for carrying 
out and overseeing the diverse set of operations that take place around the globe. For 
example, the rapid technological advance in electronics seems certain to continue and will 
shorten even further the life of any new electronic product. Therefore production on a smaller 
scale will be encouraged, favouring assembly technologies that do not require large fixed 
investments likely to be found abroad (Flamm and Grunwald 1985), although still seemingly 
under the aegis of an individual company, albeit one that is changing its shape, size, and 
organisational design (Yongwook and Simon 1994). 
2.2 The Traditional View 
There are two major schools of thought concerning FDI. The conventional school, pioneered 
by Hymer (1960) and Caves (1971), states that FDI is undertaken only by firms that possess 
some intangible asset. These firms invest in a foreign country in order to exploit the firm-
specific ownership advantage embodied in the intangible asset. FDI is, therefore, seen as an 
aggressive action to extract economic rent from a foreign market (Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-
Chun Liu 1994). 
The other school, represented by Vernon (1966) and Kojima (1973), portrays FDI as 
a defensive action undertaken by firms to protect their export market which is either 
threatened by competitors in the local market (Vernon 1966) or damaged by unfavourable 
developments in macroeconomic conditions at home (Kojima 1973), such as wage increases 
and/or currency appreciation. "Defensive" FDI is often made in low-wage countries where 
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cheap labour enables investors to reduce their production cost in order to restore international 
competitiveness. "Aggressive" FDI may be in any countries where local production is seen as 
the best way to enter the market. If both types of FDI exist in the real world, empirically it is 
difficult to distinguish one from the other because actual FDI may be undertaken for a mixture 
of reasons including market exploitation and labour-seeking motives. For example, while 
Kojima (1973) claims Japanese FDI to be of the "defensive" type, his example of Japanese 
FDI in East Asia is criticised for being indistinguishable from the "aggressive" US investment 
in Canada or Europe (Mason 1980). In this regard, China and Poland provide perfect cases 
for studying the different modes of investment by sector or product. 
In these schools of thought there have been several theories developed which we will 
elaborate separately. In order to present a complete picture of advanced FDI theories in the 
existing literature, a few differing postulation's by other writers will also be reviewed. In 
order to put the traditional theories into a practical perspective, their application and 
limitations will be reviewed. 
2.3 Theory 
The mainstream history of FDI analysis is now universally regarded as the handiwork of the 
late Stephen Hymer. Hymer both demolishes the conventional position and lays the basis for 
a more fruitful approach. As one reads his contentions, it becomes clear that the problem is 
no longer to explain the movement of funds from one country to another, but rather to 
understand a qualitatively new form of industrial organisation which coordinates productive 
activities in many different parts of the globe. 
Until his PhD dissertation, it was customary to treat direct, equity investment abroad 
on a par with 'capital flows' in general: the distinction between portfolio and equity 
investment for example, was not important to this way of analytical thinking. Admittedly, this 
deficiency was one that afflicted orthodox economic thinking of the day: thus, international 
trade theory focused on interest rate differentials being explanatory of 'capital flows'. 
Hymer's breakthrough, coming interestingly from the recognition of stylised facts such as the 
presence of cross-investment and the concentration of foreign equity investment in a few 
oligopolistic industries which did not rest happily with the interest-rate-differentials theory, 
was focused on the notion that primary insights into FDI could come only from recognising 
the oligopolistic industrial structure of the firms making such investments. Moreover, while 
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Hymer' s basic notion was that FDI had to be seen in the context of the search for control by 
oligopolistic enterprises, he indicated the importance of the so-called 'advantages' theory of 
direct, horizontal investments by multinationals. Thus, Hymer distinctly discussed how the 
firm would go abroad rather than license or sell its technology, if the special advantages that it 
possessed (and whose value outweighed the special advantages that local firms would enjoy 
in their own markets) required its own control. Thus, Hymer was the first to pose sharply the 
alternatives of licensing technology and of direct investment and to argue the different reasons 
why special advantages may not be cashed for the same returns through licensing 
arrangements and may thus require direct investment abroad, and interestingly, he also 
described these as 'horizontal' investments. Hymer's thesis was not only regarded as the first 
modem industrial-organisational theory of FDI, but also provided the inspiration for other 
writers like Vernon, Caves, Kindleberger to take this issue much further in the development 
of FDI theories pertaining to industrial organisation, which in the following sections will be 
briefly analysed. 
2.3.1 Theories of Industrial Organisation 
Vernon and Kindleberg argue that for firms to own and control foreign value-adding 
facilities, they must possess some kind of inventory, cost, financial or marketing advantages, 
(specific to their ownership), which is sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages they face in 
competing with indigenous firms in the country of production (Hymer 1966). These 
advantages, which they assume to be exclusive to the firm owning them (hence the 
expression "ownership advantages"), imply the existence of some kind of structural market 
failure. 
Another industrial organisation approach to the theory of FDI is based on models of 
"oligopolistic competition" and stresses that the advantages that enable a firm to attain a large 
size in its domestic market facilitate the expansion of its foreign subsidiaries (Caves 1974). 
This approach emphasises that once a firm has achieved a superior growth rate, it has a 
compulsion or incentive to maintain the rapid growth of sales and profits. For an extended 
period, the growth rate for one or several firms within an industry is higher than that for the 
industry as a whole- the implication being that some firms with below-average growth rates 
will leave the industry. As some firms exit, the surviving firms realise a growth rate higher 
than that of the industry because they take over part or all of the market share of the firms that 
leave. Eventually the industry becomes oligopolistic, with four to eight firms remaining 
(Aliber 1993). At this stage each firm is likely to find it difficult to maintain its growth rate, 
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so it will look to enter foreign markets with new products. FDI occurs because the firm 
prefers to cross the political boundaries with its traditional product lines. No specific 
advantage is identified with the source-country firm that would enable it to compensate for the 
cost of economic distance. 
2.3.2 Product Life Cycle Theory 
Vernon and his colleagues at Harvard were the first to acknowledge the relevance of some of 
the newer trade theories put forward in the 1950s and 1960s to help explain this 
phenomenon. In a classic article published in 1966, Vernon used a micro-economic concept, 
'the product cycle', to help explain a macro-economic phenomenon, i.e. the foreign activities 
of US MNCs in the post-war period. 
The product cycle theory was a response to the observation that US firms were 
among the first to develop new labour-saving techniques in response to the high cost of 
skilled labour and a large domestic market (Vernon 1966). In the early stages of development 
of a product, firms placed factories close to markets because of the need for frequent 
feedback from market to plant. Production runs were short because of numerous changes in 
the future of the model, which meant the demand for skilled labour was large relative to the 
demand for unskilled labour. To reduce costs, firms revamped the design of their products so 
that model changes would be less frequent and production runs longer; low-cost unskilled 
labour could then be substituted for high-cost skilled labour. As the product became 
increasingly standardised, the need for feedback from market to plant would be less frequent, 
so the distance between the plant and the market could be increased. Unit cost could be 
reduced further if production was shifted to a foreign country where the wages for unskilled 
labour was low relative to the wage rate for skilled labour in the source country. The "implicit 
assumption" of the product cycle theory of FDI is that the firms which developed the 
products in their domestic markets would acquire the manufacturing plants in the countries 
identified with abundant unskilled labour, rather then sell or license their technology to host-
country competitors. 
2.3.3 Internalisation Theory 
The basic hypothesis of this theory is that multinational hierarchies represent an alternative 
mechanism for arranging value-added activities across national boundaries to that of the 
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market, and that firms are likely to engage in FDI whenever they perceive that the nett 
benefits of other joint ownership of domestic and foreign activities, and the transactions 
arising from them, are likely to exceed those offered by external trading relationships. The 
core prediction of the internalisation theory is that, given a particular distribution of factor 
endowments, MNC activity will be positively related to the costs of organising cross-border 
markets in intermediate products. 
The internalisation theory, created by Buckley and developed by Rugman, is 
primarily concerned with identifying the situations in which the markets for intermediate 
products are likely to be internalised, and hence those in which. firms own and control value-
adding activities outside their natural boundaries. It seeks to explain the international 
horizontal and vertical integration of value-added activities in terms of the relative costs and 
benefits of this form of organisation relative to market transactions. 
2.3.4 Macro-Economic Theory of FDI 
This theory is essentially an extension of the neo-classical theory of factor endowments to 
explain trade in intermediate products, notably technology and management skills. A major 
part of this thesis, set out in Kojima (1973, 1978, 1982, 1990) and in Kojima and Ozawa 
(1984), shows that whereas Japanese FDI is primarily trade oriented and responds to the 
dictates of the principle of comparative advantage, US FDI is mainly conducted within an 
oligopolistic market structure, is anti-trade oriented and operates to the long-term 
disadvantage of both the source and the host countries. Kojima essentially believes that FDI 
should act as an efficient conduit for trading intermediate products, but that the timing and 
direction of such investment should be determined by market forces rather than by 
hierarchical control. His prescription is that outbound FDI should be undertaken by firms that 
produce intermediate products that require resources and capabilities in which the home 
country has a comparative advantage, but which generate value-added activities that require 
resources and capabilities in which that country is comparatively disadvantaged. 
By contrast, inbound FDI should import intermediate products that require resources 
and capabilities in which the host country is disadvantaged, but the use of which require 
resources and capabilities in which it has a comparative advantage. To the extent that Kojima 
uses trade models to explain patterns of FDI, he follows in the Vernon tradition. He regards 
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MN Cs as creators or sustainers of market imperfections whose impact on resource allocation 
must be less beneficial than that predicted by perfect competition. 
2.3.5 The Eclectic Theory of International Production 
The OLI paradigm developed by Dunning seeks to offer a general framework for determining 
the pattern and extent of both foreign-owned production undertaken by a country's own 
enterprises and also that of domestic production owned by foreign enterprises. 
The "eclectic theory" of FDI combines the ownership advantage from the industrial 
organisation approach with the location advantage associated with the product cycle. 
The OLI paradigm starts with the acceptance of much of the traditional trade theory in 
explaining the spatial distribution of some kinds of output (which may be termed Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (H-0-S) output). However, it argues that to explain the ownership of that 
output and the spatial distribution of other kinds of output which require the use of resources 
that are not equally accessible to all firms, two kinds of market imperfection must be present. 
The first is that of structural market failure which discriminates between firms (or 
owners of corporate assets) in their ability to gain and sustain control over property rights or 
to govern multiple and geographically dispersed value-added activities. The second is that of 
the failure of intermediate product markets to transact goods and services at a lower net cost 
than those which a hierarchy might have to incur. Such variables as the structure of markets, 
transaction costs and the managerial strategy of a firm's economic activity need to be 
considered. 
The OLI paradigm of international production postulates that the level and structure of 
a firm's foreign value-added activities will depend on four conditions. These are: 
(1) The extent to which the firm possesses sustainable ownership-specific (0) advantage 
vis-a-vis firms of other nationalities in the particular markets it serves or is 
contemplating serving. These 0 advantages largely take the form of the privileged 
possession of intangible assets as well as those which arise as a result of the 
common governance of cross-border value-added activities. These advantages and 
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the use made of them are assumed to increase the wealth-creating capacity of a firm, 
and hence the value of its assets (ltaki 1991). 
(2) Assuming condition (1) is satisfied, the extent to which the enterprise perceives it to 
be in its best interest to add value to its 0 advantages rather than sell them, or the 
right of use of them, to foreign firms. These advantages are called market 
internalization (I) advantages. They may reflect either the greater organisational 
efficiency of hierarchies or their ability to exercise monopoly power over the assets 
under their governance. 
(3) Assuming conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, the extent to which the global interests 
of the enterprise are served by creating, or utilising, its 0 advantages in a foreign 
location. The distribution of these resources and capabilities is assumed to be uneven 
and, hence, depending on their distribution, will confer a locational (L) advantage on 
the countries possessing them over those who do not. 
( 4) Given the configuration of the ownership, location and internalization (OLI) 
advantages facing a particular firm, the extent to which a firm believes that foreign 
production is consistent with its long-term management strategy. 
The generalised prediction of the eclectic paradigm is straightforward. At any given 
moment of time, the more a country's enterprises, relative to those of another, possess 0 
advantages, the greater the incentive they have to internalise rather than externalise their use, 
and the more they find it in their interest to exploit them from a foreign location, then the 
more they are likely to engage in outbound production. By the same token, a country is likely 
to attract investment by foreign MNCs when the reverse conditions apply. It also accepts that 
such advantages are not static and that a firm's strategic response to any particular OU 
configuration may affect the nature and pattern of its 0 and I advantages in a later period of 
time (Dunning, 1991). 
One can suggest that the OLI paradigm offers the basis for a general explanation of 
international production, a rich conceptual framework for explaining not only the level, form 
and growth of MNC activity, but also the way in which such activity is organised. 
Furthermore, the paradigm offers a robust tool for analysing the role of FDI as an engine of 
growth and development as well as for evaluating the extent to which the policies of source 
and host governments are likely both to affect and be affected by that activity. 
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2.4 Other Theoretical Contributions: A Selected View 
To complete this short historical review, we briefly consider two other approaches to 
explaining MNC activity which offer valuable insights into both location and ownership of 
international economic activity. Both approaches were developed by financial or macro-
economists. 
The Risk Diversification Hypothesis was put forward by Agmon and Lessard 
(1977), Lessard (1976, 1982) and Rugman (1975, 1979, 1980). Building on some earlier 
work by Grubel (1974) and Levy and Sarant (1970), these scholars argued that the MNC 
offered individual or institutional equity investors a superior vehicle for geographically 
diversifying their investment portfolios than did the international equity market. This partly 
reflected the failure of the equity market to evaluate efficiently the risks or the benefits of risk 
diversification, and partly the fact that, compared with the domestic counterparts, MNCs 
possessed certain non-financial advantages that enabled them to manage the risks associated 
with international diversified portfolios more effectively. However, there remains some doubt 
as to the extent to which the gains of international diversification are reflected in the cost of 
equity to, or the share prices of, the investing firms (Dunning 1992). 
2.4.1 Macro-Financial and Exchange Rate Theories: 
The Aliber Model - Robert Aliber (1970, 1971 and 1993) took as his starting point the 
failure of financial markets. He argued that a firm headquartered in a country identified with 
low interest rates will place a higher value on the income associated with particular plants than 
firms headquartered in countries identified with high interest rates. These national differences 
in interest rates and in the price of corporate equities means that there are country-specific 
costs of capital to firms. Thus, firms headquartered in low-interest-rate countries share a 
locational advantage. 
The key implicit assumption of this theory is that the cost of capital for a multinational 
firm is not the weighted average of the costs of the capital for firms headquartered in each of 
the countries in which this firm has subsidiaries. One implication is that a firm cannot 
significantly affect its cost of capital relative to the costs of capital of foreign firms, because 
the costs of equity capital have a large country-specific component. Furthermore, he stated 
that the source-country firms take their cost of capital as a given in their own capital markets; 
similarly, the host-country firms take their cost of capital as a given. The differences in the 
cost of capital to the two groups of firms explain why the minimum price required by the 
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source-country firms before they will sell firm-specific knowledge might exceed the 
maximum price that a cross-country firm will pay for this knowledge and why the market in 
which firm-specific knowledge is bought and sold is viewed as imperfect. 
Exchange Rate Model - Frost and Stein ( 1989) presented a model in which currency 
movements affect the geography of MNCs by altering relative wealth across countries, and 
demonstrated a significant negative correlation between the value of the US dollar and the 
propensity of foreign firms to invest in the US. However, other writers, like Cushman 
(1985) and Culem ( 1988) have argued that, rather then reflecting relative wealth, exchange 
rate movements mirror changes in relative real labour costs, and it is these that determine 
FDI. In a test of these alternative propositions, Klein and Rosengren (1990a) have 
demonstrated that the correlation between the exchange rate and US inbound direct 
investment during the 1980s supports the former rather than the latter hypothesis. Klein and 
Rosengren (1990b) show that relative wealth is also an important determinant of outward US 
investment, especially when Japan (where there are significant barriers to acquisitions and 
mergers by foreign firms) is excluded as a host country. 
2.5 Limitations of the Existing Theories 
In spite of their successes, however, the traditional theories leave many recent features of FDI 
flow unexplained. Recent strategic shifts in flows of FDI (from developed to developing 
countries and intra-Asian FDI flows) and developments in the international division of 
labour, influence the location of labour-intensive processes and component production within 
vertically integrated international industries. This indicates further the limited application of 
these theories in practice. 
So far we have discussed various foreign investment and production theories 
concerning their application to examine MNCs motives and a country's attractiveness to the 
inflow of FDI. Although these theories have gained wide coverage in the literature and among 
policy-makers in developed countries and related international organisations, there are some 
limitations on these theories as regards their usefulness in the analysis of FDI inflow to 
transitional economies and developing countries. 
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Most theories of FDI were developed when firms headquartered in US accounted for three-
quarters of the total annual flows. The assumption implicit in these theories, or at least in 
most of them, is that firms that invest abroad need an advantage to compensate for the 
extraordinary costs of FDI- costs that their host-country competitors do not incur. One test of 
each theory is whether it is consistent with changes in the geographic pattern of FDI in the 
last decade, especially with the surge in FDI in the US by firms from Western Europe, Japan 
and Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of Asia as well as the new wave of investment in 
assembly, processing and manufacture in Less Developing Countries (LDCs). Thus, the 
assumption central to each of these theories might be modified so they are consistent with the 
changes in the patterns of investment, and then the plausibility of each assumption may be re-
evaluated, however they still leave many recent features of FDI unexplained. (Aliber 1993 
and Froot 1993). 
Most theories of FDI are associated with the relaxation of one of the assumptions of 
the competitive model; these theories highlight a particular type of advantage of the source-
country firm that enables it to compensate for the cost of economic distance. Some theories 
highlight firm-specific advantages, which are generally produced within the firm as a way to 
enhance its competitive position: each firm strives to differentiate its product or processes 
from those of its competitors. In contrast, other theories of FDI highlight country-specific 
advantages, which are associated with all the firms headquartered in a particular country. As 
most theories of FDI are identified with a deviation or departure from the perfect market 
assumptions, the number of theories is limited by the number of possible imperfections. The 
large number of theories . extant in the literature suggests that many theories are modest 
variations on the same theme. 
The recent FDI surge in US inflows and Japanese outflows illustrates a few 
examples; Japanese FDI overall, which was historically quite small, exploded across all 
industries in the last decade, experiencing as an aggregate a seven fold increase from 1985 to 
1989 (Froot 1993). During this surge, both US inflows and Japanese outflows were 
particularly large and fast growing in real estate and financial services. In these industries, 
however, there was little evidence of meaningful change in competitive advantage. 
Particularly puzzling is the case of Japanese banks, which during the latest surge went on a 
much-publicised binge in acquiring foreign affiliates. Many of the banks involved were 
actually noted for their apparently inefficient operations and low profitability in comparison 
with US. and European companies. These facts suggest that existing theories do not 
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adequately explain either the timing or the magnitude of FDI surges nor their broad cross-
industry composition. 
Other theories try to explain the timing and economic geography of FDI in a 
conventional way by looking at perceived location advantages (Dunning 1980). As expansion 
through FDI means a higher cost of management, advantageous location is not enough to 
explain the establishment of foreign subsidiaries in the assembly of components and 
processing. Unless MNCs possess an advantage over local firms sufficient to offset the cost 
of international coordination, the benefits of location will be captured instead by indigenous 
firms (Froot 1993). 
The conspicuous case of the auto and electronics industries, may not point to a 
general rule of the old oligopolistic market structures and industry protection as the magnet 
for inward direct investment (Caves 1989). Among developing countries, open export-
oriented economies such as Hong Kong have been more successful than nations pursuing 
import substitution strategies in attracting new investment. The recent phenomenon of 
Korean, Japanese, US and even German car industries in location plants regarding to 
assembly and production in many countries trying to capture the internalisation network 
cannot be fully explained by the industrialisation theory. 
By contrast, the highly protected apparel and footwear industries in LDCs according 
to conventional theory, have attracted relatively little direct investment from abroad. In these 
low-technology industries, ownership advantages are apparently too small to offset the 
greater costs incurred by foreign investors (Caves 1982). The recent new waves of foreign 
investment by MNCs from Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and to some extent Indonesia in 
Malaysia, Thailand and China suggest that these theories do not hold strongly in these cases 
either. 
The greatly increased extent of two-way FDI and even of two-way flows within a 
given industry has blurred the distinction, at least among industry nations, between host and 
source countries (Dunning 1985) and creates a gap in the explanation by old theories of the 
patterns and motivation for FDI by MNCs, thus requiring a fundamental shift in both 
analytical perspective and policy stance (McCulloch 1988). 
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Wells argues that today's 'mobile exporters' are different from earlier waves of investors. 
The new investments appear to reflect shifts in comparative advantage, as countries like 
Indonesia become more attractive sites for certain kinds of manufacturing activities (Wells 
1993). The Indonesian experience shows a growth in investment from other developing 
countries in recent years. More of that investment comes from Korea and Taiwan than in the 
past. Moreover, the kinds of investment that dominate have also changed; the new investors 
are coming for reasons that differ from those that were most common in the past and which 
had been explained by conventional theories. How well do the old theories (of monopolistic 
advantage or internalisation) explain the new waves of FDI by mobile exporters in East Asia, 
destinations of these flows, motivations for such investment and its attractiveness to each 
host country?. 
The new wave of investment by Third World multinationals in other developing 
countries has by now been rather firmly established, documented and described (Wells 1983; 
Lall 1983; Khan 1987; White 1987). To a great extent, the investment was associated with 
small-scale, cost-minimising technologies, with price rather than brand-name competition, 
but recently they have invested in more advanced technological industries, and the size of 
investment has increased noticeably compared with the industrialised nations. The average 
investment in a firm owned by an East Asian developing country was $US 15.8 million, the 
average for all investors being $US 17.5 million (Wells 1979). These large inflows of FDI in 
recent years in East Asia clearly indicate that tax incentives are not necessary important for a 
developing country to attract foreign investment (Guisinger 1985; Wells 1986). This new 
phenomenon creates further problems for conventional foreign investment theories to explain 
the trends of these "mobile exports" from Third World countries. 
The product cycle model of international trade and investment offers some 
understanding of the mobile exporters (Vernon 1966). Although the theory has become 
increasingly less useful in explaining trade and investment among the industrialised countries 
(as their markets have converged and the MNCs have established facilities in a number of 
countries), it still has some validity in explaining investment flows among countries with 
quite different income levels. Foreign investment moves, according to the theory, down the 
ladder of development as products mature. Thus, the movement of investment from the richer 
developing countries of East Asia into the poorer countries of the region is consistent with the 
theory to some extent but it has strong limitations when it comes to explaining the likely 
patterns or industry destinations. 
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The shift away from traditional majority-owned foreign investment towards 'new forms' of 
investment in developing countries, notably joint ventures, licensing agreements and more 
recently co-production and assembly of components, creates an environment for the 
appearance of smaller internationally-oriented firms with export-oriented manufacturing 
strategies (Helleiner 1987) which cannot be explained by the questions relating purely to 
conventional ownership modalities. Most striking in this is that some firms, notably some 
Japanese trading companies and recently others based in Hong Kong, already specialise in 
the assembly of efficient 'packages' of equipment, know-how, management and marketing 
skills from a variety of sources. 
As far as FDI is concerned, Third World multinationals corporations (TWMNCs) 
may play an expanding role in manufacturing for export not only within the South but also 
towards the North. Some TWMNCs have developed considerable specialised knowledge of 
small-scale and labour-intensive production procedures in the manufacturing of standardised 
products (Helleiner 1988). Despite this new conventional wisdom, the export-oriented 
manufacturing TWMNCs and FDI flows deserve more study and encouragement. However 
there is still little known about optimal policies relating to them regarding the relative 
advantages of different forms of investment, different general relationships between host 
countries and foreign firms in particular industries, either for firms of varying characteristics 
or for various actors in different kinds of host countries. 
2.6 Empirical Evidence 
In reviewing the empirical literature, emphasis has been limited to the literature on the causes 
and consequences of the FDI inflow. It only considers formal FDI flows and the impact of 
such flows on the export and economic development. Formal FDI includes equity joint 
ventures, contractual joint ventures, cooperative development and wholly-foreign-owned 
enterprises, operating within the FDI policy framework. 
Beginning with the study by Reuber and associates (1973) into the determinants of 
FDI flows to developing countries, a large amount of empirical research has been carried out 
in this field. Both the alleged causes and consequences outlined in the preceding section have 
been investigated in various ways. A striking feature of this literature is its overwhelming 
reliance on the OLI-paradigm framework. However, there have been a few sporadic attempts 
to study the problem from different perspective. 
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The existing empirical studies support the view that the traditional classical theories leave 
many recent features of FDI inflow unexplained. Moreover, the existing studies have focused 
almost exclusively on the experience of the US, Japanese and European MNCs. The 
experience of more recent entrants from the developing countries of Asia and Eastern Europe 
need more attention. Furthermore, recent new clusters of FDI activities in Eastern Europe and 
export-oriented foreign investment in LDCs require new empirical investigation into the 
emerging trends and patterns of foreign investment. There is, therefore, a clear clash between 
the classical approach to FDI and the empirical findings on the level of motivation and inflow 
of capital. The traditionally accepted explanation of trends and motives of foreign firms to 
invest abroad have been either disputed or totally refuted when confronted with empirical 
testing. In general, the conclusions of these empirical studies strongly support the case 
against the application of the traditional FDI theories. New approaches need now to be sought 
or developed to help us understand the emerging new waves of FDI flows between countries. 
2.6.1 Cross-Section Studies 
Grunvald and Flamm (1985) suggest that transferring some production processes abroad, 
with one side primarily furnishing labour services, the other primarily components, is a 
substitute neither for the traditional exchange of primary goods for manufactured products 
nor for the "non traditional" export of products emerging from the NICs or LDCs and their 
imports of capital of goods and technology. This complementary intra- industry trade is a 
relatively new addition to the changing international division of labour. The traditional 
industries have generally been associated with fairly labour-intensive technologies and, due to 
the persistence of low wage rates in the Third World and the relatively low development cost 
of establishing a production capability in these older products, these industries have been the 
leading edge of the burgeoning exports of manufactures produced in developing countries. 
The high-tech industries, on the other hand, depend for their success on access to the 
specialised resources required for research and development and the highly complex 
production processes. These industries have therefore been located in the developed countries 
(DCs). As products mature, technology diffuses, high-tech products eventually become 
traditional products, and production moves to more competitive locations abroad (Bhagwati 
1982). 
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Volume manufacture in a foreign location for re-export to the home market or other export 
markets is a qualitatively new feature of foreign manufacturing operations that emerged in the 
late 1960s. In developing Asia, more than a quarter of the sales made by US affiliates went to 
the US in 1977, up from less than 10 per cent in 1966. In electrical machinery, in particular, 
some 70 per cent of output was shipped back to the US in 1977. A similar phenomenon 
appears to have taken place in Japanese multinationals. Japanese data for 197 5, show a 
significant share of sales as exports to Japan from Asian affiliates. Production abroad is even 
more important in certain high-tech electronics industries, where the products are anything 
but traditional. Semiconductors alone account for about 40 per cent of the value of US 
components reimported into that country after overseas assembly, and more than 80 per cent 
of US semiconductor production is probably assembled abroad. Thailand and Malaysia are 
also popular locations for labour-intensive industries, but they attract investment into more 
technology-intensive industries as well, particularly electrical appliances, electronics and 
metal products. MNCs are underwriting an integrated system of international production. The 
world economy is being transformed into a "global factory". 
Moreover, as Blumberg (1989) has noted, the previous focus on low cost labour has 
become subordinated to a new focus on product re-engineering to allow for the use of fewer 
components and more efficient through-put in manufacturing. Along with competing on the 
basis of technology, firms are now competing on the basis of time and production efficiency 
(Yongwook and Simon 1994). Within such a system, non-price competitive factors take on 
greater significance than price-related factors; this is not to say that costs are not important, 
but that the successful firm must be mindful of the full panoply of competitive factors. As 
Dunning has indicated, successful MNCs are those which manage a broad range of value-
added activities across a diverse set of geographical boundaries, capitalising on the distinctive 
advantages offered in each of the respective domains. 
Helleiner (1973, 1978 and 1988) in his studies argues that there has recently emerged 
a new orthodoxy to the effect that labour-intensive manufactured exports able to benefit from 
scale economies derived from sales to world markets, which were under-emphasised in the 
past, must now be encouraged with at least the same vigour with which import-substituting 
industry was encouraged in the past. Incentives for this purpose are to be offered both by 
LDCs and by the industrial nations to which they aspire to sell. If the developing countries 
are now convinced that it is the labour-intensive industrial exports that should be emphasised 
in the immediate future, and adequate incentives for them are offered, one can be confident 
that the international business community will be quick to respond. Since the second half of 
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the 1960s imports into the US from LDCs under items 806.30 and 807.00 of the US Tariff 
Schedules, which permit import duties to be levied only upon value-added activities abroad 
where inputs originated in the US, rose from $US 61 million to $US 539 million between 
1966 and 1970, or from 4 per cent to over 14 per cent of total US imports of manufactures 
from LDCs. Imports under these items accounted for approximately 27 per cent of the 
increase in the total of such US imports in the 1966-69 period, despite their start from a very 
small base (US Tariff Commission 1970). 
Doner (1991) has further demonstrated the complex forces that drive Japanese 
automobile firms to extend their local production networks by creating regional production 
schemes for the supply of auto parts in half-a-dozen nations in East and South-East Asia, in 
order to retain and perhaps increase their share of the global automobile market. Due to the 
new types of re-programmability that have been introduced into the manufacturing process, (a 
process the Japanese have called mechatronics), an entirely new set of economic forces has 
become predominant, leading to new ideas regarding production volumes, mix, and tooling 
(Yongwook and Simon 1994). 
Wells (1993) focuses on important recent trends in world FDI, transacted by 
companies he call "mobile exporters". Typically these are companies from relatively high-
income developing countries seeking low-cost installation to access third-country markets. 
The rate of growth of mobile-export FDI in some developing countries is quite astonishing. 
Wells takes Indonesia as his primary example. There the FDI approved during the 1987-90 
period was 150 per cent of all the FDI which occurred in that country from 1967 to 1987. 
The lion's share of this growth was associated with an increase in the role of export-oriented 
FDI from other developing countries. For instance, from 1977 to 1985, the share of FDI into 
Indonesia that came from developing countries was only 6 per cent. During this period, 
Japanese investment dominated. By the first half of 1991, however, other developing 
countries alone accounted for 56 per cent of projects approved for FDI (in manufacturing 
alone, the proportion rose to 65 per cent). In sum, this experience shows a growth in 
investment from other developing Asian countries during the 1990s, both in absolute terms 
and in the share of total foreign investment. More of that investment comes from Korea and 
Taiwan than in the past. Moreover, the kind of investment that dominates has also changed: 
the new investors are coming for reasons that differ from those that were most common in the 
past. 
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Wells (1993) identifies three major rounds of developing-country to developing-country FDI. 
The first round was export-oriented, driven by the desire to avoid imports quotas in third-
country markets (e.g. in textiles and shoes industries). The second round consisted of trade-
substituting FDI-developing country companies that came to Indonesia fearing that present or 
future trade barriers would block their access to Indonesia's domestic market. The third 
round came from companies seeking lower cost export bases for their products. Firms from 
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong have faced currency appreciations, wage 
increases, and labour shortages. 
David Y offie (1993) analyses the evolution of FDI in the semiconductor industry by 
taking a careful look at industry data. He notes that there is a surprising lack of agglomeration 
in recent greenfield investment. Secondly, Yoffie notes that investments in South-East Asia 
have been maintained and expanded, even though the automation of assembly and test 
processes has diminished the importance of access to low-cost labour. However, over the 
same period, substantial downstream production (consumer electronics and automobiles) has 
shifted to this region, and the industrial infrastructure has expanded. Thirdly, he contends 
that it is surprising to see little FDI into Japan despite the liberalization of FDI regulations and 
the implementation of the semiconductor trade agreement (SCT A). Furthermore he argues 
that the benefit of locating near suppliers has declined. Japanese firms are willing to forego 
these benefits in order to have production capacity inside actual or potential trade barriers in 
the US and Europe. 
Lim and Fong (1991) suggest, FDI is no longer a simple hierarchical process from 
capital rich to capital poor countries. Companies are searching for partners all over the globe, 
even to the point of collaborating with actual or former competitors. The nature of the 
movements overseas has, in terms of both production, location and research and development 
(R&D) sites, moved in the direction of what David Teece has termed " the search for 
complementary assets" (Yonwoong and Simon 1994). Firms that engage in overseas 
operations on either the R&D or production side may therefore, be less inclined to rely 
primarily on traditional entry modes such as licensing or equity based investment and opt for 
what Charles Oman has termed "new forms of foreign investment" (Oman 1984). Large 
MNCs will move increasingly into the internalisation of their production and marketing, 
knitting the LDCs into their international activities as suppliers not merely of raw materials 
but also of particular manufactured products and processes. One can depict this development 
as the next logical step for international investors following the two previous major stages of 
resource exploitation and import-substituting manufacturing. 
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Bhagwati ( 1985) argues that, as the source of import competition is technical change in 
progressive, Shumpeterian industries causing competition among similar products, the 
response of the producers of import-competing similar products cannot logically be outward 
FDI, since lower factor costs abroad are not what is driving the foreign competition. Rather, 
it may be the mutual penetration of investment which brings international competitors into 
cooperation. Further he stated that MNCs in different countries have R&D-induced 
advantages in producing different types of sub-products (for example, an MNC in Japan is 
excellent at producing small cars and an MNC in the US has an edge in the production of 
large cars). Instead of competing in each other's home countries or in third markets in both 
types of sub-products when they only have a competitive edge in one, it would be expected 
that in this situation it would be most beneficial for MNCs to enter into a mutual equity inter-
penetration, with production-wise accommodation in sub-product specialisation according to 
the advantage they possessed. Bhagwati's model predicts that MNCs with R&D-induced 
specialisation in different types of sub-products within an industry in different countries will 
interpenetrate each other's investment activities. 
Helleiner (1983), Grunwald and Flamm (1985) suggest that manufacturing for export 
is the "new frontier" for international business in LDCs, and that processing and component 
specialisation are likely to become the chief avenue of FDI inflow for LDCs. Incentives are 
therefore going to be offered in LDCs for the development of industrial exports; one can also 
expect incentives favouring labour-intensive activities increasingly to be introduced. The 
multinational manufacturing firm from an LDC is likely to play a major role in the future 
development of manufactured exports from the LDCs. The location in developing countries 
of relatively labour-intensive processes and component production within vertically integrated 
international industries has been an important feature of the international division of labour. 
MNCs are already lining up their various activities and/or product lines, to the extent that they 
are separable one from another, (where unskilled labour is predominantly used) to discover 
which are most suitable for relocation to low-wage countries. This development is part of an 
occurring adjustment process, firms in the DCs adapting to the increasing pressures of 
domestic real-wage increases and import competition from low cost sources. The transfer 
abroad of component assemblies occurs in many industries where the technology of 
production permits the separation of labour-intensive components from other steps in 
production. In the next decade or two processing, assembly and component manufacture for 
export within vertically-integrated international industries are bound to become an 
increasingly important element in this development. 
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Petri (1994) suggest that the variety of activities now being performed for export on this basis 
in the developing countries is already very large. It may be worth listing some examples in 
order to show the flavour of these developments: semi-conductors, valves, tuners and other 
components are manufactured or assembled for a large number of Japanese and US electronic 
firms in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Mexico. (The electronics 
industry is by far the most important industry in this field.) Garments, gloves, leather 
luggage and baseballs are sewn together in the West Indies, South-East Asia and Mexico for 
US and Japanese firms (Helleiner 1983). Automobile parts are manufactured for British, US 
and Japanese firms in a wide variety of countries, e.g. radio antennae in Taiwan, piston rings 
and cylinder linings in South Korea and Taiwan, automobile lamps in Mexico, braking 
equipment in India, batteries and springs in Thailand. 
The success of any developing country entering this new sphere of international 
division of labour depends crucially on its ability to influence the site-selection decision of 
MNCs. It is quite possible for a country, particularly one at a relative disadvantage with 
respect to labour and transport costs, to build infrastructure and/or offer subsidies to attract 
this particularly "footloose" type of manufacturing activity (Helleiner 1983). 
2.7 Analytical Framework 
Some of the empirical studies indicate clear changes which are occurring in today's global 
economy. The focus moves from the decision of whether or not to invest abroad to that of 
maintaining the competitiveness of an individual MNC (Gray, 1996). Furthermore, FDI by 
MNCs now plays a major role in linking many national economies, building an integrated 
international production system, the productive core of the globalising world economy. 
MNCs deploy their tangible and intangible assets (e.g. capital, R&D capacity and technology, 
organisational and managerial practices, trade links) with a view towards increasing their 
competitiveness and profitability. Another indication of recent changes is that in the early 
1990s, most countries, or, more particularly, governments of countries, are claiming FDI as 
'good news', after a period of being highly critical, if not downright hostile, to it in the 1970s 
and early 1980s (Dunning, 1994). Now one can note increased use of incentives by national 
and sub-national governments in a competitive environment to attract investors and the threat 
of beggar-they-neighbour policies (Dunning, 1995). Also these incentives differ from 
country to country, which helps MNCs deploy their assets in the cost effective way. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that empirical evidence supports these recent changes in the 
behaviour and structure of the firms' and host countries' investment environment. 
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The empirical evidence is not easy to interpret because of differing methodologies, time-
scales, investor nationality and type of project (manufacturing, services, R&D, etc.), but to 
sum up, the major conclusion that can be drawn from a survey of numerous empirical studies 
is that, the recent inflow of FDI to emerging new markets in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), China and South-East Asia cannot be analysed by the traditional framework of 
international production and investment. Generalisations for all post-communist countries are 
particularly difficult, especially when different policy reform approaches have been implied 
and may on many grounds be misleading (Rojec 1994, Sachs 1995 and Jemakowicz, 1994). 
Further research in this field, therefore, needs to focus on studying the problems for each 
individual country with respect for the uniquely different economic approaches to their 
common goal of transition to a market economy. In addition, sufficient, detailed attention 
needs to be given to the factors affecting the inflow of capital and its trends. 
In analysing the trends and patterns of FDI we adopt and expand on a standard 
typology developed by a few academics which was presented in the Introduction. In the first 
category, (resource-based manufacturing), the value added in the further processing of local 
raw materials is frequently not a very high proportion of the value of the material itself. There 
may, nevertheless, be substantial aggregate value added when realised through this form of 
manufacturing for export. Some processing activities, however, particularly in the mineral 
industries, are quite capital-intensive and/or skill-intensive and may not therefore be the most 
suitable for location in a low-income country. The heavy effective protection offered by the 
cascaded tariff structure to the processing industries in the developed world is a further 
significant obstacle to the development of processed manufactured exports of this type 
(Helleiner 1973). This is particularly so in those instances when raw material extraction is not 
under the control of the same firms as the processing. There are, however, new opportunities 
emerging for growth of trade within the regions themselves (e.g. the EU-Eastern Europe 
region and the South-East Asia region). China, with its rich resource base and as a low-
income country has some FDI potential, especially as it is one of Japan's closest neighbours 
(most Japanese firms undertake foreign investment with a view to securing for the nation a 
stable and low-cost source of input (UNCTC 1983). In recent years, many NICs have also 
begun to follow this Japanese investment pattern. Investors from these countries are already 
involved in resource-based export industries such as petroleum products (Zhu Noi Xiao 
1994, Byrd 1992). 
In the second category (differentiated final goods), foreign firms are more willing to 
move their production units to overseas locations, especially to developing countries with low 
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labour costs and a familiar host country environment. These overseas exports of 
manufactures emerged in industries with relatively high barriers to entry and relatively 
sophisticated and controlled marketing. They are most likely in those cases where the firm's 
strategy is built not upon national marketing and product differentiation but on international 
production and cross-hauling (Vernon, 1971). 
In the evolving context of global competition, a series of new roles have emerged for 
the developing economies. Among these roles are high value-added manufacturing, small 
batch production, e.g. ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits), specialised 
engineering for initiating rapid design changes, high-technology production of both software 
and hardware, and low cost, high-quality R&D (Electronic Business Asia 1993). By linking 
up with various economic partners in the NI Cs and ASEAN, developing countries could 
stimulate export manufacturing from these countries. Wage increases in North-East Asian 
countries indicate recent trends of moving these plants from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong 
Kong to Thailand, Malaysia and China and open up the possibility of competitive exports of 
manufactured goods. 
Investment by Japanese firms across the Pacific Rim seems to reflect a fundamental 
change in focus from "transaction costs to transaction benefits" (Imai 1985). Japanese firms 
now seem much more willing to go outside their traditional subcontracting and sourcing 
relationships and to plant deeper roots into the local economies of the region (Economist 
1993). The Japanese government has inspired all firms to transfer those factories which use 
more energy and raw materials or labour force, to developing countries. In 1992 the FDI 
from Japan to Asia-Pacific developing countries was $US 6.187 billion (Yongwook 1994). 
Standardised labour-intensive consumable (category 3) constitute one of the areas in 
which developing countries can develop competitive advantages in the export-oriented 
manufacturing. MNCs may choose to locate the production of particular new final products 
or product lines, presumably those most intensive in the use of unskilled labour or most 
subject to pollution legislation, in less-developed countries. The role of FDI in this category 
remains controversial. On the basis of the experience of NICs, it has been argued that FDI 
involvement is by no means necessary for the successful expansion of these exports as they 
embody well-diffused technology (Helleiner 1988, Wells 1993). The changing role of FDI in 
the international division of labour, variation in factor endowment and wage growth have 
opened up the potential for the growth of new trade flows. The potential for trade growth 
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based upon differences in labour costs remains strong, as reflected in the wage variation 
among North-East and South-East Asian countries (Drysdale 1988). These factors, together 
with changes in relevant government policies presents, one can argue, opportunities for 
developing countries for truly international sub-contracting, which involves indigenous 
enterprises in those countries rather than mere subsidiaries of foreign firms. 
Countries with comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods (category 4), can 
strongly influence FDI location for labour-intensive processes and component specialisation 
within vertically integrated international industries. Since the 1960s adjustment processes 
have been occurring in DCs, created by the increased pressure of domestic real-wage 
increases and import competition from low cost sources (Grunvald and Flamm 1985). The 
transfer abroad of component assemblies occurs in many industries where the technology of 
production permits the separation of labour-intensive components from other steps in 
production. Assembly operations related to high-tech electronic industries, the production of 
semi-conductor devices in particular, are by far the most important. The other industries with 
significant assembly operations located in LDCs are electrical appliances, automobile parts, 
electrical machinery and optical products (Athukorala 1989). For example, the main parts, 
assemblies, sub-assemblies and final assembly tasks for the dot matrix printers for the 
Japanese company NEC, are provided by eight factories in southern China. The company's 
personal computers are assembled in Hong Kong using parts and components procured from 
local suppliers in other parts of Asia (e.g. Thailand and Malaysia), while the hard disk drives 
are produced by a number of coordinated factories in the Philippines (Business Tokyo 1992). 
Korean, German, US and Italian car manufacturers are relocating their assembly operations 
to countries with low labour costs following the recent shifts in the cost-adjustment 
processes. Many Japanese computer firms have sought out universities and research institutes 
in China, for example, as a means to reinforce their manpower ranks with qualified 
individuals, many of whom are grossly under-utilised within the Chinese science and 
technology establishment. Most importantly, however, these R&D-oriented relationships 
have started to extend beyond the software engineering area and into new areas such as 
consumer electronics, semiconductors and air-conditioning. The Japanese identify the main 
purpose of these new facilities as the performance of design and development (D&D) 
engineering function. Toshiba, for example, has moved the design team for VCRs from 
Japan to Singapore through the establishment of a local subsidiary that now has total design 
responsibility (Business Times 1994). Matsushita, which is among the leading Japanese 
manufacturing firms, has probably put together the most well-articulated strategy for the 
Asia-Pacific region. As of 1992, close to 60 per cent of Matsushita's non-Japanese 
manufacturing was conducted in the Asia-Pacific region (Economist 1993). This has led to an 
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opening up of many existing 'networks' to a larger and larger number of qualified local firms 
throughout the Pacific Rim, especially in countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and China 
(Asian Business 1994). 
In some investment decision making in this sphere, investors attach significant weight 
to the existence of a large domestic market which can absorb a substantial proportion of 
output at the initial stage of market entry (Guisinger 1985). The heavy protection which has 
been required to enable most import-substituting manufacturing establishments in the LDCs 
today to survive augurs poorly for the possibility of their sustained entry into competitive 
world markets. It would be, in principle, possible to offer sufficient subsidies, direct or 
indirect, to encourage export by existing plants at least in those cases where the agreements 
with foreign investors do not specifically prohibit them. 
Helleiner argued that overseas exports of manufactures emerged in industries with 
relatively high barriers to entry and relatively sophisticated and controlled marketing which 
are based on a firm's strategy built on international production and cross-hauling (Vernon 
1971). For example in Poland Daewoo entered the Polish market and bought a large, 
antiquated auto company (FSO) on the condition that the Polish government provide it with a 
30 per cent tariff protection. 
Assembly exports from LDCs have grown much faster than the total number of 
manufactured exports from these countries. For instance, their share in total US imports of 
manufactures from LDCs increased from 4 per cent in 1966 to 10 per cent in 1993 ( Grunvald 
and Flamm 1985). It can be reasonably expected that overseas production arrangements will 
continue to remain a dynamic growth area in the foreseeable future. For DC firms which 
operate in industries severely affected by import competition from low-cost sources (i.e. 
electronics, electrical goods and automobiles), offshore assembly is crucial for their survival. 
Governments in these countries also actively encourage such operations through value-added 
tariff provisions and other measures with a view to cushioning domestic economies against 
disruptions resulting from rapid import penetration. In these instances, a host government's 
preference for reducing the role of traditional FDI has been the main influence, but in some 
cases the initiative has come from the smaller MNCs in NICs and LDCs (Cable and Persaud 
1987). 
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2.8 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion reveals that empirical works over the past decades have not 
produced consensus as to the trends and patterns of FDI in transitional economies and 
developing countries. To comment on the issue of trends and patterns of FDI first, the LDCs 
exhibit significant differences with regard to (1) source of FDI and newly emerging patterns 
in general and at industry level as well, and (2) motivation of foreign firms to moved their 
production line offshore and the host country's changing investment incentives and attitude 
towards FDI. Various analyses of FDI data reveal vast differences in the source and 
determinants of FDI not only between countries, but also among different industries and 
manufactured goods (World Bank, 1996; Athukorala, 1987; Wells, 1993). A similar 
conclusion applies to the trends and patterns of FDI in transitional economies (Jermakowicz, 
1994; Rojec, 1994; Lemoine, 1996; Sikora 1993). In addition, trends of FDI inflow to 
emerging market economies tend to exhibit different patterns and determinants thus, leading 
to significant variation in motivational behaviour of foreign firms (Cieslik, 1996, Shultz, 
1997; Schmidt, 1994). The preceding observations suggest that new trends are emerging not 
only among source countries but also among host countries and can be associated with 
globalisation, information technology and the international division of labour. 
As to the impact of FDI on the domestic economy, the picture is even more complex. 
For a given economy, the nature and the degree of this impact is determined by the stage of a 
country's economic development, economic policy and general business environment. Due to 
the obvious differences in these features, the impact and benefits of FDI to the domestic 
economy are likely to vary substantially from country to country. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that the empirical evidence as to the role and trends of 
FDI is rather mixed and at times, inconclusive. To sum up, the major conclusion that can be 
drawn from a survey of numerous empirical studies is that, with regards to the role, trends 
and determinants of FDI, generalisations based on traditional theories can be misleading, 
particularly for newly emerging transitional economies. Further research in this field, 
therefore, needs to focus on studying the issues of FDI for transitional countries in detail 
giving sufficient attention to new emerging patterns and trends of FDI. 
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CHAPTER 3 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIES OF CHINA 
AND POLAND 
The major conclusion of the previous chapter was that no meaningful analysis of the trends 
and patterns of FDI can be undertaken without reference to the underlying economic structure 
and the institutional background of the countries in question. This chapter is therefore 
intended to provide an overview of the Chinese and Polish economies and to place FDI in the 
context of these transitional economies, in order to lay the foundations for the subsequent 
analysis. The original reform proposals and the systems in practice will be briefly discussed 
with regard to various selected functional areas. 
3.1 China: An Introduction 
In 1979 China commenced a gradual reform program to restructure its centralised, communist 
party-controlled economy. Direct planning controls were relaxed, the decentralisation of 
centralised decision-making processes was begun, attempts were made to increase reliance on 
market forces, the development of non-state-owned economic entities was encouraged, and 
the gradual opening of China's economy to the outside world was introduced. 
The main changes came in two areas. Agricultural production was predominantly 
returned to the private sector operating through markets. The government ignored the inflow 
of informal direct foreign investment by overseas Chinese, predominantly from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, in production for export, which enabled export earnings to grow rapidly. In the 
rest of the economy the Chinese government adopted a cautious and pragmatic approach to 
economic reforms, proceeding in an incremental fashion. Experimentation with reform started 
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in rural areas. The 'household responsibility system', i.e. the return of agricultural 
production to private farmers, together with increases in the relative prices of agricultural 
products, brought substantial productivity gains and resulted in a diversification and increase 
an agricultural production. 
Table 3.1 China: Main Economic Indicators 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Population (mln) 1139.20 1153.30 1170.10 1183.60 1196.40 1209.34 1222.40 1223.90 
GDP (Current $US 449.10 387.4 406.09 483.00 599.01 522.19 650.12 667.00 
prices) (bin) 
GDP (real growth 4.3 
rates) 
Inflation(% change) 16.32 
Exports 51.86 
Imports (cif) 58.44 
Current Account -4.48 
Balance 
International 
reserves 
Foreign debt 
Exchange Rate vs 
$US 
17.02 
44.79 
4.72 
3.9 
1.30 
61.27 
52.52 
11.89 
28.60 
52.52 
5.22 
8.0 
5.08 
70.45 
62.57 
3.02 
42.66 
60.80 
5.43 
Notes: mln=million, bln=billion, cif=imports on board 
13.2 
8.85 
80.52 
76.35 
5.82 
9.44 
69.30 
5.75 
13.8 11.9 9.7 9.2 
18.00 24.20 14.80 12.20 
90.97 119.82 155.77 158.3 
103.09 114.56 132.89 138.8 
-12.40 7.20 14.00 19.5 
21.20 
83.80 
5.80 
51.62 65.00 92.00 
90.00 100.00 120.00 
8.45 8.31 8.32 
Source: State Bureau of Statistics, China Country Risk Report, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
Ltd (PERC), Beijing, 1997, p. 3; State Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, 
various years; 
Increased opportunities were provided to township and village manufacturing 
enterprises. The township and village enterprises absorbed some of the surplus labour that 
emerged as agricultural efficiency increased. They began to compete for inputs and to sell to 
local consumers. They had somewhat less easy access to various subsidies, including cheap 
credit, and therefore had to be somewhat more efficient than state enterprises. They were 
consequently more flexible and more responsive to changes in market conditions than state 
enterprises. An important side effect was the introduction of market business methods, 
including payment by results in the enterprises affected, and by example, in other Chinese 
enterprises. Informal investment in export industries grew rapidly. State enterprises, after a 
period of improvement in the early 1980s, became less efficient, as managers and workers 
took over control in the late 1980s in their own short term interest (World Bank 1990). 
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Productivity of the township and village enterprises was hampered, however, by the low 
skills of workers and management, shortages of raw materials and uneconomic scales of 
production. Collective enterprises in urban areas ran into similar problems. They were often 
able, nevertheless, to profit by exploiting loopholes in dual pricing. 
Before 1979, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), controlled through the central planning 
system, transferred all their surplus funds to the State, while losses were covered by budget 
subsidies. Investment funds and some working capital balances were provided to the 
enterprises through the government budget in the form of grants. The banking system 
supplied additional working capital at highly subsidised rates. Wages were paid according to 
a centrally approved scale. The enterprises' responsibility was to fulfil quantitative output 
targets established by the plan regardless of their financial results. Managers therefore had 
little incentive to improve efficiency and productivity. The focus of SOE reform was on 
making the SOEs responsible for their own profits and losses by introducing autonomy of 
decision-making and incentives for managers. 
As in other centrally-planned economies that have not moved to private ownership, 
the reforms have not been effective. Taxes are decided by bargaining between enterprises and 
authorities, so that marginal tax rates vary substantially among SOEs (Tam 1991). A loss-
making enterprise is not taxed. This confusion of fiscal and financial measures has made 
taxation ineffectual. The limited duration of contracts for SOEs created incentives for 
management to focus on short-term profit maximisation. Costs differed among enterprises 
because of unequal access to subsidised raw materials and in their ability to sell at market 
rather than planned prices. These factors, together with price controls and varied access to 
cheap credit and budgetary subsidies, have continued to distort production and investment 
decisions. 
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Table 3.1.1 China: Gross Industrial Output and Shares of Industrial 
Enterprises, 1985-90 (100 million yuan, current prices) 
Types 1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
State-owned 3288 6302 6971 8250 10351 12343 13064 
77.6% 65.8% 62.3% 59.8% 56.8% 56.1% 54.6% 
Collective, 949 3117 3752 4782 6587 7858 8523 
Township & 22.4% 32.1% 33.5% 34.6% 36.1% 35.7% 35.6% 
Village 
Individual na 180 309 502 790 1058 1290 
1.9% 2.8% 3.6% 4.3% 4.8% 4.4% 
Foreign na 117 163 279 495 758 1047 
1.2% 1.4% 2.0% 2.7% 3.4% 4.4% 
TOTAL 4237 9716 11195 13813 18223 22017 23924 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: State Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of China, China Statistical Publishing House, 
Beijing, 1991. 
The government has attempted to reduce the interference of central and local 
authorities by the introduction of a contract system for some medium and large-scale 
enterprises as well as leasing arrangements for small enterprises. Mandatory planning has 
been reduced. The proportion of fixed investment by SOEs financed through the State budget 
declined, falling from 60 per cent in 1978 to about 14 per cent in 1988. The number of 
products that were allocated through the central output plan declined from about 250 items in 
the early 1980s to about 20 items in 1988 (Blejer and associates 1991 : 67), but provincial 
governments have often taken over the planning mechanisms. 
Although the reforms contributed to an increase in the growth of output by SOEs, 
their share in total industrial production fell from 78 per cent in 1978 and 66 per cent in 1985 
to 55 per cent in 1990 (Table 3.1.1). The increasing share of rural and urban collective 
enterprises and foreign enterprises reflected their greater dynamism compared to state 
enterprises. 
3.2 Economic Structure 
It has been nearly nineteen years since the beginning of China's market-oriented economic 
reform. During these years of gradual and continuous reform, the structure of the Chinese 
economy has changed significantly. Today, public ownership develops in conjunction with 
35 
other forms, as the strength of the market mechanism continues to grow, the government's 
method of control over the economy has slowly shifted from direct command to indirect 
macroeconomic interventions. 
According to the objective of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), the aim is to 
retain the predominance of public ownership, "SOEs will remain the backbone of the 
industrial sector but a breakthrough in solving their major and difficult problems has to be 
made in the years to come" supplemented by non-state and private ownership, while 
achieving an effective separation between state-ownership and control of enterprises (IMF 
Report, 1996: 51). As part of this system a dual-track ownership structure emerged. The most 
important component of the dual-track strategy has been the radical restructuring of the 
ownership pattern by the explosive growth of the non-state sector since 1984. The most 
prominent type of firm in the "non-state sector" is the community-owned enterprises in the 
rural areas known as township and village enterprises (TVEs). In 1988, the Seventh National 
People's Congress passed a constitutional amendment that endowed the legitimate status of 
the private economy (Developing Economics, 1996), and this sector has grown quickly in the 
years since then. 
At present there are five principal participants in the Chinese economy: 
1 ) state-owned enterprises 
2) collective enterprises-enterprises owned by local groups for which the 
government is not responsible for wages or similar obligations 
3) private enterprises-businesses operated by private individuals 
4) stock-share enterprises companies owned partially or wholly by 
share-holders, including companies partially owned by the State 
5) foreign-invested enterprises or joint ventures-enterprises owned at least 
25% by foreign individuals or companies. 
The private enterprises have been growing rapidly in the 1990s. By the end of 
1992, approximately 7.7 million (89 per cent) of the retail-sales outlets in China belong to 
private businesses. The number of self-employed business people has expanded to more than 
15 million in urban areas all over the country. The number of larger private enterprises in the 
country increased from 91,000 in 1989 to 420,000 in 1994 (China News Analysis, October 
1996). 
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The private sector has developed fastest along the South-East coast of China where 70 per 
cent of the country's private businesses are located. Another 19 per cent are in Central China 
and only 1 per cent are in the western part of the country. But one can make no mistake, the 
role of the private sector in the Chinese national economy today is still small, and the total 
number of salaried employees in the private sector is still relatively minor (5.35 million 
employees) (Economic Information Daily, May 1995). 
Table 3.2 China: Gross Output Value According To Ownership ( % ) 
State Collective Individual Other* 
1985 
1995 
64.9 
30.9 
* Mostly private 
32.1 
42.8 
1.8 
13.2 
1.2 
13.1 
Source: State Statistical Bureau of China, China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing, 1996, p. 75, 
It must be emphasised that the ·public sector has not been withering away, as 
suggested in claims that China is "growing out of the plan" e.g. (China News Analysis, 1 
October 1997). The state sector has actually retained its relative standing. SOEs produce 
approximately one third of industrial output and provide more than half the total investment in 
fixed assets. They employ more than 100 million people, representing 18 per cent of the 
overall number of employed and 70 per cent of the urban employed (staff and workers). 
There were 35 million more SOE workers in 1994 than in 1978 (Wing Thye Woo, 1995). 
3.2.1 SOEs 
A key question that has faced economic reformers in China is whether the continuation of 
public ownership represents an insurmountable barrier to the functioning of markets and 
efficient resource allocation. In contrast to Poland, China has consistently maintained its 
preference for public ownership as a means of achieving its vision of a socialist market 
economy. As envisaged by China's policymakers, such a system would be characterised by 
increased competition and the elimination of mandatory planning, but not necessarily by the 
replacement of SOEs with private ownership. The most difficult part of the whole economic 
reform is the restructuring of the SOEs. Many SOEs are loss-making and have become a big 
burden on the government budget. 
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The solutions taken into consideration by the government do not emphasise privatisation but 
rather mergers and take-overs of less efficient companies by successful ones, and include 
cooperation with private enterprises. The merging of enterprises, like the splitting up of 
enterprises into smaller units, has been the aspect of the economic restructuring process 
aimed at improving economic efficiency. However, certain organisational changes, especially 
if externally imposed by government authorities rather than determined by internal needs of 
the organisation, can have a negative impact. To avoid closure of a loss-making enterprise 
and the associated redundancies, local governments often order another thriving firm to 
merge with the loss-making one, a practice that, unless carefully organised, could 
unnecessarily burden a successful firm. 
The official line for reform is: 'Seize large enterprises, release small ones'. 'Seize the 
large' means massive state firms which are likely to lose more money than they earn become 
'the pillar of industry' and count on government support. By letting these firms buy up 
smaller enterprises and integrate vertically, Beijing wants them eventually to resemble South 
Korean chaebols, dominating the domestic market with the help of government protection 
before expanding overseas. 'Release the small' means that medium-sized factories are 
encouraged to explore new management incentives, to auction useless equipment, merge with 
other struggling plants-anything to keep production lines running (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, September 12, 1996). The 'large' category enterprises number approximately 
5,000, but account for 56 per cent of output value in the state-owned sector. They need to be 
reformed at all costs. The dead horses among them will be merged with profitable plants. 
On the other hand, local governments have been repeatedly told that the time has come 
to 'release and let live' the approximately 500,000 small SOE enterprises in the country. This 
'releasing' does not mean privatisation. The reform of small enterprises, their 'opening and 
setting free', remains controversial. The 'releasing and let live' policy takes many forms: 
joint-management by contracting, leasing, trusteeship, commission. Other formulas, 
however, modify ownership relations (purchase, annexation, share cooperative, sale) and 
such reforms remain controversial. 
Altogether, enterprise reform remains a 'weak link' in the reform of the economic 
structure. Between 1990 and 1995, the percentage of loss-making enterprises increased from 
27.6 to 43 per cent, and losses from 18 to 88.3 billion yuan. The Economic Information 
Daily sums up the situation in a few figures: in 1995, 14,000 large and medium-sized 
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enterprises had losses totalling 35 billion yuan-that is approximately 34 per cent of the profit 
made by those performing well. Some 5-7 per cent of SOEs have long stopped production, 
partly or fully, and these employ 7.5 million people (9.38 per cent of the total work force). A 
portion of workers were put on leave and sent home for as long as one year or more. In 
addition to 'on leave' surplus labor, many firms had surplus workers in their active work 
force as well. According to an ILO survey, 197 firms (or 66 per cent of those surveyed) 
reported having surplus labor in their active work force. Overall, for all firms, including 
those that did not believe they could cut jobs, managers estimated that on average, they could 
reduce employment by 14 per cent without affecting output. In other words, more than 14 per 
cent of the entire industrial work-force covered in the survey was concealed unemployment or 
'in-job' labour surplus (ILO Survey, 1996). A large quantity of the labor force was in a state 
of idleness, again causing a waste of labor resources. 
In 1996, the share of loss-making enterprises was as high as 47 per cent and for the 
first time total losses of SOEs exceeded total profits; in the first quarter of 1997, losses 
increased another 11 per cent. Also, total outstanding debt increased by 11 per cent in 1996 
and stood at 495.9 billion yuan (7 per cent of GDP) by the end of the year. 
The major limits to a thorough reform of the SOE sector are, however, the 
employment problem, the lack of an adequate social security system, limited management 
capacities and the existing political power structures. Up to 30 million SOE employees are 
considered redundant, adding to the 100-130 million rural surplus workers. The employment 
situation is not truly reflected in the official figures, which report a relatively constant low rate 
of urban unemployment of 3 per cent, while actual unemployment among industrial workers 
is estimated by experts of the ILO at more than 21 per cent. Officially, more than 10 million 
factory workers lost their jobs in 1996, but only 5.3 million were re-employed. Total 
employment is reported, however to have increased by 9 million (The Vienna Institute 
Report, 1997: 3). 
All across China, Beijing is trying to invigorate its lethargic state sector through 
experiments with management control. The goal is to create a stable of managers with enough 
entrepreneurial savvy to run the industrial behemoths when they are finally cut loose from 
state control. Transforming the system more broadly is an uphill challenge, and Beijing 
recently conceded defeat in its high-profile attempt to make 100 key enterprises responsible to 
shareholders. Overall, the slide continues. China's state sector is in worse shape now than at 
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any other time in its 19 years of economic reform (Far Eastern Economic Review, September 
12, 1996). Beijing is investing in declining industries. When that happens, it is choking off 
growth. Beijing considers that it is stabilising the economy to keep those people employed, 
but with so many workers coming into the job market, it is ultimately investing in instability. 
Many reformers recommend widespread bankruptcy, but that would tear an ugly gash in 
China's social fabric (for more details see, China News Analysis, September, 1996; Wong, 
Heady and Woo, 1995). Nonetheless, at the 15th Party Congress in October 1997, the Party 
leadership decreed that China would bite the bullet and allow more widespread bankruptcies 
and unemployment. 
3.3 The Communist Legacy 
Before 1978 the Chinese government, through the State Council and its associated 
commissions, ministries practised comprehensive central economic planning. The State 
Council was assigned responsibility for guiding economic development by drafting national 
economic plans and budgets and monitoring their implementation. Government intervention 
in the economy was pervasive. Central economic planners tried to make most of the decisions 
concerning consumption, production, employment, income distribution and investment. 
Production targets were assigned directly to SOEs and indirectly to collectives firms and rural 
production units. Sources of inputs, including raw materials and machinery for both 
agriculture and industry, were controlled by the central authorities. Prices of goods and 
services were set by the central and local governments with little reference to their cost of 
production and relative scarcities. 
This Soviet-type central planning by the central government resulted in gross 
economic inefficiency and slow growth for 30 years. Problems inherent in this economic 
system were partially recognised but not resolved by two cycles of centralisation and 
decentralisation of economic control over the period. Occasional moves to decentralisation 
sought to transfer some control from central to local governments without greater reliance on 
market forces. Vacillation over planning by the central government resulted in poorly 
administered economic activities and disorder across the regions. 
The economic growth achieved was largely the result of increasing the amounts of 
labour, capital and land employed, but there was little growth in factor productivity, or in per 
capita income or living standards. The problems confronting the Chinese economy were 
40 
similar to the problems encountered by other centrally planned economies. These problems 
were greatly exacerbated by the attempts at self-sufficiency which led to an inward orientation 
of the economy. Irrational pricing and isolation from foreign competition exacerbated the 
distortions created by the quantitative target planning, increasing overstaffing and inefficiency 
in production and an emphasis on product quantity and not quality. Biases against individual 
incentives and labour specialisation bolstered by rigid restrictions on the mobility of labour, 
the assignment of jobs and the system of lifetime employment led to low labour productivity. 
Service sectors, following Marxist theory, were neglected. The financial sector was 
underdeveloped as were transport and trade. 
3.4 Fiscal Management 
Changes in the structure of the Chinese economy and decentralisation of central government 
power had a great influence on the role of the government budget. In 1978, government 
budgetary revenues at all levels came to 35.3 per cent of GNP; in 1995 the comparable figure 
was only around 12 per cent. Government savings were negative. This has been of 
considerable concern for the Chinese government, especially when the transfer of 
responsibility of enterprises had been completed by the mid-1980s, but the share of revenue 
in GNP continued to decline. Trends in business savings are hard to ascertain due to a lack of 
data. However, it seems that enterprises' capacity to save has increased at a declining rate, as 
indicated by the trend in enterprise income during 1986-90. This is corroborated by similar 
trend in industrial profits. One possible reason for the slow down is the increase in losses due 
partly to the distorted price system but mainly to poor management. In addition, enterprises 
profits are squeezed from various sources, such as the burden of support for retired and 
disabled employees. 
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Table 3.4 China: Central Government's Budget Deficit, 1979-93 (Yuan bin) 
Year Revenue Expenditure Deficit Revenue/ Expenditure/ 
GDP GDP 
1978 112. l 111.1 1.0 31.2 31.0 
1979 110.3 127.4 -17.1 27.7 31.9 
1980 108.5 121.2 -12.7 24.3 27.1 
1981 108.9 111.5 -2.6 22.8 23.4 
1982 112.4 115.3 -2.9 21.6 22.2 
1983 124.9 129.2 -4.3 21.5 22.2 
1984 150.2 154.6 -4.4 21.6 22.2 
1985 186.6 184.5 2.1 21.8 21.6 
1986 226.0 233.l -7.1 23.3 24.0 
1987 236.8 244.9 -8.1 21.0 21.7 
1988 262.8 270.7 -7.9 18.7 19.3 
1989 294.8 304.0 -9.2 18.5 19.1 
1990 331.3 345.2 -13.9 18.7 19.5 
1991 358.3 381.4 -23.0 18.1 19.3 
1992 394.l 414.1 -20.0 15.0 15.7 
Note: Bln=billion 
Yuan-Chinese currency 
Source: State Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of China, China Statistical Publishing House, 
Beijing, pp. 31, 209, 1992; Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance Data, Ministry of Finance, 
Beijing, 1994. 
Scaled to GNP, budgetary revenues have fallen steadily to about one-third of their 
1978 level. Under the pressure of this erosion in revenue, budgetary expenditures have been 
cut back as well. Overt deficits have been kept to moderate levels: between 2 and 3 per cent of 
GNP in most years including 1995 (Beijing Review, 3-16 April 1996). Deficits of this size 
are not in themselves enough to destabilise an economy, but they are enough to largely 
eliminate the ability of policy-makers to use fiscal policy to affect the macroeconomy. 
As revenues and expenditure are closely related, the changes in revenues have had a 
big impact on the reduction in overall budgetary outlays. Reductions in expenditure have been 
concentrated in investment, defence outlays and subsidies. Budgetary outlays for investment 
were at their highest in 1978 at 16.2 per cent of GNP and have declined steadily since to only 
2.6 per cent of GNP in 1995. Military expenditures peaked in 1979 at 5.6 per cent of GNP 
and declined to 1.2 per cent of GNP in 1995. Subsidies, including price subsidies and 
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subventions to loss-making SOEs, peaked in 1981 at 8.2 per cent of GNP and declined to 
1.4 per cent of GNP by 1995 (Beijing Review, 3-16 April 1996). By contrast, government 
current expenditures have been maintained at almost exactly 10 per cent of GNP throughout 
the entire reform period. Despite the dramatic decline in revenues, the share of GNP allocated 
to administration, education and other ordinary government sectors has been maintained, 
thus the total revenue allocated to these sectors has also dropped dramatically. 
The main cause of the decline in budgetary revenues is clearly the plummeting result 
of remittances from the industrial SOEs. Also part of the problem was the old tax and 
budgetary system, under which SOE profit remittances funded the bulk of government 
activities. Since January 1994, a new tax system has been established which creates a nearly 
uniform value-added tax and profit tax that applies equally to all ownership forms. 
A serious problem faced by the Chinese leadership in the process of economic reform 
was that of inflation. Table 3.4.1 shows the annual rates of change in retail prices, market 
prices and the implicit GNP delator in the period 1980-90. None of these indicators 
accurately measure changes in the general price level, either because of their limited coverage 
or because of shortcomings in the methods of calculation. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
inflationary pressures made themselves felt in 1980, 1985 and 1988-89. The situation in 
1988-89 was particularly serious. In 1988 market prices surged by more than 30 per cent 
over the preceding year. Unlike previous increases in 1950 and 1960, inflation in the 1980s 
occurred during a period of rapid economic growth and restructuring, as well as opening up 
to the outside world. This makes the causes of the inflation unclear, as well as the extent to 
which it was related to economic reform. The same factors however may also exert pressure 
on the economy in the 1990s. 
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Table 3.4.1 China: Inflation 1980-90 (% increase over preceding year) 
Retail prices Market prices GNP delator 
1980 6.0 2.0 3.7 
1981 2.4 6.6 2.2 
1982 1.9 3.5 0 
1983 1.5 4.1 1.4 
1984 2.8 0.3 4.6 
1985 8.8 16.9 9.0 
1986 6.0 7.7 4.6 
1987 7.3 15.8 5.0 
1988 18.5 31.9 11.8 
1989 17.8 9.7 9.2 
1990 2.1 4.1 
1991 2.9 -1.5 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, Statistics of China's Commerce and External Economics Relations ( 1952-
88), Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, Beijing, various years. 
Inflation is a complex phenomenon, particularly in China, where reforms caused 
political and economic forces to interact, generating a mixture of open and repressed 
inflationary pressures, excess aggregate demand fuelled by monetary expansion, rising 
wages outstripping productivity increases, persistent structural imbalances and ineffective 
macro-economic policies. However, it appears that excess demand, rather than cost-push, 
was the principle cause, even though the other factors contributed to the problem. 
In recent years the government's target of keeping the inflation rate below 10 per cent 
has been accomplished. The target of a 'soft landing' of the economy was achieved in 1996. 
The rate of inflation was more than halved, from 14.8 per cent in 1995 to 6.1 per cent, if 
retail prices, the official measure, are considered, and from 17 .1 to 8.3 per cent, if the 
consumer price index is taken. However, a substantial increase in stock is reported, which 
means that the effective rate of growth of the economy is somewhat lower. Exports declining 
considerably during the first half of the year (-8.2 per cent), slowly started to recover in 1997 
(The Vienna Institute Monthly Report, May-September, 1997). In 1997 the Chinese economy 
was expected to grow slightly faster than in 1996. 
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The rapid decline of inflation was mainly due to the lower growth in the prices of consumers 
durables and was helped by a bumper grain harvest for the second consecutive year. In 
certain categories of consumer durables, e.g. electric household equipment and electronics, 
prices fell even in absolute terms, due to an over-supply caused by the over-investment 
during the boom period 1992-94 and due to a sluggish demand. The latter can be explained 
by the fact that the income of urban households, which is on average more than double that of 
rural residents, increased only at a moderate rate of 3.4 per cent, after allowing for inflation. 
Given the increased income inequality, this has left many urban families worse off than in 
1995. However, rural per capita income increased much faster (8 per cent), and total retail 
trade was up 13 per cent, even more than in 1995. 
3.5 Foreign Trade 
Before the reforms were begun China was an insignificant participant in international markets 
for goods and capital. China's foreign trade system was set up originally as a state monopoly 
according to the principles set down by Lenin. The foreign trade sector was highly 
centralised, with all decisions made by the central government's Foreign Trade Ministry, 
which had branches at provincial and local government levels. In 1977, the sum of imports 
and exports, or its total trade turnover, was less than $US 15 billion and it was only the 30th 
largest exporting country in the world. As shown in Table 3.5.1 its share of the world trade 
in that year was only 0.6 per cent, significantly less then in 1927-29, when China's trade 
attained its peak pre-communist levels, accounting for a little more than 2 per cent of world 
trade. China's role as a trading nation on the eve of reform was also significantly less than it 
had been in the 1950s when the Communist party launched its ambitious first five-year plan, 
which was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union (Lardy, 1994:3-33). 
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Table 3.5. China: Merchandise Trade (selected years 1927-93) 
Year Volume in $us billion % of world trade 
1927 1.33 2.1 
1928 1.53 2.3 
1929 1.44 2.1 
1953 2.37 1.5 
1957 3.11 1.4 
1959 4.38 1.9 
1962 2.66 0.9 
1970 4.59 0.7 
1975 4.75 0.8 
1977 14.80 0.6 
1978 20.64 0.9 
1980 38.14 0.9 
1985 69.60 0.9 
1990 115.41 1.6 
1992 165.61 2.2 
1993 195.72 2.5 
Source: State Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook of China, China Statistical Publishing House, 
Beijing, various years; The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Trade Outlook, 
Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relation and Trade, Beijing, various years._ 
Foreign trade has been playing a more and more important role in China's economy. 
In 1995, exports accounted for 21 per cent of China's GNP. In other words, 21 per cent of 
China's national production was accomplished through export. China's export composition 
has also experienced a great change. Before 1980 China's export consisted mainly of primary 
goods. More than one-quarter of China's exports were energy products, especially oil. This 
situation has, however, changed dramatically. Energy exports dropped from 23.1 per cent in 
1980 to 6.7 per cent in 1991, agricultural goods went from 24.7 per cent in 1980 to 15.8 per 
cent in 1991, and manufactured goods rose from 45.5 per cent in 1979 to 77.5 per cent in 
1991 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1992), which was much higher than the average (30 per 
cent) for other low-income countries and comparable to the level of many "upper-middle-
income countries" (World Bank, 1985:30), reflecting the improvement in China's export 
composition. During this period labour-intensive and low-class manufactured goods were the 
mainstream of China's exports. 
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In the 1990s, the situation has been further improved. Capital-knowledge-intensive exports 
have been increasing. In 1995 machinery and electronic products rose to 30 per cent of the 
total exports from less than 10 per cent in 1988. Another interesting change has been 
occurring in China's weapons exports. Since 1983, China has become the world's fourth 
largest seller of arms to the Third World. China's weapons sales rose to nearly 5 per cent 
between 1982 and 1988, from less than 1 per cent in 1978 (Harding, 1992). In 1987 the 
Chinese military's chief arms-trading company, Poly Group Corp, sold more than $US 500 
million in weapons. Some analysts believed that Poly was instrumental in the sale of CSS-2 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1987, a deal estimated at more than 
$US 2 billion (Far Eastern Economic Review, September 1996). 
The capital goods are regarded as the chief goal of China's importing strategy, although 
in most years since 1979, capital goods comprised only about 40 per cent of total imports, 
which was even less than that in 1950. It may reflect the fact that China's dependence on 
foreign technology has decreased somewhat. To some degree it is a consequence of the 
policy to reduce imports of complete sets of equipment. According to official statistics, 
imports of technology reached $US 27 billion in the 1980s and were distributed throughout 
75 sectors and all provinces. It is difficult to evaluate exactly how much of a role the imported 
technology has played in China's economic development due to the absence of enough 
statistical material. According to official opinion, it has remarkably improved China's 
technological level and narrowed the existing technological gap between China and developed 
countries. An estimation made by an official in China's National Planning Committee is that 
about 60 per cent of added GNP every year was attributed to increased efficiency created by 
the introduction of technology. It is also said that most of the 329 products that were awarded 
national prizes in 1989 had some relation to imported technology. Since 1984, each US dollar 
import of technology created a production value of 3.9 RMB, tax income 0.91 RMB and 
foreign exchange earnings $US 0.19 (People's Daily, August 1990). The total product value 
created by the import of technology reached 87.42 billion RMB. The imported technology 
has also built up China's export ability. Now China is exporting such products as televisions, 
refrigerators and tape-recorders, produced by imported production lines. A survey, released 
in 1990, reports that 13 per cent of the equipment in all Chinese enterprises and 
approximately 15,600 types of products reached world standards due to the introduction of 
Western technology (People's Daily, August 1990). The import of technology, Chinese 
economists believed, had enabled China to narrow its technological gap with Western 
countries in many industrial sectors. 
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Industrial raw materials and semi-finished manufactured goods constitute the largest 
proportion of total imports. In most years the proportion was 40-60 per cent. This pattern of 
imports is very similar to that of developed countries and dissimilar to that of developing 
countries. China has a large territory and is rich in resources, however, the endowment per 
capita is quite limited. This situation has been worsened by the inefficient use of resources 
and the pattern of industrialisation started in the 1950s, which emphasises resource-hungry 
industries. Resource use per unit of GNP in China was almost three times as high as in 
developed countries. As a result the higher the growth rate of the economy, the greater the 
import of raw materials. 
From 1984 to 1988, when the average annual growth rate of its GNP was 11.56 per 
cent, a vast quantity of rolled steel, totalling 73 million tonnes, was imported (Statistical Year 
Book for Asia and Pacific 1982-1989, 1990). After 1990 a new phenomenon emerged. Most 
of the foreign direct investment, especially from Hong Kong and Taiwan, was being con-
. centrated on assembly and processing projects, and was therefore heavily dependent on 
imports of semi-finished products. Thus, the growing number of foreign-funded projects 
importing raw materials and semi-finished products increased. This trend will probably 
continue for years. A research report of the Institute of Economic Reform Studies in the State 
Council says, "China's rapid economic development was based on its large quantity of 
imports. (World Economic Herald, July 1987). 
From the early 1960s to the early 1980s, China purchased large quantities of grain 
from abroad to supplement inadequate domestic harvests. Along side this, consumer goods 
accounted for only 15-25 per cent of total imports before 1983. The rural reform started in the 
early 1980s enabled China to drastically reduce imports of food-stuffs, which had fallen from 
approximately 20 per cent of total imports in 1983 to about 3.4 per cent in 1986. After 1987, 
however, the stagnation in economic reform led China to increase its imports of grain again, 
so that total imports rose to 4.4 per cent in 1991. It is expected that China will continue to 
increase its imports of grain until the end of this century. In the mid-1980s, China's imports 
of durable consumer goods increased noticeably, rising from about 1. per cent of total imports 
in 1978 to more than 5 per cent in 1984 and 1985 before dropping off slightly in 1986. The 
imports of automobiles rose to 7.6 per cent in 1985 from less than 1 per cent in 1980 (China 
Statistical Year Book, 1992). 
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After 1987 the Chinese government tightened the imports of durable consumer goods again. 
Moreover, the imported production lines of these goods have been put into production 
successfully. As a result, the imports of durable consumer goods dropped to 2.59 per cent of 
total imports and automobiles to 1.9 per cent in 1988. As the increase in imports of durable 
consumer goods did not completely offset the decline in purchasing of foreign foodstuffs, 
consumer products as a whole made up a smaller share of China's imports in the mid-1980s 
than they did between the 1970s and the early 1980s. Since the mid-1960s, Western 
countries have become China's major trading partners. Between 1987 and 1990 the West's 
dominant position decreased marginally. Its contribution to China's imports dropped from 
66.9 per cent in 1986 to 49.2 per cent in 1991 because China reduced its imports of durable 
consumer goods and automobiles, although retaining its imports of grain at a low level. The 
Western embargo after the Tiananrnen Square Massacre of 1989 was another factor. The 
proportion of China's exports to the West also dropped to 34.7 per cent in 1991 from 40.2 
per cent in 1986 due to China's increasing export to South-East Asian countries and the 
increased protectionism against China's labour-intensive exports (China Statistical Year 
Book, 1992). 
During the period 1979-1989, China had a trade deficit with Western countries, while 
at the same time earning a surplus in trade with developing countries. However, China began 
to earn a surplus in trade with most Western countries as well after 1990. Japan was China's 
largest trading partner. Japan's exports to China mostly consisted of machinery, steel, 
automobiles and other durable consumer goods. China's purchases from Japan were not fully 
offset by its exports, a majority of which were textiles, petroleum and coal. Between 1978 
and 1993 China ran huge trade deficits with Japan, except for one year. Although China 
reduced its imports of automobile, steel and durable consumer goods after 1987, the trade 
deficit with Japan was still a major issue in China's foreign trade. In 1993 this deficit 
accounted for 60 per cent of China's total trade deficit (China Trade Report, March 1996). 
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Table 3.5.1 China's Top Trading Partners, 1994-96 (total trade in $US bin) 
1994 1995 1996 
Japan 47.9 57.5 59.8 
20.2% 20.5% 20.9% 
Hong Kong 41.8 44.6 46.8 
17.7% 15.9% 16.8% 
us 35.4 40.8 44.8 
15.0% 14.5% 16.8% 
EU 31.5 40.3 43.9 
13.3% 14.4% 16.2% 
ASEAN 13.2 18.4 21.2 
5.6% 6.6% 8.7% 
Taiwan 16.3 17.9 18.8 
7.0% 6.4% 7.3% 
South Korea 11.7 17.7 18.5 
5.0% 6.0% 6.9% 
Russia 5.1 5.5 5.9 
2.2% 1.9% 2.1% 
Others 31.8 32.3 33.4 
14.0% 13.8% 13.5 
Total 236.7 280.8 324.6 
100% 100% 100% 
Source: The China Business Review, China Data, The China Business Review, Beijing, various issues. 
Hong Kong, China's second largest trading partner (Table 3.5.1) (between 1989 and 
1992 Hong Kong was the largest ahead of Japan), comprised 17 per cent of China's total 
value of exports and imports in 1993. In 1989 this percentage reached 32.1 per cent. From 
Hong Kong, China earns a large trade surplus every year. Of China's exports to Hong Kong 
about 40 per cent were consumed in the territory, while the remaining 60 per cent were re-
exported to third party countries like the United States and those countries (or areas) with 
whom China had no diplomatic or direct relations, such as South Korea (before 1993), 
Taiwan and Indonesia (before 1992). Similarly, about 75 per cent of China's imports from 
Hong Kong came from outside the territory (China Statistical Year Book, 1992). 
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Table 3.5.2 China-US Trade, 1988-95 ($US bin) 
Year US exports US imports US balance 
1988 5.0 8.5 -3.5 
1989 5.8 12.0 -6.2 
1990 4.8 15.2 -10.4 
1991 6.2 19.0 -12.8 
1992 7.5 25.7 -18.3 
1993 8.8 31.5 -22.8 
1994 9.3 38.8 -29.5 
1995 11.7 45.6 -33.9 
1996 12.6 47.3 -34.7 
Source: The China Business Review, China Data, The China Business Review, Beijing, p. 41, May-June 
1996 and 1997. 
The US share of China's trade increased from 6 per cent in 1978 to 14 per cent in 
1993 (Table 3.5.2). From Chinese and UN statistics, China produced a trade deficit for all 
the years from 1978 to 1991. In 1993 China's trade surplus with the US was $US 22.8 
billion. As mentioned above, some of China's exports to the US were through a third country 
(area), like Hong Kong. Therefore, according to US statistics, the US had a large trade 
deficit with China after 1985. In 1993 this deficit was $US 22.8 billion. That is to say, a 
large amount of the surplus in trade with Hong Kong in China's statistics is actually China's 
surplus in trade with the United States (The Central, Daily, July 1994 and Newsweek, May 
1991). 
Since 1984 China has also rapidly increased its trade with Taiwan and South Korea. 
In 1994 Taiwan was the fifth and South Korea the sixth largest trading partner of China. 
China has also expanded its trade with the former Soviet Union, the proportion of which, in 
China's total foreign trade, rose to 3.8 per cent in 1991 from 1.7 per cent in 1983 (China 
Statistical Year Book, 1992). Trade with Russia has given China a more diversified set of 
partners. China could thus export consumer goods that were unable to find a good market in 
Western countries. On the other hand, the Russians could sell industrial equipment, which, 
though not the most advanced in the world, would be useful to Chinese enterprises. Rapidly 
expanding trade reminds the Russians of what can be gained from peaceful behaviour and a 
full normalisation of relations with China. 
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A Chinese economist has pointed out to me that given "China's vast size, huge population, 
and large economy, it would be unrealistic to attempt to modernise the entire national 
economy through a growth in exports in the manner of the four little tigers in Asia". For 
China, import substitution and export substitution would have to co-exist for a long time. It 
would appear that China can actually follow a policy of import substitution as a means of 
developing its capital and consumer goods, and it may also encourage the export of 
manufactured goods (Kleinberg, 1990). There is, therefore, the potential for the two forms to 
supplement and permeate each other. 
3.6 Poland: An Introduction 
In contrast to China's gradual reforms, Poland has embraced the swifter 'Big Bang' approach 
to economic reform. Profound institutional, economic and technological changes have 
occurred in the Polish economy since the launching of the radical economic programme in 
1990. As a result, Poland has achieved stronger economic growth and has become a much 
more open economy, more strongly linked to the advanced economies of the OECD 
countries. Most macroeconomic performance indicators improved markedly during the 
transitional period (Table 3.6), a trend broadly confirmed so far in 1997. Per capita income in 
Poland has been rising rapidly over the past few years and present standards are close to one 
third of the OECD average (valued at purchasing power parity exchange rates). 
Table 3.6 Poland: Macroeconomic Indicators, 1991-96 ( % growth rates) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Real GDP -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 5.5 
Consumption 7.5 3.5 4.6 3.0 4.5 4.0 
Gross fixed investment -4.5 2.8 2.9 9.2 19.0 23.1 
Government spending -26.6 10.4 -2.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 
Export revenues -1.7 10.8 1.0 20.5 21.4 25.8 
Industrial output -11.9 2.8 6.4 12. l 9.4 10.6 
Agricultural output -1.6 -12.7 6.8 -9.3 13.0 14.2 
Unemployment rate 11.9 13.6 16.4 16.0 14.9 12.7 
Budget deficit(% of GDP) 3.8 6.0 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 
Consumer price index 70.0 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 16.8 
Gross profit margin (%) 4.6 2.1 2.8 4.1 4.2 4.8 
Net profit margin -1.3 -1.5 -0.5 1.7 2.0 2.6 
Source: Warsaw School of Economics, Poland-International Economic Report, World Economy Research 
Institute, Warsaw, 1997, p. 39 
52 
In 1991-95, the Polish economy grew more than twice as fast as the OECD average. Growth 
became increasingly broad-based, even though sharp sectoral contrasts persisted. To a large 
extent, the strength of the expansion resulted from rapid integration with Western Europe and 
into the world economy at large, as witnessed by an upsurge in exports and imports (Figure 
3.6.). Helped by improving profitability and tax inducements, fixed investment boomed, and 
in 1995 its contribution to the expansion of GDP stood at a par with that of household 
consumption, boding well for future growth potential. 
Figure 3.6 Poland: The take off (index 1991=100) 
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Figure 3.6.1 Poland: Output: international comparison (Real GDP, 
1989=100) 
105 
11'.m 
115 
90 
85 
Ill 
~ 
tlllll 1!1190 
Poland was the first among the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to 
recover following the initial output collapse associated with transition (Figure 3.6.1 ). The 
pace of real GDP growth rose continuously from 1992, reaching 5 .2 per cent in 1994 and 7 
per cent in 1995. Actual growth thus significantly exceeded the projections for 1994 (4.5 per 
cent) and 1995 (5.0 per cent) included in the Strategy for Poland (Table 3.6.1). 
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Tab 3.6.1 Strategy for Poland: Macroeconomic Framework* 
Targets in Strategy for Poland Outcomes 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1994 1995 1996 
GDP 4.5 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.2 7.0 5.8 
Consumption 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.0 
Gross fixed investment 6.0 
Export volume1 6.0 
Imports volume1 2.5 
Foreign trade balance (in % -2.1 
of GDP)1 
CPI (end year) 23.6 
Employment -0.3 
Unemployment rate (in % 17 .2 
of labour force, end year)2 
Labour productivity 
Average wage (gross) 
Average pension (gross) 
State budget revenue 
State budget expenditure 
State budget deficit (in % 
of GDP) 
Public debt (in % of GDP) 
4.9 
1.5 
6.5 
5.3 
8.0 
3.7 
77.7 
7.0 
7.0 
4.0 
-1.7 
16.1 
0.7 
16.7 
4.3 
2.8 
1.4 
4.3 
8.4 
3.3 
76.9 
8.0 
8.0 
5.2 
-1.7 
12.0 
1.3 
15.6 
3.8 
3.0 
3.1 
4.8 
1.8 
2.8 
74.1 
8.0 
9.0 
6.0 
-1.5 
8.7 
2.0 
14.0 
3.5 
3.1 
1.0 
5.5 
2.1 
2.5 
72.4 
9.2 
18.3 
13.4 
-4.7 
29.5 
1.1 
16.0 
4.1 
1.6 
4.1 
7.1 
6.7 
2.7 
69.5 
18.5 
16.7 
20.5 
-5.2 
21.6 
0.3 
14.0 
6.7 
4.6 
3.2 
4.4 
4.2 
2.6 
56.2 
18.9 
17.4 
21.6 
-5.6 
15.6 
0.8 
12.4 
8.9 
3.4 
2.8 
5.3 
3.8 
2.8 
54.3 
1. Customs-based, excluding unrecorded trade. In 1996, net unrecorded exports may have amounted 
to close to 5 per cent of GDP. 
2. Registered unemployment 
Note: Year-average real percentage change unless noted 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 15; Ministry of 
Finance, Strategy for Poland, Ministry of Finance, Warsaw, June 1994; GUS, Macroeconomic 
indicators, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, various years. 
Growth has become increasingly broad-based as the expansion has unfolded. 
Whereas in aggregate terms growth was initially confined to private firms, output in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) also bounced back starting around 1994. In industry, the volume 
of sales by private entities, which had soared by 34 per cent annually in 1991-93, rose further 
by 26 per cent annually in 1994-95. Sales of industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
which had continued to contract through 1993, picked up in 1994, rising by 4 per cent. In 
1995, they shrank by 1 per cent. However, the underlying performance of SOEs is 
understated by these figures, which do not take into account privatisation, and those figures 
of private firms are correspondingly overstated. If changes in name were taken into account, 
55 
it would probably appear that activity in SO Es continued to expand in 1995, albeit more 
slowly than in 1994. 
Table 3.6.2 Poland: Growth of Value-Added by Sector (in % )t 
Share in 1993 1994 1995 1996 
GDP 
1992 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 6.8 5.7 -14.9 11.6 12.3 
Industry 34.0 8.8 10.3 9.9 12.8 
Construction 7.8 1.1 2.7 7.3 8.6 
Trade and repair of consumer goods 13.1 5.8 -1.5 4.4 5.9 
Hotels and restaurants 0.4 2.3 7.3 5.9 8.7 
Transport, storage and communication 6.2 -5.3 0.5 3.1 5.4 
Financial intermediations 0.5 29.1 102.l 19.4 34.6 
Public administration and defence 6.1 5.2 7.8 4.1 3.6 
Education 3.8 0.1 10.3 1.4 3.2 
Health care and social security 4.2 0.5 4.1 2.9 3.4 
Other 13.0 -8.4 5.2 3.9 3.4 
l. Preliminary 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 16; GUS, Bulletin 
Statystyczny, Central Statistical Office, Warsaw, various years. 
Striking contrasts across broad sectors of the economy persisted in 1994, when 
value-added was rising by 10 per cent in industry, but growth was negative in trade, 
transportation and construction (Table 3.6.2). Agricultural value-added collapsed by 15 per 
cent in 1994, largely because of a severe drought. 1996 growth rates were slightly more 
uniform, with value-added increasing 5.9 per cent in trade, 8.6 per cent in construction and 
13 per cent in industry. Agricultural output rebounded, with value-added up almost 12 per 
cent, reflecting a much better harvest (OECD Report, 1997). Within industry, more and more 
branches participated in the overall expansion: the number of major products for which output 
was still declining dropped from 36 out of 62 in 1992 to 16 in 1994-95 (see Appendix 3.1, 
Table 1). The fastest growth in gross output was recorded in manufacturing, up 13 per cent 
in 1994 and 12 per cent in 1995 (Figure 3.6.3). The more dynamic industries included 
several technology-intensive ones, such as electronics, telecommunications equipment, 
automotive, precision instruments and machinery. 
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Figure 3.6.2 Poland: Production in the Main Industrial Sectors (1992 
Ql=lOO, seasonally adjusted) 
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At the regional level as well, an increasing number of voivodships (Polish 
administrative areas) experienced growth, with gross industrial output rising in almost two 
thirds of the 49 voivodships in 1992, and in all but one voivodship by 1994. At the same 
time the dispersion of regional growth rates declined, while the proportion of voivodships 
recording double digit growth rates surged from one quarter to two thirds. In 1995 however, 
as the pace of industrial growth nation-wide decrease from 13 to 9 per cent, the dispersion of 
regional growth rates rose anew. In cumulative terms, the dispersion has been considerable, 
implying that disparities at the yearly frequency did not mainly reflect a lack of short-run 
synchronisation across voivodships, but that significant and lasting differences in dynamism 
merged. Indeed, industrial output declined by 10 per cent between 1991 and 1995 in the most 
depressed area (Legnickie voivodship) and surged by 40 per cent in the most dynamic one 
(Nowosadeckie voivodship). 
Since the liberalisation of most prices m 1989-90, inflation has been steadily 
declining, and by the end of 1996, the 12-month CPI inflation rate was down to its lowest 
point since 1987 reaching 13.8 per cent. Sporadic short-run deviations from these trends 
have been observed, linked to seasonal factors, supply-side shocks, or tax measures, but, on 
the whole, inflation has been sustained, if extremely gradual (Figure 3.6.4). Inflation has, 
however, been slower than targeted by the government in its budgets: the end-year CPI 
inflation objectives for 1994-95 were exceeded by large margins, with outcomes of 29.5 per 
cent in 1994 (against a target of 23 per cent) and 21.6 per cent in 1995 (against a target of 17 
percent), but in 1996 come down to 13.8 percent. Overall, inflation remained much higher 
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than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but came down below the level recorded in 
Hungary (Figure 3.6.4). Relatively tight financial policies, including effective hard budget 
constraints, have contributed to maintain the disinflation trend in 1996-97 period. 
Figure 3.6.3. Poland: Inflation · International Comparison (CPI, end-year 
percentage change) 
Figure 9. INFLATION: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
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3.7 Economic Structure 
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Between 1989 and 1996, the nature of the Polish economy changed radically. The structure 
of the supply side changed considerably during the first half of the 1990s, largely due to 
shifts in relative prices. At the broadest level, the share of services in output soared from 35 
per cent to 53 per cent, while that of industry declined from 44 per cent to 33 per cent (see 
Table 3.7). The share of agriculture fell from 13 per cent in 1989 to 7 per cent in 1996. By 
1995, the share of services was still below the OECD average of approximately 68 per cent. 
The share of agriculture stood at about the same level as in New Zealand, Ireland and 
Portugal. 
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Table 3. 7 Poland: Main Indicators of Economic Structure 
Population million 38.6 
GDP per head PPS-ECU (1995) 5300 
as % of EU-15 average per cent (1995) 31 
Structure of production: share 
in Total Gross Value Added per cent 
-agriculture 7.6 
-industry 33.3 
-services 53.1 
-construction 6.0 
Gross foreign debt/GDP percent 32 
Exports of goods & services percent 22 
/GDP 
Stock of FDI* billion ECU 4.0 
ECUperhead 100 
Note: all data for 1996 unless otherwise indicated 
* FDI stock converted at end-1996 exchange rate of 1 ECU=$US1.25299 
Source: EU Commission, Poland-EU Membership, EU Commission Services, Brussels, July 1997, p. 18; 
Centre for Poland Transformation, Poland-Statistical Report, European Bank for Reconstructing and 
Development (EBRD), London, 1997 
The decline in value-added was relatively larger in industry in 1990-91 and the 
subsequent recovery swifter. At a more disaggregated level, the relative importance of the 
various branches within industry underwent durable changes. For example, the share of 
mining and quarrying plummeted between 1989 and 1995 from 13 to 5 per cent. 
Turning to the structure of supply by ownership types, the shares of the private sector 
doubled over the period under consideration, from 28 per cent in 1989 to 56 per cent in 1996. 
It had thus regained most of the ground lost under central planning. On the employment side, 
the share of private activity rose less, from 47 per cent in 1989 to 65 per cent in 1996. Even 
in traditionally wholly public services such as health care and education, the share of private 
providers is no longer trivial. The change in the composition of output and the increase in the 
role of private entities reflected to a large extent the dynamism of new private firms, 
particularly the smaller ones. The number of businesses soared in the early 1990s, helped by 
relatively liberal rules governing the establishment of new ventures. At the end of 1996, the 
Polish economy counted over 2 million enterprises. The greater vitality of smaller and leaner 
firms has translated into a decline in the relative importance of the larger ones. 
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The recomposition of output has reflected the change in the nature and content of demand. 
State orders, rationing through official channels and partly compensatory transactions in 
shadow markets ceased. Likewise, the rules governing foreign trade were completely 
overhauled, giving rise to new export and import potential and confronting domestic 
producers with heightened competitive pressures. 
Among domestic components of aggregate demand, a major shift involved the re-
balancing of investment and consumption. At current prices, the share of gross fixed capital 
formation in GDP declined from 22 per cent in the mid-1980s to about 17 per cent in 1995, 
and that of stockbuilding from 7 per cent to 1 per cent, while the share of total consumption 
expanded from 70 to 82 per cent. To some extent, the contraction in the share of total 
investment was the manifestation of a permanent shift from the inefficient regime of over-
accumulation of capital and repressed consumption to a less constrained and more balanced 
one. Consumption patterns also changed considerably, as the choice sets faced by consumers 
expanded. Within household consumption, the assortment of foods purchased underwent 
major changes. At the same time, the share of housing, commuting and health care 
expenditures increased sharply, reflecting the commercialisation of heretofore heavily 
subsidised or simple public services. 
The share of foreign trade in GDP increased significantly between 1989 and 1996, 
with exports of goods and services rising from 19 per cent to 26 per cent and imports from 
15 per cent to 24 per cent on a national accounts basis. Import penetration in industry 
doubled, with imports rising from 14.5 per cent of industrial sales in 1989 to 30 per cent in 
1996, while the share of exports in industrial sales increased from 14 per cent to 23 per cent 
in 1996. At the same time, dramatic changes occurred in the direction and content of external 
trade. Geographically, the lifting of the corset imposed by the former Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the recessions in the other transitional countries prompted 
a massive switch from East to West. The share of trade with OECD countries rose from one 
half to three quarters, while that with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe declined 
sharply. 
The composition of trade flows also changed considerably during the first half of the 
1990s. Based on a classification of goods according to the 21 lines of the EU combined 
nomenclature, the share of natural resource intensive exports declined (to 45 per cent). So did 
the share of exports embodying a relatively large proportion of skilled labour, capital and 
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technology (to 33 per cent). Correspondingly, the share of exports intensive in low-skill 
labour rose by 10 percentage points, consistent with the increasing importance of outward 
processing. 
On the import side, the share of natural resource-intensive purchases dropped by 7 
percentage points. The share of imports intensive in skilled labour, capital and technology 
remained stable, at close to one half. On this very aggregated basis, Poland by 1995 had 
revealed a comparative advantage in sectors intensive in low-skilled labour and natural 
resources. 
3. 7 .1 Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
Moving to a market economy is clearly intimately linked with the privatisation of state-owned 
property and the restructuring of production processes. For the economy as a whole, it is 
estimated that 60 per cent of GDP (EU Report, 1997:23) is generated in the private sector. 
The "small-scale" privatisation of retail, catering and service sectors was more or less 
completed between 1990 and 1992. The "large-scale" privatisation, on the other hand, was 
slow to take off. Up to now, few of the large enterprises have actually completed the 
privatisation process. The private sector's share in the creation of industrial output reached 52 
per cent in 1996. Privatisation is slow in the energy and telecommunication sectors and is 
strongly resisted in the area of postal and transport services. The process was given some 
impetus in 1995 with the launch of the mass privatisation programme through the sale of 
vouchers. 
The relatively slow start of large-scale privatisation does not mean that changes in the 
economy as a whole have not taken place; indeed some large enterprises have succeeded in 
restructuring to a certain extent while remaining state-owned. However, the extension of the 
private sector has to large extent come from the birth of new enterprises. This was made 
possible by the liberal rules on establishing businesses, modest tax incentives, decentralised 
trade policy and currency convertibility. 
The speed of restructuring depends in part on the access to new investment. This can 
be accumulated through retained earnings, borrowed domestically, acquired through sales of 
shares or brought in from abroad. Due to the slow privatisation of large enterprises, the 
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borrowing of enterprises has been rather limited, but FDI has recently begun to flow into 
Poland as opportunities for investment have expanded (for further details about SOEs and 
privatisation see Dabrowski, 1995; Wolfgang Quaisser, Richard Woodward and Barbara 
Blaszczyk, 1995; Maurice Ernst, Michael Alexeev and Paul Marer, 1996). 
3.8 The Communist Legacy 
Before 1989 the Polish economy struggled through a decade of mounting political and 
economical problems which were due mainly to the effects of central planning and ideological 
constraints by the Communist Party. Planning became largely a personalised bargaining 
process of the 'vanguard party' which degenerated into cults of personality and abuses of 
position by the nomenklatura. The deep inefficiencies of planning became increasingly 
evident with time. Heavy industries such as machine building and metallurgy were 
emphasised, while development of consumer goods lagged. SOEs had compulsory targets, 
administrative allocation of inputs, very limited autonomy, arbitrary shifting of assets and 
appointment of management by the Party bodies (Balcerowicz, 1995). 
Decades of bureaucratic allocation created serious distortions, with some sectors 
(particularly heavy industry) massively overbuilt and others (light industry and services) 
severely repressed. Relative prices diverged greatly from market patterns, and this meant 
massive explicit or implicit subsidies among sectors. Energy, housing, public transport and 
staple foods were extraordinarily cheap, whereas consumer manufactures, if available at all, 
were often shoddy. Pervasive shortages allowed firms to operate in 'sellers' markets and 
reduce incentives to improve quality. With near complete state ownership, enterprises lacked 
the defined property rights that spur work effort and profit-making in market economies. 
Firms had little reason to use inputs efficiently and strong incentives to hoard both labour and 
raw materials. Many firms added negative value; at world prices the cost of their inputs 
would have exceeded the value of their output. 
In 1980 food price increases led to a series of strikes inspired by the union-led 
Solidarity movement. Poland defaulted on its international debt obligations. Unable to service 
one of the highest foreign debts in the world for over a decade, it could not borrow abroad 
anymore. The state-controlled part of the economy stagnated completely, and acute shortages 
occurred, even of basic commodities. The country was heading for hyperinflation. The 
Polish economy was clearly heading for collapse. Given this background, the Polish 
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authorities had little choice but to embark on an ambitious stabilisation programme in 1990, 
designed to arrest the decline in the currency (zloty) and to stabilise the overall price level. 
3.9 Fiscal Management 
Fiscal reform was crucial as the role of the government was redefined and the revenue 
sources changed. The reform of the tax system was radical and rapid: corporate tax, income 
tax and VAT were introduced by 1993. Changes in the social security system were begun, 
but further reforms were required as the deficit of social security funds continued to increase. 
Total expenditure was about 50 per cent of GDP. Subsidies to firms, which in the 
1980s formed a high percentage of government expenditure, still constituted 6 per cent of 
GDP in 1992. Explicit subsidies in the government budget have since been reduced to less 
then 2 per cent of GDP. Enterprise support has recently re-emerged in the context of 
restructuring programmes, mainly for the coal sector and for toxic waste containment. 
Implicit subsidies in the form of tax and social security arrears have also not been completely 
eliminated and new exemptions have been created by the establishment of free economic 
zones. Since 1993, the cash deficits of the state budget and of the general government (i.e. 
including local budgets, social security and other extra-budgetary funds) have remained 
below 3 per cent of GDP, even excluding privatisation receipts other than leasing revenue 
(amounting to 0.8 per cent of GDP in 1995) (see Table 3.9.1 and Appendix 3.2, for a more 
detailed account of Poland's national budget). 
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Table 3.9 Poland: General Government Revenues, Expenditures and 
Balance (in % of GDP) 
State Bud~et 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total revenue1 34.8 43.9 45.1 47.6 48.3 47.8 48.2 
Including transfers 34.8 26.1 27.2 29.5 30.0 29.3 29.3 
Excluding transfers 34.8 25.9 27.1 29.4 30.0 29.2 29.3 
Local budgets 4.6 3.9 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.9 
Extra-budgetary funds 11.3 10.4 10.9 10.5 10.8 11.0 11.6 
State extra-budgetary units 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 
Local extra-budgetary units .. 0.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 
Total expenditure1 45.1 45.8 50.0 49.9 50.5 49.7 50.9 
Including transfers 34.6 29.9 33.2 32.3 32.7 31.9 31.8 
Excluding transfers 26.9 20.5 21.3 20.7 20.6 21.7 21.8 
Local budgets 4.3 4.2 4.6 5.4 5.4 6.2 
Extra-budgetary funds 16.2 17.9 20.8 20.7 20.9 19.2 19.6 
State extra-budgetary units 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 
Local extra-budgetary units 1.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 
Total balance1 2.8 -2.0 -4.9 -2.3 -2.2 -1.8 -2.8 
Including transfers 0.2 -3.8 -6.0 -2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -2.7 
Excluding transfers 7.9 5.4 5.8 8.7 9.3 7.6 7.3 
Local budgets .. 0.3 -0.3 -1.2 -1.0 -0.9 -1.3 
Extra-budgetary funds -5.0 -7.4 -9.9 -10.2 -10.1 -8.1 -8.1 
State extra-budgetary units -0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.1 
Local extra-budgetary units -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 
Memorandum items: 
Nominal GDP (in bln zl) 56.0 80.9 114.9 155.8 210.4 286.0 344.6 
1. Excluding transfers between the state budget, local budgets, extra-budgetary funds and extra-
budgetary units 
2. Bln=billion, zl=zloty 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 37 
Both in 1994 and 1995, higher-than-projected growth and inflation helped contain the 
deficit of the state budget below target. The growth bonus broadened the real tax base. The 
net impact of extra inflation was also positive, as in the short run the expenditure side of the 
budget was less indexed than the revenue side. Fiscal intakes, however, did not rise as much 
as the size of the unexpected increase in nominal GDP might have suggested, since exports 
and investments, which are relatively lightly taxed, turned out to contribute more than 
projected to growth, and also as a result of tariff cuts and falling National Bank of Poland 
(NBP) profits. In the circumstances, the absence of a tangible improvement in the fiscal 
deficit in 1995, which would have helped mitigate the inflationary impact of money growth, 
was somewhat disappointing. The other general government bodies, after transfers from the 
state budget displayed a small surplus, amounting to 0.5 per cent of GDP in 1994 and 0.8 per 
cent of GDP in 1995 (OECD Report, 1997). Developments in this area are dominated by the 
finances of social security, which account for over two thirds of the general government 
expenditures incurred outside the state budget. While contributions were buoyed by the swift 
growth of the wages bill, outlays grew rapidly as well. 
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Fiscal decentralisation made some headway. A number of expenditures were in the process of 
being devolved from the central to the local level, with a view to improve efficiency by 
having decisions taken at administrative levels closer to the final expenditure point. In 
particular, a November 1995 law transferred a number of tasks, (including road maintenance, 
the running of primary schools, social assistance facilities, local health care services, and 
local cultural institutions) from the centre to 46 large cities (in line with a pilot programme 
launched in 1994). The law also provided for the transfer of financial resources, inter alia, in 
the form of the allocation to those cities of a share of the personal income tax. 
3.10 Foreign Trade 
The collapse of communism and the demise of "international" institutions created by the 
USSR to control its client states, resulted in a breakdown of trade patterns established in the 
1949-1989 period. Between 1990 and 1995, annual per capita recorded trade in goods and 
non-factor services (export plus imports) rose from less then $US 600 to close to $US 
1,400. At the same time, trade rose from 14 per cent to 23 per cent of GDP measured in 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. By 1996, Poland's share in world trade came close to 
its share in world population (0.7 per cent). Likewise, the rapid expansion of exports brought 
Poland close to where its size (population) and income level (PPP per capita GDP) would 
predict based on cross-country experience. 
Table 3.10 Poland: Trade Contribution to Economic Growth, 1990-95 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Share of global trade (%) 
Imports 0.28 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.59 
Exports 0.42 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.47 0.51 
Total 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.53 
Share in trade in GDP (%) 
Imports 14.9 20.2 19.3 20.9 23.1 25.8 26.4 
Exports 16.5 19.2 15.7 13.7 18.5 20.7 21.4 
Per capita trade in $US 
Imports 250 406 416 490 559 750 820 
Export 376 390 314 368 447 601 745 
Source: Warsaw School of Economics, Poland-International Economic Report, World Research Institute, 
Warsaw,1996, p. 179; Buro do spraw obrotu zagranicznego, Zestawienie Obrotow Handlu 
Zagranicznego, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny (GUS), Warsaw, 1997 
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Despite a certain increase, Poland's share in the international division of labour is still small. 
It is higher for imports than for exports. The economy's pro-import orientation is additionally 
reflected by the foreign trade share in Poland's GDP and the value of trade in per capita 
terms, even though disproportions between imports and exports have slightly narrowed over 
the last few years. 
During the initial two years of the transformation-cum-stabilisation programme, 
launched by the first non-communist government on 1 January 1990, the reorientation of 
Polish trade was swift and dramatic. Imports from the Soviet Union and other CMEA 
· (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries fell, and trade with the West expanded 
spectacularly. The EC (European Community) replaced the CMEA as Poland's major trading 
partner. (See Table 3.10.1). 
Fostering the swift expansion of Polish exports and imports, particularly trade with 
the European Union (EU) (70 per cent of exports and 65 per cent of imports), is the gradual 
lowering of trade barriers. Another important factor underlying the expansion of trade with 
EU countries has been the ongoing liberalisation in both directions in line with the provisions 
of the EU Association Agreement, OECD membership and with GATT (now-WTO) 
commitments which were signed by Poland in 1994, 1996, 1996 respectively. 
Exports are being facilitated by the phasing out of EU tariffs on Polish exports that 
began in 1992 with the abolishment of duties on almost half of Poland's industrial exports to 
the EU. By January 1995, approximately 70 per cent of Poland's industrial exports 
(representing 85 per cent of total recorded exports) benefited from duty-free access to the EU 
market. Germany remained by far Poland's largest trading partner, absorbing some 38 per 
cent of exports and accounting for 27 per cent of imports. Trade with others countries in 
transition started to pick up in 1994, but their share remained small, at 17 per cent of exports 
and 15 per cent of imports in 1995 (OECD Report, 1997:18-21). The revival of trade with 
countries of the former Soviet Union, notwithstanding a continuing overall contraction in that 
region, reflected the development of new private-based trade links. Among the most 
spectacular increases were those of Polish exports of food and machinery to the Ukraine and 
Russia. 
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Table 3.10.1 Poland: Commodity Structure of EU Imports ( % ) 
(Excluding Fuels) 1988 1992 1993 Changes 
1988- 93 
Agricultural Products 18.4 10.8 8.6 -9.7 
Food 4.5 3.7 3.0 -1.5 
Raw Materials 4.7 2.6 3.0 -1.7 
Chemicals 7.7 8.8 7.2 -0.5 
Leather Products 3.7 3.3 2.8 -0.8 
Textile Products 1.6 1.4 1.2 -0.3 
Clothing 10.6 15.5 18.5 7.9 
Wood&Paper 6.2 7.3 7.4 1.2 
Building Materials 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.5 
Glass 1.2 1.2 0.9 -0.4 
Iron and Steel 7.8 10.4 8.6 0.9 
Non-Ferrous Metal 9.7 9.6 5.7 -3.9 
Engineering Products 4.5 5.0 4.7 0.2 
Transport Equipment 8.4 6.2 11.4 3.0 
Electrical Machinery 3.3 3.2 4.5 1.2 
NEC 6.3 8.6 10.6 4.3 
Manufactured Products 75.8 85.0 87.5 11.7 
Source: Lemoine, CEEE Export to the EC (1988-93): Country Differentiation and Commodity 
Diversification, Centre for Eastern European Countries, Paris, 1994, p. 31. 
The merchandise structure of foreign trade changed substantially during the transition 
period. Changes included a decrease in the export share of mineral products, agricultural, raw 
materials and chemical products and an increase in that of manufactured products, transport 
equipment, NEC and electrical machinery (see Table 3.10.1). The manufacturing industries 
have been at the centre of Poland's export drive. Intermediate and investment goods 
constituted the bulk of imports, with the share of the former approximately 65-70 per cent, 
and the share of the latter approximately 13-15 per cent. Outward processing (the importation 
of inputs that are processed in Poland and then re-exported) accounted for an increasing share 
of foreign trade. In 1995, this share reached 24 per cent for exports and 12 per cent for 
imports (in light industry, 82 and 62 per cent respectively). Thus, far from being a symptom 
of excess demand, import growth was largely associated with the development of the supply 
side of the Polish economy. The changes in the specialisation index of exports point to the 
fact that in industrial strategies the inheritance of the past is still present, but they also show 
that rather deep reorientation are taking place. Poland has kept or developed strong 
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specialisation in resource-intensive sectors: e.g. agriculture, raw materials, wood and paper, 
non-ferrous metallurgy. In the period 1988-1995, it became relatively specialised in labour-
intensive activities e.g. clothing, furniture and has managed to maintain its relative 
specialisation in transport equipment. Several branches of machinery have also been among 
the growing export commodities. 
The expansion of foreign trade can partly be linked to the expansion of the private 
sector the exports of which reached $US 9.6 billion in 1995. Taken by industry, almost 30 
per cent are derived from electrical engineering, 20 per cent from light industry, 16 per cent 
from wood and paper and 12.2 per cent from agro-food. Also, the private sector dominated 
exports in certain product ranges such as agro-food (90 per cent), light industry (80 per cent) 
and wood and paper (78 per cent) (World Economy Research Institute, 1996). The other 
notable features of private-sector trade included a faster growth in export than imports and a 
distinct concentration on Central and Eastern European markets. 
In 1995 Poland recorded a deficit with all major groups of trade partners. The largest 
part of this deficit was accounted for by the trade with OECD countries. A comparison of the 
share of particular country groups in Poland's trade deficit and in trade yields an interesting 
observation (see Table 3.10.2). The deficit with the EU and Eastern European countries is 
smaller compared to their share of Poland's exports and imports. On the other hand, the 
deficit with other OECD nations and the developing countries is significantly higher 
compared to their share of Poland's trade. 
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Table 3.10.2 Poland: Trade by Major Country Groups in 1995 
Exports Imports Trade 
balance 
$ mln annual share in $ mln annual share in $ mln 
growth total growth total 
rate exports rate imports 
EU 16,357 37.1% 70.5% 18,791 33.4% 64.5% -2,434 
Other OECD 1,116 14.3% 5.0% 2,761 32.5% 9.5% -1,595 
countries 
Developing 1,735 -3.15% 7.5% 3,047 32.3% 10.5% -1,312 
countries 
CEFTA 1,239 50.6% 5.0% 1,622 76.65% 5.5% -383 
Other EE 2,692 60.6% 12.0% 2,849 32.8% 10% -157 
countries 
Total 23,189 34.5% 100% 29,070 35.0% 100% -5,881 
Note: mln=million 
EE-European Economies 
Source: Warsaw School of Economics, Poland-International Economic Report, World Economy Research 
Institute, Warsaw, 1996, p. 121. 
3.11 Conclusion 
Since the adaptation of the Open Door policy in 1978, the utilisation of foreign capital has 
become one of the important dimensions of China's contact with foreign countries in terms of 
funds, materials, technological exchange, and economic cooperation. Effective utilisation of 
FDI must be accompanied by an appropriate macroeconomic environment. Economic changes 
that have been discussed in this chapter clearly indicate that China has continued to express a 
strong desire to stimulate and guide its socio-economic development through promoting a 
more liberalised investment framework and through further pursuing economic reform to 
encourage FDI. 
Despite the fact that China has achieved impressive economic growth and increased 
efficiency and productivity in non-state sectors, the existing economic structure is still 
inadequate, particularly as it lacks the economic laws that are necessary to strengthen and 
macro-control the economic order. For example, many SOEs are allowed to operate at losses, 
creating strong burdens on the central budget and non-state sector development. Reforms of 
government organisations should be encouraged, separating government from enterprises and 
thereby reducing administrative monopolies by promoting competition. 
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In contrast to China, Poland's initial geopolitical and economic structure created a different 
approach to economic reform. Poland launched a radical, comprehensive stabilisation-
liberalisation programme, freeing 90 per cent of prices, eliminating most trade barriers, 
abolishing state trading monopolies and making its currency convertible for current 
transactions. While this 'Big Bang' approach created controversy and negative economic 
growth during the early stages of transition, Poland now has the potential to build on the 
substantial achievements of the past economic reforms. There are still structural adjustment 
problems, including the need to speed up the privatisation programme (especially the 
privatisation of large industrial SOEs), to control inflation as well as further cuts and a 
restructuring of the government. However, rapid economic growth and continued economic 
reforms create new interest and opportunities for foreign investors. There is also a strong 
influence on the business environment which has led the Polish government to introduce 
liberal investment policies in accordance with OECD rules. An analysis of investment policies 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 3.1 
Table A4. Output of major products 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Coal (mn tonnes) 148 140 132 130 134 137 
Brown coal (mn tonnes) 67.6 69.4 66.9 68.I 66.8 63.5 
Coke of hard coal (mn tonnes) 13.7 11.4 II.I I0.3 11.5 11.6 
Natural ga• (bn m ') 3 867 4 132 4 019 4 949 4 635 4 803 
Electricity (bn Kwh) 136 135 133 134 135 139 
Fuel oils COOO tonnes) 2 883 2 655 2 578 2 728 2 746 2 776 
Refined oil (mn tonnes) 12.9 11.7 12.6 13.4 13.4 13.4 
Caustic soda ("000 tonnes) 404 324 326 296 297 327 
Crude steel ( mn tonnes) 13.6 10.4 9.9 9.9 JI.I 11.9 
Rolled steel (mn tonnes) 9.8 8.0 7.5 7.6 8.6 9.0 
Electrolytic copper ('000 tonnes) 346 378 387 404 405 407 
Aluminium ('000 tonnes) 46.0 45.8 43.6 46.9 49.5 55.7 
Sulphur COOO tonnes) 4 660 3 935 2 917 I 894 2 163 2 427 
Phosphatic feniliser ('000 tonnes) 467 253 329 282 415 523 
Nitrogenous fertiliser ('000 tonnes) I 303 I 148 I 167 I 224 I 386 I 619 
Pesticides ('000 tonnes) 19.7 17.0 21.8 22.3 20.7 24.2 
Synthetic fibres ('000 tonnes) 150 106 111 114 138 137 
Synthetic rubber and latex ('000 tonnes) 103.1 79.5 88.9 75.1 83.4 104.7 
Tyres ('000) 5 896 5 189 6 S47 7 521 8 929 10 880 
Plastics ("000 tonnes) 627 596 650 671 651 735 
Paints COOO tonnes) 202 191 209 216 233 248 
Metal cuttings machines (tonnes) 27 033 15 539 8 685 7 003 6 171 7 421 
Washing powders COOO tonnes) 243 224 194 211 241 227 
Agricultural tractors ('000) 35.4 17.5 8.0 11.5 15.3 21.5 
Cars COOO) 266 167 219 334 338 366 
Heavy vehicles ('000) 39.0 20.1 17.7 18.8 21.4 30.7 
Buses (unit•) 3 856 I 938 I 273 I 000 I 048 I 419 
Freight cars {units) 4 154 2301 678 362 249 835 
Bicycles ('000) I 339 971 814 745 973 I 090 
Shipplng over 100 dwt COOO dwl) 227 329 464 613 538 551 
Sewing machines ('000) 343 245 127 169 181 179 
Refrigerators and freezers ('0Cl0) 604 553 500 588 605 585 
Washing machines and dryers ('000) 482 336 363 402 449 419 
Vacuum cleaners ('000) 913 857 961 1 001 I 143 I 156 
Colour televisions ('000) 338 304 619 841 881 I 136 
Radio sets ("000) I 433 589 334 329 309 225 
Tapen:corders ("000) 299 108 58.9 22.2 14.3 12.l 
Rechargeable cells ('000) I 792 I 824 I 678 2 117 2 230 2 301 
Light bulbs (mn) 213 209 201 216 246 277 
Telephones ("000) I 589 992 349 297 428 409 
Cement (mn tonnes) 12.5 12.0 11.9 12.2 13.8 13.9 
Paper COOO tonnes) 924 949 I 031 I 070 1 199 I 335 
Sawn wood (dam·') 3 995 3 378 3 381 3 460 3 424 3 476 
Fibre boards (mn m') 93 89 96 100 110 104 
Cardboard COOO tonnes) 141 111 116 114 127 142 
Cotton fabric ('000 km) 428 286 239 229 256 205 
Wollen fabric ('000 km) 64.7 44.3 32.9 31.8 33.4 32.6 
Footwear ( mn pairs) 105 71.1 58.6 50.7 56.3 62.8 
Knitwear (mn) 183 114 83 85 111 127 
Meat ("000 tonnes) I 628 I 394 I 255 I 093 I 090 I 145 
Cured meat products ('000 tonnes) 714 676 669 676 718 756 
Sea fish C 000 tonnes) 430 410 448 360 414 
Butter ("000 tonnes) 272 192 155 146 120 122 
Milk <mn hi) 20.4 14.0 12.3 11.8 12.6 12.6 
Cottage cheese ('000 tonnes) 186 164 165 168 186 197 
Sugar ('000 tonnes) I 971 I 636 I 468 I 982 I 383 I 595 
Concentrated fruit juices ('000 tonnes) 80 69 105 144 113 85 
Edible plant fats COOO tonnes) 279 289 355 423 468 550 
Spirit• COOO hi) I SIO I 457 I 357 I 495 I 566 I 539 
Cigarettes (bn) 91.5 90.4 86.6 90.7 98.4 100.6 
Saur<"~: CcntrJI Statistical Office. 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 172 
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Appendix 3.2 
Table A7. State budget 
Millions of zlotys 
1992 1993 1994 1995 Budget 19% 
Revenue 31 277.6 45 901.0 63 125.3 83 721.7 100 171.2 
I. Tax revenue 24 615.6 36 962.3 51 568.5 68 975.2 84 596.9 
l.l Indirect taxes 10 309.9 17 749.5 26 884.2 36314.7 46 690.6 
Turnover iax 10 309.9 9 409.5 129.5 41.7 0.0 
Value added tax 5 129.I 15 013.9 20 673.4 25 698.6 
Excise tax 3 120.3 9 001.7 12 139.9 18 087.0 
Import surcharge 2 577.8 3 266.I 2 580.0 
Poll tax 90.6 161.3 192.1 325.0 
Tax on sale of securities 1.5 0.0 
1.2 Income tax of legal entities 5 062.l 6 257.2 6 827.7 8 837.1 9 960.0 
Enterprises 3 967.3 4 837.2 5 681.8 7 911.0 8 500.0 
Financial institutions I 094.8 I 420.0 I 145.9 926.l I 460.0 
l .3 Personal income tax 7 226.1 I l 942.4 17 375.6 23 51 l.8 27 866.3 
1.4 Tax on wage increases I 698.8 998.7 469.3 166.9 0.0 
1.5 Abolished taxes 318.7 14.5 11.7 144.7 80.0 
2. Non-tax revenue 6 161.6 8 152.5 9 937.3 12 064.8 12 979.3 
2.1 Dividends 848.2 691.4 599.5 805.8 I 461.0 
Enterprises 823.2 495.2 492.6 610.3 l 311.0 
Financial institutions 25.0 196.2 106.9 195.5 150.0 
2.2 Transfers from the ccntml bank I 211.3 l 418.2 2 355.1 2 980.0 I 850.0 
2.3 Custom duties 2 677.4 4 383.2 4 888.8 5 774.5 6 460.0 
2.4 Revenue of budgetary units I 139.4 I 308.2 I 535.9 I 970.0 2 613.0 
2.5 Other non-tax revenue 285.3 351.5 383.8 510.0 530.0 
2.6 Foreign grnnts 143.5 0.0 0.0 
2.7 Import levies 30.7 24.4 0.0 
2.8 Revenues from local 
governments 65.3 
3. Privatisation receipts 484.4 780.4 I 594.9 2 641.6 2 565.0 
3.1 Enterprises 480.5 726.4 I 169.7 2 120.3 2 165.0 
3.2 Banks 3.9 54.0 425.2 521.3 400.0 
4. Foreign revenue 16.0 5.8 24.6 40.1 30.0 
Expenditure 38 189.1 50 242.8 68 865.0 91 169.6 109 671.2 
I. Subsidies I 984.0 I 956.5 2 458.5 2 994.2 3 134.5 
2. Foreign debt service I 176.4 I 211.1 I 832.1 3 262.6 4 725.0 
3. Domestic debt service 2 438.3 4 749.9 7 400.9 11 097.I 13 214.0 
4. Social insur.mce 7 345.3 10 420.7 14 273.4 15 309.7 17 303.6 
5. Current expenditures 20 758.6 26911.7 36 993.3 51 522.3 55 487.2 
6. Settlements with banks l 778.4 I 411.0 2 225.6 2 112.5 2 604.3 
7. Capital expenditure l 950.2 2 477.7 3 129.5 4 127.0 5 371.4 
8. Subsidies tu local authorities 757.9 I 104.2 551.7 744.2 7 725.3 
9. Reserve of the Council of Ministers 105.9 
Balance -6 911.5 -4 341.8 -5 739.7 -7 448.0 -9 500.0 
Financing 
I. Domestic 7 194.4 4 928.4 6 979.4 6 512.8 11 493.8 
I.I Banking 6 618.8 3 753.9 4 926.0 I 250.5 7 981.9 
1.2 Non-banking 575.6 I 174.5 2 053.4 5 262.3 3 511.9 
, Foreign financing -282.9 -586.6 -I 239.7 928.5 -I 993.8 
\.femorltlu/11111 item: GDP 114 944.2 1?5 780.0 210 407.3 286 025.6 344 600.0 
lmtrc'e: Ministry of Finance. 
Source: As for Appendix 3.1 
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CHAPTER 4 
INVESTMENT AND TRADE POLICIES 
In 1978 China began to pursue an 'open door' policy permitting FDI into the country to 
modernise the economy. The government introduced new economic legislation, beginning 
with tentative, experimental draft laws and regulations for trial implementation. By the end of 
the 1980s in China, a large volume of laws, regulations and other . official pronouncements 
had been enacted at central and local government levels. 
The liberalisation reforms in Poland started in 1989 when the first non-communist 
government began to dismantle the Stalinist model of a centralised planned economy. Unlike 
China, in Poland most regulations and laws were established in early 1990 at a time when a 
radical, comprehensive stabilisation-liberalisation programme was being launched. It focused 
on stabilisation, liberalisation, and changes in the tax system and the social security net. A 
some privatisation law was accepted, and many quantitative and other restrictions in foreign 
trade and investment were lifted in order to introduce competitive pressure on domestic 
enterprises freed from the command mechanism. 
This chapter outlines incentives to, and the regulation of, FDI and related policies in 
the two countries in a comparative perspective. It focuses principally on policy at the national 
level, but where appropriate, addresses regional developments. The first section reviews each 
government's objectives and is followed by an outline of FDI policies. 
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4.0 China: An Introduction 
Starting in 1979 with the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using 
Chinese and Foreign Investment, China developed more than 500 central government and 
local laws, regulations, orders and other policy pronouncements to govern foreign trade and 
investment. These indicated that China had the expectation that foreign investors would help 
to solve major economic problems such as a lack of capital, large pools of unemployment and 
underemployment, low production efficiency with under-utilised machines, and a persistent 
trade deficit with consequent pressure on foreign exchange resources. It was hoped that FDI 
would help to expand export capacities to earn the foreign exchange needed to pay for 
additional imports and to reduce balance of payment constraints. Foreign investment was 
sought in order to add to capital resources, obtain modem technology and equipment, 
improve production capacity and efficiency, increase the quality and variety of products, 
acquire modem management skills, upgrade the skills of local manpower, expand 
employment and generate public revenues. 
The MNCs on their side wanted to enlarge their world market share, increase profits, 
and diversify to spread risk. They wanted to capture a share of the domestic market by 
jumping China's trade barriers. Some also saw opportunities for low-cost manufacturing for 
exports. China and the MNCs thus had different, but compatible objectives. The reasons why 
in practice there has been a great deal of conflict lie in the overall economic environment in 
general and in the FDI policies in particular. 
4.1 Foreign Investment Policy 
From the very beginning FDI has been an integral part of China's 'open-door policy', and as 
early as 1979 the first law on joint ventures came into force (for more details see Appendix 
4 .1). The permission to set up joint ventures had not been considered sufficient by the 
authorities, and was therefore supplemented by a policy promoting the inflow of FDI. The 
Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping then opted for a location-based policy promoting 
FDI: the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian should become especially attractive for 
foreign investors. In addition to developing the administrative power of the provincial 
governments (in the areas of finance and taxation, domestic and foreign trade, planning, 
pricing, wages and employment), four Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were approved in 
1979 and 1980: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou. Foreign-funded enterprises 
operating in these zones enjoyed preferential tax treatment, were exempted from import duties 
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on equipment and raw materials used, and exports and imports were not subject to the usual 
procedures for approval. 
Altogether, enterprises in the SEZs were to operate according to the rules of the 
market. Due to their success, a further opening of new zones followed. All these 'open 
economic zones' offered special incentives to foreign investors and for promoting foreign 
trade. In 1992, after Deng's famous 'South China Tour', privileges similar to those of the 
coastal areas were granted to a number of major cities in inland provinces, particularly in the 
Yangtze River valley and in border areas, and this heralded a new era in China's FDI policy. 
From the very beginning, a certain ambivalence by the authorities arose from the 
conflicting goals of opening the economy while attempting to ensure an equitable distribution 
of the benefits of economic growth and of developing an appropriate industrial structure. 
Obviously, the location-based policy towards FDI was given preference over a sectoral 
approach as it complied very well with several general principles of economic reform: 
( 1 ) Decentralisation: highly centralised economic decisions, characteristic of a centrally 
planned economy, were considered a major obstacle to the development of the 
Chinese economy in the past, experience with decentralisation could be gained and 
its effects could be more easily controlled. 
(2) Gradualism: contrary to Poland and other post-communist government policies in 
CEE countries after 1989, which opted for a quick transformation of their centrally 
planned economies into market economies, the Chinese authorities, while 
preserving the main features of the communist political system, tried to avoid abrupt 
changes and adopted a gradual strategy: 'Crossing the river stone by stone' as 
Deng put it. By allowing the market to operate in limited areas, valuable experience 
'was gained before extending the reforms to the whole country. 
( 3) Principle of greatest efficiency: Chinese policy was focused on areas in which 
reforms were expected to succeed with relative ease. FDI policy followed this 
principle in various ways. An important determinant for FDI in developing countries 
is the quality of the existing infrastructure. Under conditions of very limited 
resources, it is rational for the country to concentrate its efforts on certain 
promising areas first. Consequently, the first locations chosen to attract FDI were 
the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian as well as the first SEZs, situated in the 
south-east, close to Hong Kong and Taiwan which could be expected first to make 
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use of the new investment opportunities, being familiar both with the language and 
culture. 
In a step away from location-based policy towards FDI, the first guidelines for FDI 
on a sectoral basis were launched in 1993. They already showed the main characteristics of 
the 'Interim Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment', which were put into 
force on June 27 1995. According to these provisions, FDI was to be encouraged in 
agriculture, energy, communications, important raw materials, high technology and the 
utilisation of resources, especially in the central and western provinces. FDI is still subject 
however, to certain restrictions in sectors where China is experimenting with foreign 
investment or where state monopolies exist in fields in which China can meet local demand 
through self-financed imports of advanced technology and in projects for exploiting rare and 
valuable mineral resources. Prohibited are projects endangering security, or harming the 
country's social and public interest and those with adverse effects on the environment or 
which will damage natural resources. Investments which fit none of these categories are 
classified as permitted. Together with the Interim Provisions a more detailed catalogue of 
industries was issued (Guidelines for Foreign investment Projects), which will be updated 
from time to time. Xinhua, the official news agency, called the rules 'a manifestation of the 
Chinese government's intentions to actively, reasonably and effectively utilise foreign funds', 
and said they embodied a substantial change from the short-term quantitative strategy to a 
long-term, qualitative one in the use of foreign funds. However, there is not much in the 
Interim Provisions which concerns their implementation, besides guiding the authorities in 
the approval of FDI projects. Under the emerging new industrial policy it can be expected that 
preferential treatment will increasingly rely on loans and financial subsidies, and less on 
profits' tax rates. This leads us to important developments in the second half of 1995. 
At the plenum of the CPC (Communist Party of China) Central Committee in 
September 1995, when the proposals for the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) and the long 
term perspective until 2010 were discussed, State President Jiang Zemin stressed that the 
central government's policy towards the five SEZs and New Pudong Area will remain 
unchanged in principle, but that certain policies will be changed and adjusted according to 
China's economic development. In a subsequent statement for the press, Prime Minister Li 
Peng indicated that 'China would ease back on preferential tax and other incentives for 
investments in its six special economic zones (Financial Times, October 1995). 
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Concerning the reduction of privileges for foreign-funded enterprises in general, it was 
clearly stated that foreign-funded enterprises were gradually to be treated on an equal footing 
with national enterprises especially in regards to taxation. In a first step it was declared in 
November 1995 that from 1996 there would be no more tariff exemptions for foreign 
investors for the import of production equipment. At the prevailing average tariff rate of 40 
per cent this would mean an average cost increase to the foreign investors of 28 per cent as 
calculated by the US-China Business Council in Beijing. In addition, a certain grace period as 
well as exemptions for special cases were reported, so the final outcome of the new 
regulations with respect to foreign investors cannot yet be assessed. 
Summarising China's likely future policies towards FDI, the main principles seem to 
be the following: 
• promoting FDI according to specific economic sectors 
• decreasing FDI in regions where FDI was strongly promoted in the past 
• increasing promotion of FDI in the less developed regions which received little FDI in the 
past 
• gradual reduction of privileges for foreign-funded enterprises over local entrepreneurs. 
However, as indicated by the many differing and ambiguous statements of officials, 
the implementation of these principles still remains undecided. This has to be seen in the 
wider context of an ongoing struggle between the protagonists of 'quantitative' growth of the 
Deng era and the proponents of a more balanced and 'qualitative' growth in the group around 
Jiang Zemin (for further details about China's specific investment policies see Appendix 4.1). 
4.1.1 Tax Policy 
The Chinese government recognises that the tax system is the main criterion for judging 
whether the investment environment is good, and that a good tax environment must maintain 
a stable, reasonable and equitable tax rate with easy filing procedures and must generally hold 
to international practices. 
China's tax framework embraces a complex array of income, production and sales 
taxes. Tax policy is technically formulated by the Ministry of Finance. Throughout the period 
since 1980, China has continuously and selectively, both by region and by FDI performance, 
used tax incentives as 'economic levers' to guide FDI into its designated regions and sectors. 
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While the economic efficacy of this proliferation remains to be seen, the psychological effect 
on foreign investors in their response to such spatial and sectorial priorities has been 
encouraging. 
In general, this multi-layered, priority-targeted, and region-exclusive tax incentive 
structure reflects China's recent efforts in implementing its industrial policies and in 
accommodating the execution of the uneven development strategy, starting from the coast and 
moving gradually into its hinterland. Taxation of enterprises with foreign investment provides 
for reductions in standard rates, exemptions and credits, accelerated depreciation and 
reductions in social security contributions. This is misleadingly labelled as preferential. In 
practice many enterprises with foreign investment pay higher taxes than local firms unless 
local joint ventures can negotiate a good deal. 
FDI in different sectors, locations or for different duration in China attract differing 
tax rates. The tax policy distinguishes four forms of enterprises with foreign investment: 
• equity joint ventures 
• contractual joint ventures 
• wholly-owned foreign enterprises 
• cooperative developments. 
Incentives for foreign investors have in theory discriminated against domestic 
enterprises (but as already mentioned in the previous section most of the privileges for 
foreign-funded enterprises will be reduced gradually to an equal footing with domestic ones 
especially with regard to taxation). The incentives mainly consist of tax concessions including 
tax holidays, exemption from customs duties, subsidies for infrastructure costs, subsidies to 
interest rates, and low fees for land use. Some of the incentives have already been 
withdrawn. Provinces and municipalities give further incentives, which create conflict with 
national policy. The taxes on enterprises with foreign investment consist of four major types: 
• the enterprise income tax 
• the consolidated industrial and commercial tax 
• local taxes 
• withholding tax and individual income tax (for details about each tax and incentive see 
Appendix 4.2). 
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To avoid losses in its tax revenues, China has successfully negotiated the insertim into all its 
tax treaties, except the one with the US, a 'tax-sparing' provision that allows a credit for tax 
spared by China's tax concessions against the resident state's tax levied on income. In 1980, 
new tax legislation was passed to deal with joint ventures between Chinese and foreign 
investment companies. A newly established joint venture scheduled to operate for a period of 
ten years or more was to be exempted from enterprise income tax in its first profit-making 
year, and allowed a 50 per cent reduction in income tax in the second and third years. Joint 
ventures in farming and forestry and in remote regions were to be allowed a 15-30 per cent 
reduction in income tax for another 10 years. Further revisions were introduced two years 
later in 1982 by the State Council so that enterprises with foreign investment in industry, 
communications, transportation, agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, scheduled to 
operate for a period of 10 years or more, would be exempted from income tax in the first and 
second profit-making years, and would be allowed a 50 per cent reduction in income tax in 
the third through the fifth years. Only 80 per cent of normal tax rates were levied for 10 years 
in the following industries: machine building and electronics, metallurgy, chemicals and 
building materials, light industry, textiles and packaging, medical appliances and 
pharmaceutical, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, agriculture, processing related to 
these industries and construction. A decision to exempt enterprises with foreign investment a 
small-scale production (annual income less than one million renminbi yuan) and low profits 
from local taxes could be made by local authorities. 
Provisions in the 22 Articles of the Provisions of the State Council for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment in 1986 exempt export enterprises and advanced 
technology enterprises from tax. Different status is given to enterprises with foreign 
investment identified as export enterprises or advanced technology enterprises at different tax 
rates. Priority is given to export and advanced technology enterprises through a variety of 
preferential treatments. They both enjoy rebates of the total income tax paid. Advanced 
technology enterprises were granted preferential treatment such as eight years of reduced 
taxation or exemption from normal enterprises income tax. A further three-year extension 
during which enterprise income tax was paid at half the standard rate could be granted. 
Larger, technology-intensive, projects of over $US 30 million and projects relating to energy, 
communications or port construction could be levied at the reduced rate of 50 per cent of 
standard income tax. Preferential treatment was also to be given with regard to royalties for 
proprietary technology in the form of income tax reductions and exemptions. 
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Foreign investors in export and technologically advanced enterprises remitting profits abroad 
were to be exempt from income tax. In effect, these provisions partially repealed Article 4 of 
the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Income Tax Law, 1980. The State Council provision 
also exempts export and advanced technology enterprises from paying all subsidy payments 
for employment to the central government. They must pay labour insurance and welfare 
expenses, including housing subsidies to local workers through local governments in 
accordance with local regulations. 
4.1.2 Economic Zones 
As a part of the Open Door Policy, special economic zones (SEZs) were designed to promote 
and upgrade the development of Chinese industries in general and attract foreign capital and 
technology and enhance exports in particular. These provisions are of interest to enterprises 
established in coastal regions outside the SEZs as well as economic and technology 
development zones. Tax incentives are now essentially the same in SEZs, economic and 
technology development zones and most open areas. Foreign-funded enterprises in SEZ 
shave income tax levied on their income at a reduced rate of 15 per cent. The local 
governments of SEZs determine whether local income tax reduction is granted. Profits 
remitted abroad are exempt from income tax. Products of exports produced in SEZs are 
exempt from consolidated industrial and commercial tax. Consolidated industrial and 
commercial tax on products produced and sold within SEZs, are levied at half the tax rate. 
It is well established that an efficient, effective and competitive taxation system should 
be simple and transparent, i.e. with no greater burdens than in the international arena. It 
should also be uniformly administered so as to avoid arbitrary measures and discrimination 
among firms. Chinese taxation of enterprises with foreign participation is not always 
transparent according to these rules. For example, accelerated depreciation, by reductions in 
the price of capital, contributes to the trend of substituting capital for labour, which in China 
often conflicts with national policy. While no research has yet been carried out on its 
efficiency and effectiveness due to lack of information from the Chinese government, it 
would be surprising if its effects were different from those in other developing countries. 
4.2 Trade Policy 
In China, the trade reforms broke away from the inherited, centralised and inward-looking 
economic system. Prior to the beginning of the reforms, the organisation of foreign trade in 
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China followed the Soviet model closely, and foreign trade remained completely under central 
control. On the eve of the reforms in China (1978) foreign economic relations were 
associated with a strategy of import substitution. In China the reforms progressively relaxed 
the monopoly on foreign trade. As George de Menil puts it, "the dismantling of central 
planning, the introduction of decentralised incentives . . . uncovered large, previously hidden 
opportunities for commercial gains, and unleashed previously suppressed entrepreneurial 
energies (de Menil, 1995). 
In 1984, 'the provincial branches of national foreign trade corporations' (FTC) 
became independent financial, operating bodies, and each province was allowed to create its 
own FfC. As a result the number of FfCs increased from 12 in 1978 to about 1,000 in 1986 
and to 9,000 in 1994. This generated increased competition upstream and downstream: FTCs 
had to compete for foreign markets, and also had to compete for domestic supply as 
production units progressively acquired the capacity to choose their FfC (Lardy 1992; Zweig 
1994). Nevertheless, beyond the joint ventures with foreign capital, a number of production 
firms, the big exporters, were given the right to carry out foreign trade operations directly. 
The most dynamic part of foreign trade activity was located outside the state sector, which 
grew rapidly. Township and villages enterprises (TVEs) became important suppliers of 
goods for exports. Also, joint ventures with foreign capital increased their share in exports 
and imports. 
In China, attracting FDI has clearly been a priority of trade policy. The first measures 
of the opening-up policy were to allow FDI and to create special economic zones to attract 
foreign investors. The policy toward FDI included both strong incentives as well as severe 
constraints. Joint ventures benefited from tax exemptions and reductions, along with 
concession import duties (World Bank, 1994). Trade policy has also been used actively to 
attract foreign capital since measures to protect the domestic market have been taken, 
frequent! y under the pressure of foreign investors (EB RD, 1994). China has emphasised the 
decentralisation of foreign trade decisions and export promotion policies. Not all trade policy 
measures, however, provided incentives to export. On the import side, liberalisation 
measures clearly lagged behind the reforms in the export sector. In the early 1990s, the 
import regime displayed the following characteristics: 
• The foreign trade reforms led to a phasing out of mandatory planning and to a 
decentralisation of decision-making and responsibilities. The scope of the foreign trade 
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plan was reduced, and in 1992, mandatory planning covered less then 20 per cent of 
imports. The process of scaling down the plan has been accompanied by the 
decentralisation of responsibility for implementing the plan and by an increased number of 
foreign trade companies, mainly at the local level (Lardy, 1992; Fukasak.u and Wall, 
1994). The activities of these foreign trade companies remained subject to administrative 
control (local or central). 
• The level of protection remained high. It resulted from the high tariff rate, which stood at 
32 per cent (weighted average, see Table 4.2) but also from multiple and overlapping non-
tariff barriers, administered by the national or provincial authorities. In 1992, these 
included: 
- import licensing (covering 25 per cent of total imports in 1992) 
- import rights given to one or a few FTC for specific products (this channel 
concerned 32 per cent of imports) 
- direct control on imports of some commodities in the sector of 
machinery and equipment (this covered approximately 7.7 per cent of 
imports) 
- foreign exchange allocations: imports outside the plan were indirectly 
regulated through the control of enterprise access to foreign currency. 
The authorities control approximately 50 per cent of imports in this way. 
Table 4.2 China: Tariffs on Industrial Imports 
Weighted average 
Industrial countries 5.0 
EU 5.7 
Japan 1.9 
us 5.4 
Czech Republic 4.5 
Hungary 13 + 8% surcharge 
Poland 9.2 + 6% surcharge 
Bulgaria 16.0 
Romania 7.0 
Brazil 15.0 
India 54.0 
China 35.0 
* Pre-Uruguay Round 
Source: Lemoine, Trade policy and Trade Patterns During Transition: A Comparison between China. and the 
CEECs, Centre for Eastern European Countries (CEP II), Paris, 1996, p. 15. 
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According to the Memorandum of Understanding on Market Access signed with the US in 
October 1992, China has committed itself to dismantling most of these barriers. The 
measures it has committed itself to take are among those being considered by the members of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which is examining China's membership. These 
measures amply show that China's trade regime is still very far from liberal. These include: 
publishing trade laws and regulations, restrictions on internal directives, identifying agencies 
involved in the import-approval process, lower tariffs, and the elimination of all import 
licensing requirements, quotas and controls by 1997. 
• As the implementation of trade policies has become decentralised, assessing the precise 
degree of liberalisation is complicated. The whole system of tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
is characterised by a low degree of transparency and a lack of neutrality (IMF, 1994). The 
tariffs are set at a high level, but there are many tariff exemptions that benefit exporters: the 
materials and components imported for export processing, as well as equipment and 
machinery imported by joint ventures and by export processing enterprises are exempt 
from customs duties. As a result of these concessions, which encompass half of all 
imports, the tariff revenue actually collected as the percentage of total imports declined 
steeply during the transition, and the ratio stands much below that of the Poland or other 
CEE countries (see Table 4.2.1 ). 
Table 4.2.1 Revenues Collected from Customs Duties 
Tariffs and imports % 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Hungary na 10.7 10.7 9.7 
Poland 10.4 12.2 12.9 10.0 
China 1978 1983 1988 1993 
15.3 12.8 7.5 4.3 
Sources: As for Table 4.2 
China's trade policy is moving along the track of the fast growing Asian countries, 
where import liberalisation has been slow and trade regimes could be defined as "mixed" 
(Helliwel, 1994; World Bank, 1996). China's present trade regime looks to be very different 
from that of the CEE countries, and close to that implemented by the New Industrialising 
Economies (NIEs). The bias in favour of exports in China's trade regime reinforces these 
characteristics. 
83 
On the export side, export promotion was at the core of the Chinese strategy of opening up. It 
has aimed at developing a modem export sector. This strategy was supported by the existence 
of a strong comparative advantage in labour-intensive industries. As Audretsh, points out 
such traditional industrial policies, with selected targets (firms or industries), prove to serve 
well in a situation of industrial catching-up, where comparative advantages are relatively 
evident (Audretsh, 1995). 
The export-oriented strategy relied on a broad set of devices: export plans were 
progressively phased out and were abolished at the beginning of the 1990s, but they were 
replaced by different instruments that combined to form a vigorous policy of export 
promotion. Contracts were signed by the FfCs with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Relations (MFTEC) in regard to foreign exchange earnings. As an incentive for 
implementing these foreign exchange targets, exporters were allowed to retain a fraction of 
their foreign currency earnings. The retention schemes were highly differentiated according to 
geographic locations and industrial sectors. The reform of foreign exchange since January 
1994 has abolished the retention scheme, and all exporters are required to exchange all their 
foreign currency earnings. In return, buying foreign currency for import purposes was to be 
made easier. Under the new foreign exchange guidelines the RMB is 'conditionally' 
convertible for certain trade transactions. This means that Chinese importers with a valid 
import contract and required licences or quota permits can, in principle, purchase foreign 
exchange without receiving prior authorisation from the State Administration Exchange 
Control. 
Another incentive scheme relied, as mentioned above, on tariff exemptions and 
concessions that were implemented to stimulate export-oriented activities. Furthermore, in the 
second half of the 80s, the authorities created "production networks for exports" in order to 
stimulate high-performing enterprises in selected industrial sectors, using investment 
financing and the guaranteed supplies of inputs. Finally, the policy of attracting FDI has also 
aimed at expanding export capacities as joint ventures are required to balance their foreign 
exchange imports and exports. 
Up to the mid-1990s, China followed diverging trade policies. In November 1995, 
China announced major trade reforms which included substantial tariff cuts that would reduce 
its average tariffs to 24-25 per cent, as well as the elimination of quotas, licences and other 
import controls on over 30 per cent of the commodities subject to such restrictions. These 
84 
measures, together with the new policy towards FDI (that intends to remove the preferences 
enjoyed by the coastal provinces and export-processing operations), would mean a 
substantial change in China's trade policy. They would reduce the bias in favour of exporting 
activities and lead to a readjustment of imports in favour of domestic demand. 
4.3 Foreign Exchange Control System 
Foreign exchange activities had been handled by the People's Bank of China (PBOC) before 
March 1951, when the Bank of China (BOC) was re-established to handle foreign exchange 
business and assumed most of the control over foreign exchange. However, until March 
1979, the BOC was only a PBOC agent. Decisions on foreign exchange control were made 
by the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade and the PBOC. 
The BOC had been the sole, source for handling foreign exchange business, 
including import and export banking, before the establishment of the China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) in October 1979. Later, designated foreign 
exchange banks were allowed to engage in foreign currency operations. On April 27, 1994 
the China Import and Export Bank was established. 
In March 1979, Beijing established the State Administration of Exchange Control 
(SAEC) and also its local branches directly under the State Council to assume the PBOC's 
functions as the administrator of overseas business. Between January and August 1982, the 
SAEC and the BOC were both put under the control of the Import and Export Administrative 
Commission of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. Subsequently, the 
SAEC took over the BOC's responsibilities in the enforcement of foreign exchange laws and 
regulations, the promulgation of exchange rates, unified administration of foreign exchange, 
the planned management of foreign exchange revenue and expenditure, and the supervision 
of international payments. The BOC was still in control of foreign currency deposits and 
loans, import and export banking, international settlements, international remittances, 
overseas Chinese remittances, and foreign exchange transactions. The BOC would also 
undertake SAEC's tasks where no SAEC branches existed (Chen Bo-chih, 1995). 
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Beijing has also endeavoured to enact laws and regulations on the management of foreign 
exchange, foreign funds, and foreign-funded banks. According to the Provisional 
Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control enacted in December 1980, planned management 
of foreign exchange revenue and expenditure is imposed on enterprises, organisations, and 
groups; centralised management of foreign loans is practised also. In March 1981, Beijing 
enacted the Tentative Measures on Loan Extension to Joint Ventures. The Regulations on 
Extending the Business Scope of Existing Overseas Chinese and Foreign Banks in Shanghai 
enacted in October 1984 allowed these banks to engage in six kinds of foreign exchange 
business including foreign exchange loans, discounts, remittances, and documentary bills, 
etc. However, up to March of 1995, foreign banks were still banned from taking RMB 
deposits or extending RMB loans. 
The PBOC decided the official exchange rates until the SAEC was established in 
March 1979. The SAEC then decided the official exchange rates according to the situation of 
mainland China's international payments and the exchange rates of its trading partners, 
though changes in the official exchange rates remained relatively rare. Since April 9, 1991, 
the SAEC has flexibly readjusted the official exchange rates according to long-term 
developments in international payments, the exchange rates of trade partners, and the daily 
exchange rate fluctuations of major international currencies. Since then, the official exchange 
rate of RMD against the US dollar has changed several times (Access China, 1997). 
On December 29, 1993, the PBOC issued a notice on further reforms of the exchange 
control system. The new exchange control reforms took effect on January 1, 1994. The main 
reform measures included the abolition of foreign exchange certificates, the establishment of a 
unified, managed floating exchange rate system, establishment of an interbank foreign 
exchange transaction market, and the replacement of the foreign exchange quota-retaining 
system of Chinese enterprises by a bank-based system of foreign exchange transactions. 
Specifically, the last measure features implementation of a settlement system for foreign 
exchange revenue and allows for conditional convertibility of RMB in connection with 
current account items (Wank Ya-ke, 1994). The PBOC enacted the Regulations on the 
Administration of Foreign-Funded Financial Institutions on February 25 1994 and the 
Tentative Regulations on the Administration of the Settlement, Sale and Payment of Foreign 
Exchanges and the Tentative Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Currency 
Accounts on April 1. These three regulations took effect on April 1 1994. 
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4.4 Foreign Exchange Policy 
Before 1979 China operated a highly concentrated foreign exchange management policy, 
unifying both foreign exchange revenue and expenditure and defined expenditure of revenue: 
all foreign revenue had to be sold to the state, and when foreign exchange was needed, it was 
allocated by the state. The rate of foreign exchange was set by the state and foreign exchange 
capital and foreign exchange business were managed and handled by the Bank of China. In 
1979, China began restructuring its foreign exchange system, gradually taking the path of the 
market. 
There were two main kinds of exchange rates in China before January 1 1994. One 
was the adjusted exchange rate (EXADJ), the other was the official exchange rate (EXOFF). 
The former was influenced more by the demand and supply of foreign exchange markets. As 
the inflation rate started to climb and the real interest rate gap between China and the US 
started to widen after May 1991, the adjusted exchange rate of the RMB against US dollar 
devalued from 5.58 in January 1991 to 10.05 in June 1993, while the official rate remained 
stable at about 5.32 to 5.72 between 1991 and 1993. Enterprises with foreign investment 
were concerned with foreign exchange risk and the effects of a devalued Chinese currency 
over a period of years. The devaluation of the Renminbi exchange rate has resulted in the 
appreciation of foreign capital for which equity is denominated in foreign currency. Overseas 
borrowing in foreign currency seems cheaper relative to local borrowing in Chinese currency. 
The devaluation of Chinese currency would apparently make domestic market-oriented 
production less profitable than export-oriented in terms of repatriation of profits in foreign 
currency. Repatriation of profits in foreign currency is thus related to the market orientation 
of major products of foreign-funded enterprises. However, the continuing devaluation of the 
Chinese currency in the long term would undermine the value of foreign capital denominated 
in Chinese currency (Access China, 1997) .. 
To promote a more stable investment environment, at the beginning of 1994, the 
government made major changes in the system of foreign exchange by removing the double-
track system, settling foreign exchange by banks, and making the Renminbi convertible 
under the current account. In June 1996, the PBC published Regulations on the Management 
of Foreign Exchange of the PRC, which went into effect on 1 April 1996. In June 1996, the 
PBC published Regulations on the Settlement, Sales and Payments of Foreign Exchange and 
decided to incorporate the sales and purchase of foreign exchanges of foreign-funded 
enterprises into bank settlements from July 1 of the same year. Since 1December1996 China 
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has effected the convertibility of the Renminbi under the current account, defining the 
framework of a new foreign exchange system. The foreign exchange rates would mainly be 
decided by the overall monetary situation. The basic money supply, the loan scale and interest 
rates would also have a direct and sensitive impact on the changes in foreign exchange rates. 
Until 1988 there were some restrictions in remitting profits and dividends and 
repatriating capital. Net profits after paying taxes could be remitted abroad from the foreign 
exchange deposit account of joint ventures upon application to the Bank of China. For the 
transfer of capital in foreign exchange, investors had to apply to the SAFE or its branch 
offices. Foreign staff could only remit or take abroad an amount in foreign exchange not 
exceeding 50 per cent of their legitimate net salary earnings. If the remitted amount was more 
than 50 per cent of their income, investors had to apply to the SAFE or its branch offices. 
These restrictions created negative business perceptions. They were relaxed in 1988. In 
practice such regulations were, in any case, not adhered to. Since foreign enterprises and 
joint ventures import inputs into production and export some outputs, they can remit profits 
by other than arm's length pricing. 
4.5 Labour Market Policy 
In accordance with the Law of the PRC on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment, the employment and dismissal of staff and workers of a joint venture should be 
provided for in accordance with the law in the agreement and contract of the parties to the 
venture. Labour policy for foreign-funded enterprises was mainly concerned with four 
aspects: 
• recruitment and dismissal in labour contracts 
• training 
• labour payments and 
• insurance and welfare benefits. 
In earlier years, the employment of staff and workers in a joint venture was 
recommended by the local department in charge of the venture or the local labour office. 
Dismissal had to be approved by the department in charge of the venture and the labour 
management department. Informal investors would face little problem with this situation. 
Autonomous rights of employment for joint ventures were extended in 1986. With the 
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assistance of the local labour office, a joint venture, with the agreement of Chinese 
authorities, could employ and dismiss workers. 
Enterprises with foreign participation were obliged by contract to train Chinese 
workers but had no control over selecting candidates for training. Staffing difficulties had 
their roots in controls over domiciles and cumbersome recruiting systems. In a centrally 
planned economy, firing a person was more difficult than hiring one. This resulted in 
enterprises with foreign participation being overstaffed with non-productive or unqualified 
workers. This added substantially to the cost of operations. These situation created conflicts 
and dissatisfaction among foreign investors. By 18 May 1988 the State Council approved 
new legislation which gave power to enterprises with foreign investment to conduct 
employment matters independently, in accordance with current international practices. These 
rules did not work in practice. Dismissal of workers was limited only to cases where criminal 
offences had been committed. 
Table 4.5 China: Wages and Benefits to Workers in Firms with Foreign 
Participation 
Guandong and three special economic zones 
Total labour charges of which 
70% is wages paid directly to workers 
5% is welfare expenses 
25% labour insurance and subsidies. 
Annual permissible labour charge increase: 5-15 % 
Shanghai 
Wage (which includes basic wages, allowance, bonuses) 
-not less than 120% of wages in similar SOEs 
Pension insurance- equivalent to 30% of total wage bill 
paid monthly to the Shanghai People's Insurance Corp. 
Food and fuel subsidies- 30 Renminbi yuan per person, 
paid to the Shanghai Finance Bureau. 
Housing subsidy- 30 Renminbi yuan per person, 
paid to the Shanghai Finance Bureau 
Source: Business International, Joint Ventures in PRC: A Corporate Guide, Hong Kong, 1985. 
Labour policy requires that workers in enterprises with foreign participation receive 
more than workers in similar SOEs. The figures of nominal wages are misleading because 
enterprises with foreign participation have to pay high 'on costs'. All enterprises with foreign 
89 
·_ ! 
participation usually pay the workers at least 120 per cent of their normal entitlement in 
similar SOEs. They must also make payments to a retirement and pension fund and an 
unemployment insurance fund for Chinese employees. The foreign investment firms must 
also make payments to subsidised housing, i.e. the cost of the building and/or purchase of 
the housing for local staff and workers, as well as the cost of living subsidies. Much of the 
payment is not made directly to workers but to local governments and their firms which 
contract the workers. This is not mandatory, however, for foreign investors outside the major 
cities. From 1987, export-oriented and advanced technology enterprises have paid relatively 
smaller subsidies, known as the commodity price adjustment subsidy, to the local finance 
departments. 
Table 4.5.1 Manufacturing Wages (US cents per hour, 1984 average) 
Asian developing countries: a comparison 
China 16.6 to 41.5 
Philippines 24.7 
Indonesia 30.2 
India 32.1 
Thailand 41.1 
Malaysia 103.5 
Hong Kong 144.1 
Singapore 153.8 
Taiwan 179.4 
Poland 120.0 
Source: Business International, Joint Ventures in the PRC: A Corporate Guide, Hong Kong, 1985, p. 144 
The training of workers and staff in joint ventures has been regulated to a much lesser 
degree than the payments of employees. It is in the interest of enterprises with foreign 
participation to train labour to improve efficiency and productivity. Where labour is 
constantly being turned over, however, the incentives for training are reduced. The 
overpricing of labour and underpricing of capital encourages the use of machinery instead of 
labour, further limiting training responsibility. 
4.6 Privatisation 
A key question that has faced economic reformers in China, as elsewhere, is whether the 
continuation of public ownership represents an insurmountable barrier to the functioning of 
markets and efficient resource allocation. In contrast to Poland, China has consistently 
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maintained its preference for public ownership as a means of achieving its vision of a socialist 
market economy. As envisaged by China's policy makers, such a system would be 
characterised by increased competition and the elimination of mandatory planning, but not 
necessarily by the replacement of SOEs with private ownership, as in a capitalist system. The 
objective is to retain the predominance of public ownership, (as mentioned in the Ninth Five-
Y ear Plan (1996-2000) that SOEs will remain the backbone of the industrial sector, but a 
breakthrough in solving their major and difficult problems has to be made in the years to 
come), supplemented by non-state and private ownership, while achieving an effective 
separation between state ownership and control of enterprises (IMF Report, 1996:30). 
As the Chinese government has pointed out that SOEs are still the backbone of 
industry, the solutions taken into consideration do not emphasise privatisation but rather 
merger and take-overs of less efficient companies by successful ones, and includes 
cooperation only with private enterprises. From this ideological stand point many critics 
object that selling means that "the state economy abandons its own enterprises, and thus is 
unable to play its leading role and stabilise the market". In other words, a state enterprise is 
more than the value of its assets. Selling may allow better use of state funds, but at the price 
of losing one state enterprise. These doubts, however, do not reflect the facts. In practice, 
these sales do not represent a selling out or privatisation, because the buyers are the staff 
members and workers of the enterprise. All these processes were major topics for discussion 
at the National Party Conference and the CPPCC in March 1996. 
So far, several 'experiments' have been launched, with the aim of concentrating, 
restructuring and increasing the cooperation of SOEs with other enterprises, either privately 
or collectively owned. To try to revive at least one sector, the government has tried to 
transform some of its lumbering, loss-making military enterprises into civilian manufacturing 
firms, but only a limited number have started to generate profits. China has also tried to 
reduce the production capacity of its ailing textile industry, with many such plants setting up 
stores and restaurants to create jobs for surplus workers (China Daily, 5 April 1996). Until 
now, Beijing policy was, 'let state enterprises lumber along, merge some, fiddle with new 
management incentives, foist their pension obligations onto local government, and wait' 
(China News Analysis, September 1996). This is surely not the sort of reform most Western 
analysts have in mind. The new policy discourages bankruptcies. Laid-off workers have to 
be re-employed by local governments. The most desperate companies can expect bail outs. 
It's not a plan so much as acknowledgment of the lack of one. 
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The recent 15th Party Congress identified the reform of ownership as a major weapon in the 
struggle to reform the state sector. The CPC announced a strategy which would manage the 
privatisation process at its own pace and follow its own way to avoid conflict between 
powerful actors in the state sector in accordance with their political agendas. There are three 
distinct types of reform which relate to three different levels in the organisation of the state 
sector: 
• the changes in the bureaucracy running the enterprises 
• the development of companies to manage state assets at the local level 
• the conversion of the enterprises into share-holding companies. 
In the meantime, if these reforms are to succeed, the state must send out clear signals 
to its enterprises by developing further strategies to carry through the ownership reforms. 
Among these, the most crucial for the future of the restructuring process will be a sound 
competition policy, the reform of the banking sector, and a speeding up of reform of the 
social security system. Also, China will have to improve the legal framework for the 
privatisation process, protecting shareholder's rights, controlling the actions of the public 
assets management companies and allowing the creation of investment funds independent of 
the government. External investors (foreign nationals, banks, investment funds) will have to 
feel that their rights as investors are sufficiently protected to allow them to inject capital into 
the state enterprises, bringing along with them an expertise and an intention to carry out 
restructuring. 
4. 7 Poland: An Introduction 
There are high expectations of FDI in the transition process in Poland, a country with a very 
limited capacity to generate capital and to change its structure due to a long history of central 
planning and mismanagement. Poland expects FDI to play a major role in three areas: first 
and foremost, it expects FDI will stimulate the privatisation process of Poland's economy, 
thereby not only converting the structure of the Polish economy into an efficient one, but also 
playing a major role in integrating the economy into the international system; secondly, FDI is 
expected to be a strong contributor of foreign capital which Poland needs due to its currency 
shortages; and finally, Poles expect that a further benefit of FDI will not only be the 
introduction of modem technology know-how, but also managerial skills. The major 
argument is that foreign investment, through its introduction of modem technology and 
international connections, ~ill change Poland's export structure to high value-added products 
(Jermakowicz, Bochniarz, 1991). 
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The objectives of MN Cs have not always been compatible with national policies, especially in 
times of globalisation, technological change, spatial organisation of economic activity and 
increasing competition for market share. The reasons why in practice there has been a great 
deal of conflict, lie in the overall economic environment in general and in the FDI policies in 
particular, as mentioned earlier. Poland aimed to attract FDI with a variety of policy 
instruments and changes to its legal system. It also offered a wide rage of incentives, 
including tax holidays and subsidised credits to foreign investors. These major policies which 
affected the entry and operations of FDI will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
4.8 Foreign Investment Policy 
The first Polish foreign investment regulations were in force by the end of the 1970s when 
the Communist Government created limited business opportunities for Polish emigres 
looking to invest from abroad. A major liberalisation came in 1986. From this date forward, 
foreign investment legislation became progressively more liberal, opening more sectors of the 
economy to foreign investors, allowing the full transfer of profits abroad, and finally, giving 
the investors more control over their ventures. This meant a basic departure from the enclave 
model approach to foreign investment. Since the departure from the enclave model approach 
to foreign investment in the late 1980s, and the gradual shift toward the national treatment 
approach (Kubielas,1996:20-35) finally adopted in the 1991 FDI law, we can now 
distinguish many changing periods in FDI policy. 
Before 1989, foreign capital participation was allowed only in the form of foreign 
partnerships limited to small-scale production and joint ventures with minority foreign 
interests. The establishments thus formed were subject to a complicated procedure of 
authorisation which excluded entry into sectors deemed of importance for social or state 
interests. They were also subject to severe restrictions on the repatriation of profits and capital 
invested, which were made dependent on the result of their hard currency balance of 
payments, with the remainder of their hard currency proceeds being compulsorily resold to 
the central bank under strict exchange controls. All tax allowances were strictly related to the 
company's export performance. With limited access to the state-regulated distribution of 
material supplies and effective prohibition on the acquisition of real estate, these partnerships 
and joint ventures were essentially treated as foreign-financed vehicles/enclaves earning hard 
currency for the central bank of Poland. Without compensation guarantees in the event of 
expropriation, with licences usually issued for only ten years and restricted transferability of 
ownership interest even within Poland, it is not surprising that· these partnerships and joint 
93 
ventures usually adopted a "quick buck" strategy, turning in extremely effective export 
performances in market niches with unusually high profitability. 
However, the average capital investment per firm was always as low as possible 
(tending to the minimum foreign capital requirement of $US 50,000). The investors were 
usually people of Polish origin (Polonia-Poles living abroad) living in neighbouring 
countries, content to spend their profits on living expenditures in Poland (Jermakowicz, 
Bochniarz, 1994:18). 
The first big wave of new FDI establishments came after the joint venture law was 
fundamentally amended in 1988, and reached its peak in 1990. The law was further modified 
in December 1989 in connection with the liberalisation of the foreign exchange law, and again 
in July 1990 in connection with the law on privatisation. The whole package was a major step 
toward a national treatment of companies with foreign participation. Joint ventures gained 
free access to all material supplies and the right to acquire real estate under a permit of the 
Minister of Interior. The restrictions on majority holdings were abandoned, though the 
transfer of shares and the initial setting-up of operations still required a permit from the 
Foreign Investment Agency. 
The regulations on the expatriation of profits were much relaxed, though the 
connection with a company's hard currency balance of payments was maintained, while the 
proceeds from the sale of shares on the dissolution of the company could not be transferred 
until 10 years had elapsed, unless the proceeds were in hard currency or the company was 
liquidated pursuant to a judicial execution (for example expropriation). This was still enclave 
treatment in comparison with what home enterprises enjoyed, but continued drawbacks were 
significantly counterbalanced by privileged tax status, as joint ventures gained a general three-
year income tax holiday combined with three-year concessions on import duty of production 
inputs. It turned out to be a genuinely attractive legal arrangement for foreign investors, 
provoking a massive explosion in new registrations with relatively small amounts of capital 
invested. These investors followed what might be called a foothold strategy, marked by 
presence rather than extended economic operation. 
The final step towards the national treatment of FDI was made with the enactment, in 
July 1991, of the Law on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties. Under 
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this law, practically all restrictions on the transfer of profits or equity capital were abandoned. 
The requirement that the setting-up of such activities be authorised by a state body was also 
abandoned, except for a special few areas (defence, sea and airports, legal practice and real 
estate service) where permits would still be required, as they would also need to be where 
privatisation of state enterprises was involved. At the same time, however, the automatic 
three-year corporate tax exemptions were also discontinued except for investments above 2 
million ECU s, or if joint ventures were located in a depressed area with high structural 
unemployment, or brought with it new technology, or exported more than 29 per cent of its 
output. At the same time, a total guarantee of payment of equivalent compensation for losses 
in the event of expropriation was now offered by the Ministry of the Treasury. These new 
regulations may be regarded as the most important factors in the second wave of FDI inflow, 
in 1992, which was comparable to the first one in terms of number of establishments, but far 
more impressive in terms of capital invested, with the annual inflow reaching nearly $US 1 bn 
for the first time and all this despite sharply declining profit margins on sales and returns on 
equity. At the same time, foreign investors increased significantly their stake in established 
joint ventures as measured by the percentage of foreign capital participation or average capital 
invested per firm. This may have signalled a change in investment strategy in favour of more 
long-term involvement, less affected by the short-term prospect of a temporary tax holiday. 
This process of the liberalisation of FDI legislation culminated in the Law on Companies with 
Foreign Participation of 14 June 1991. 
This Law was amended in March 1996, abolishing special administrative 
requirements for setting up and operating a company with foreign capital so that the 
conditions offered to foreign investors were equal to those enjoyed by local businesses. A 
permit would be required when a legal entity transferred state-owned assets to a joint venture. 
Poland also signed bilateral agreements on the protection and promotion of foreign 
investment with several countries. In July 1996 Poland became a member of the OECD, 
which, along with the liberalisation of capital flows, included changes making it easier for 
foreign companies to set up in Poland. More generally, all new laws are now screened for 
compatibility with EU legislation, while existing ones are to be gradually reviewed and 
amended in the same direction. 
The following legal forms are available to a foreign investor who wishes to establish a 
business entity in Poland (for details see Appendix 4.3): 
• a limited liability company (Sp. z o.o.), in which shares are issued in 
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exchange for contributed capital 
• a joint stock company (S.A.), which differs from a limited liability company (apart 
from the required minimum of equity capital), in that there is a possibility of 
issuing bearer shares; companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange must have 
a joint stock form 
• a representative or branch office. 
A foreign investor may enter Poland in order to: 
• establish a limited liability company, in which the foreign investor may join other 
foreign or Polish investors or be the sole owner 
• establish a joint stock company with other foreign or Polish shareholders (but not 
alone). The establishment of a joint stock company generally requires at least three 
founders 
• establish a joint stock company with other foreign or Polish shareholders with 
equity raised through a public subscription of shares (a separate permit issued by 
the Securities Commission is required for a public offering) 
• acquire an interest in an existing Polish limited liability or joint stock company. 
4.8.1 Tax Policy 
Poland moved quickly, early in the 1990s, to established a modern tax structure. In doing so, 
it closely followed the Western European pattern combining personal and corporate income 
tax with a value-added tax (VAT) and several excise taxes. After six years, the legislative 
work is largely done. New, Western-style taxes have performed very well but with less net 
effects on public finances and private enterprise operations than the raw data suggests (World 
Bank Country Study, 1994). New challenges are now emerging for further liberalisation and 
changes in tax regulation in accordance with the country's transition to a market economy and 
its accession to the EU. The major changes in tax regulations should concern new tax rates, 
capital group taxation, and the issue of transfer pricing (for details about taxes see Appendix 
4.4). 
4.8.2 Tax Incentives 
The Council of Ministers' regulation concerning new investment tax reliefs was published in 
Dzennik Ustaw (Journal of Laws) Nos. 18/94 and 68/94. It introduces investment tax relief 
for limited-liability companies, joint-stock companies, state-owned enterprises, cooperatives 
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and other business entities. Foreign investors enjoy equal treatment with Polish investors. 
The law granting the possibility of deductions specifies six situations in which persons can 
take advantage of reliefs: 
• Parties that invest at least 2 million ECU: parties that have invested no less than 2 
million ECU before starting operations may deduct this sum from their revenue in 
a given year and over the next three years (up to 25 per cent per year). 
• Exporters: if a company's export-derived profit constitutes more than 50 per cent 
of the export revenue derived from export in a given year and exceeds 8 million 
ECU, taxpayers may deduct their investment expenses from their revenue. A 
possibility thus exists for a revenue deduction of up to 50 per cent. 
• Licences, patents, results of domestic R&D projects: taxpayers who incur 
investment expenditures upon the purchase and installation of machines or devices, 
or connected with the implementation of licences, patents and results of domestic 
development projects can deduct the investment sum from taxable revenue. A 
possibility exists for a revenue deduction of up to 50 per cent. 
• Sale of sea products and processed fish outside Poland (SSW 234): taxpayers who 
derive profits outside Poland from the sale of sea products and processed fish to 
foreign parties, and who have invested in machines and devices, have the right to 
deduct expenses worth up to 50 per cent. 
• Profit margin: a company's profit must constitute at least 4 per cent of revenue (in 
the sectors of food processing or construction services) or 8 per cent of revenue in 
other cases. All taxpayers who have met this condition may deduct the whole or 
part of their investment expenses from their taxable revenue. The maximum 
deduction from revenue cannot exceed 25 per cent per year. 
• Medicines, medical equipment and ISO 9000 quality systems: taxpayers 
purchasing machinery or equipment or constructing buildings to set up a high-
quality security system for production, or implement a certified ISO 9000 quality 
system are allowed to deduct expenses for the above equalling up to 50 per cent of 
taxable revenue. 
Relief defined in the Council of Ministers' regulation do not apply to taxpayers who 
have already taken advantage of any other reliefs or deductions (including tax reliefs defined 
in the Law on Companies with Foreign participation of June 14, 1991). In the case of 
concurrence of deduction rights, the taxpayer may take advantage of only one of the rights. 
Also, Poland has signed withholding tax rates for double tax treaty relief with many countries 
(for details see Appendix 4.5) (PAIZ, 1997; The Warsaw Voice, 1997) 
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4.8.3 Economic Zones 
To boost the economies of poor Polish regions, the government has launched a series of 
Special Economic Zones centred on aging heavy industries. The first zone "Euro-Park" 
(designated SSE in Polish) opened in 1995 in the southern town of Mielec, where aircraft 
manufacture had been located. Four SSEs were created near Czestochowa, Katowice, Lodz 
and Suwalki in 1996; another four were due to be established in 1997. Also, the Council of 
Ministers proposed the establishment of so-called separate investment-project concentration 
areas, in late spring 1996. The separate project concentration areas were to be set up in areas 
vacated by state farms and in communes with only one major workplace. Provincial 
governors and provincial tax offices would draw up area maps. 
The main idea behind these special areas is to give investors tax breaks, although they 
are smaller breaks than SSEs can offer. To encourage investment in regions with high 
unemployment, the Industry Ministry is considering social-security breaks, making investors 
exempt from ZUS social insurance premiums, which currently boost employers' labour costs 
by approximately 48 per cent (The Warsaw Voice, July 1996). The Polish government has 
also established four duty-free zones in major big cities. 
4.9 Trade Policy 
The reform process began in 1990 when Poland abolished the state monopoly and 
administrative management of foreign trade; the trade system was largely liberalised and 
made transparent, with customs duties becoming the main trade policy instrument. Foreign 
trade corporations were dismantled and all firms and individuals could take part in export and 
import operations. The number of firms engaged in foreign trade increased. Private 
enterprises grew rapidly, especially in import activities. The most dynamic part of the foreign 
trade activity was located outside the state sector, and this non-state sector accounted for an 
increased share of trade flows (see Table 4.9) 
Table 4.9 Poland: The Private (Non-state) Firms in Foreign Trade 
Activity 1993 1994 1995 1996 
In export(%) 44.0 46.4 48.6 52.7 
In imports(%) 59.8 60.2 61.7 64.5 
Source: Warsaw School of Economics, Poland-International Economic Repon, World Economic Research 
Institute, Warsaw, 1996, pp. 61-78 
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The increased share of private firms in foreign trade resulted from the creation of new private 
firms and from the privatisation process itself. Joint ventures with foreign capital also gained 
increased importance both in exports and imports (Lemoine, 1996). Despite these changes, 
SOEs still retained an important position in export supplies, thus confirming the fact that in 
the area of foreign trade the SOEs were able to adjust their behaviour to the new incentives 
(Naughton, 1994). Initially, Poland used trade policy as an instrument to combat near 
hyperinflation in 1990-91. Thus, most non-tariff restrictions were eliminated (January 1990) 
and customs duties were suspended on 4,500 import items (June 1990), with the average 
applied tariff being only 5.5 per cent, so as to use import prices as transmitters of world 
market prices. Thereafter, to support the budget and the balance of payments, the tariff 
suspension was withdrawn (August 1991), and the average unweighted most favoured nation 
(MFN) tariff rose to 18.4 per cent. This was followed by the implementation of an across-
the-board 6 per cent import surcharge (which was due to abolished in 1997), from which 
only alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, fuels and automobiles were exempted (W odd 
Bank Country Study, 1994:63-70). 
To assist the transformation process, the EU improved access to its markets, initially 
through a bilateral trade and cooperation agreement (September 1989) that provided for the 
phasing out of selective quantitative restrictions (QRS) over a ten-year period and granted 
MFN status, including the more favourable Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
treatment for some goods (January 1990). In December 1991, the EU opened further its 
market for Poland, when the Association Agreement with Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia was signed. This agreement fostered further expansion of trade with the EU, 
the share of EU partners in Poland's external trade having already become more important 
than for several EU countries themselves, underlining Poland's continued integration with 
Western Europe. 
Exports are being facilitated by the phasing out of EU tariffs on Polish exports that 
began in 1992 with the abolishment of duties on almost half of Poland's industrial exports. 
By January 1995, around 70 per cent of Poland's industrial exports, (representing 85 per 
cent of total (recorded) exports), benefited from duty-free access to the EU market. This 
privilege was extended to steel products in January 1996, and should encompass textiles and 
clothing as well from January 1997 (however, voluntary export restraints in the latter sector 
will only be lifted one year later). Among the remaining barriers to exports to the EU are anti-
dumping actions, mainly affecting the metallurgical and chemical sectors (Foreign Trade 
Research Institute, 1995). In addition, there are some self-imposed export quotas, such as for 
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raw skins and metal scrap (however, Poland agreed in early 1996 to relax some of those 
export restrictions), as well as some export licensing requirements (for petroleum products, 
dairy items and textiles). 
On the import side, the Uruguay Round led Poland to liberalise 96 per cent of its 
tariffs on industrial goods (exceptions included motor vehicles, automotive components, oil 
and some textile products) and later, included all tariffs on agricultural products. The phasing 
out of tariffs stipulated in the European Agreement started on the Polish side with the 
abolishment in 1992 of customs duties on one-quarter of the industrial imports (especially 
capital goods and raw materials), and is being followed by a series of cuts in the remainder 
spread out over the second half of the 1990s. From 1999, most imports of industrial goods 
from the EU should enter Poland duty free. Tariffs on imports from other countries of the 
Central European Free Trade Association (CEFT A) are also subject to accelerated cuts. As a 
result the trade, weighted average tariff for industrial goods declined to 9 .5 per cent in 
January 1995 and 6.75 per cent in January 1996 (see Table 4.9.1) 
Table 4.9.l Poland: Import Tariffs ( % ) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Agricultural 2.04 19.52 20.17 19.77 19.37 18.98 18.60 
products 
Industrial 18.38 14.49 9.78 4.92 3.58 2.50 2.15 
products 
Combined 19.48 16.30 11.03 6.70 5.47 4.48 4.12 
Im;eorts surchar~e 6 5 3 0 0 0 0 
Note: The rates overstate actual tariffs in so far as they abstract from tariff suspensions, which as of 
January 1996 were equivalent to about one percentage point. 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 125. 
In the case of agricultural products, the average import tariffs remain much higher, 
partly due to the conversion of non-tariffs into tariffs. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement, 
agricultural tariff ceilings are to be reduced by 36 per cent in six annual instalments from 
1995, but given that the ceilings are not binding on most items, actual tariffs rates may not 
fall that much (OECD Economic Survey, Poland 1997:19). To further diversify its 
geographical expansion of trade, Poland signed similar agreements with the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). The agreement with EFTA parallels in many ways the EU 
Association Agreement. It could, however, be considered more liberal overall than the EU 
Agreement. Tariffs and QRS are eliminated for all industrial goods (except textiles and 
metallurgical products, mainly steel). There is a completely free trade in fish products. 
Processed agricultural products receive the same treatment granted to EU goods before the 
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introduction of the European Economic Area (EBA). Furthermore, foreign payments and 
pricing mechanisms within the former CMEA have been transformed into a standard system 
of payments for transactions valued at world prices, and most of these transactions are now 
settled in convertible currencies. Internal subsidies have been reduced or in some cases 
completely eliminated. Producer subsidies were of two types - direct trade subsidies and 
production subsidies. Direct trade subsidies have mostly been eliminated, while production 
subsidies have been reduced to varying degrees. External subsidies, which allowed intra-
CMEA prices to deviate substantially from world prices, have been eliminated (Drabek and 
Smith, 1995). 
In 1994, the government implemented an export promotion programme. This 
programme includes tax and financial incentives as well as the provision of guarantees and 
insurance. Tax incentives consist of VAT refunds for export products, income tax relief for 
investors involved in export promotion and property tax relief for companies investing in 
exports. Financial relief will be provided by the National Bank of Poland (NBP) through 
attractive re-finance credits to institutions financing exports. Finally, the Export Credit 
Insurance corporation (KUKE) will be recapitalised ($15 million) and an additional fund will 
be established for the provision of export insurance against non-commercial risk. 
4.10 Foreign Exchange Control System 
Legislation governing foreign exchange transactions is aimed at defending the domestic 
convertibility of the zloty. Polish currency as well as securities expressed in Polish currency 
may be transferred abroad and from abroad without any limitations. The limitations relate to 
foreign exchange values which principally means foreign exchange currency and international 
money SDR and ECU. There are a number of general regulations relating to foreign exchange 
transactions: 
• all domestic settlements, with few exceptions, are made in zloty. Use of foreign currencies 
for this purpose is prohibited 
• all receivable of foreign origin, denominated in foreign currencies, must be immediately 
transferred to Poland, (for instance current payments to Polish companies from foreign 
importers may not exceed a three month period). 
It is however permissible to: 
• credit foreign or Polish importers subject to informing NBP about the transaction and 
within generally accepted terms of such credits on world markets 
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• offset mutual, current receivable and liabilities with a given client up to $US 50,000 
• collect receivable of up to $US 10,000 in any form. 
Companies treated as "domestic entities" may hold a foreign currency account in 
Poland or abroad only in exceptional cases, with the permission of the NBP. Moreover, they 
may buy foreign currencies in order to settle foreign exchange liabilities subject to the 
following general rules: 
• payments for goods and services must be properly documented by invoices; 
• payments of dividends abroad may only take place after an audit of the company's 
financial statements. 
Foreigners working in companies and representative offices are not subject to the 
above restrictions. They are allowed to transfer foreign currencies to Poland, keep foreign 
currency accounts in foreign exchange banks and to buy Polish zloty, depending on their 
needs. The transfer of foreign currencies abroad nonetheless requires that their origin be 
documented. 
4.11 Foreign Exchange Policy 
During the 1980s, the value of the Polish zloty was determined in terms of a basket of 
currencies and adjusted periodically with a view to securing the profitability of Polish 
exports. In addition to the official market, there was an unofficial market for foreign 
exchange, where the value of the zloty was determined by market forces. As inflation 
accelerated, the size and frequency of adjustments in the official exchange rate increased. 
The liberalisation of the foreign exchange system has been an important component of 
trade policy. In Poland, as in most CEE countries, the initial devaluations were followed by 
the re-appreciation of the currencies (IMF, 1994). At the beginning of 1990, internal 
convertibility of the zloty was introduced and the foreign exchange market for current 
transactions was unified at a rate of Zl 9,500 per US dollar, which involved a 31.6 per cent 
devaluation of the official rate (Table 4.11). Alongside the official fixed exchange rate, the 
parallel market rate continued to be determined freely by market forces in a market where a 
large number of small foreign exchange dealers (kantors) have participated. 
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Table 4.11 Poland: Exchange Rate Policy 
Period Exchange Rate Policy Action Comments 
Before 1990 Multiple exchange rates, Frequent and substantial 
adjustable peg to a basket of devaluation 
currencies 
January 1, 1990 Fixed exchange rate system Unification of official Exchange rate: 
and black market rates ZI 9,500 per $US 
Devaluation (31.6%) 
May 17, 1991 Fixed exchange rate system Devaluation (16.8% Exchange rate: 
against the dollar, 14.4 Zl 11,100 per $US 
against the basket) Basket includes: 
Shift from a dollar peg 45%, deutsche mark 
to a basket peg 35%, pound sterling 
10%, French franc 
5%, Swiss franc 
Oct 15, 1991 Preannounced crawling peg Rate of crawl announced: Basket unchanged 
1.8% per month (Zl 9 per 
day) 
Feb 25, 1992 Preannounced crawling peg Devaluation (10.7% Exchange rate: 
against the basket) Zl 13,360 per $US 
Rate of crawl: 1.8% Basket unchanged 
per month (Zl 11 per day) 
July 10, 1992 Preannounced crawling peg Rate of crawl: 1.8% per Basket unchanged 
month (Zl 12 per day) Technical 
adjustment made 
Aug 27, 1993 Preannounced crawling peg Devaluation (7.4% against Basket unchanged 
the basket). Rate of crawl 
reduced: 1.6% per month 
(Zl 15 per day) 
Feb 10, 1995 Preannounced crawling peg Devaluation (6.7% against Exchange rate: 
the basket). Rate of crawl Zl 9,800 per $US 
reduced: 1.2% per month Basket unchanged 
(Zl 9 per day) 
Jan 20, 1996 Preannounced crawling peg Rate of crawl reduced: Basket unchanged 
1.0% per month Technical 
adjustment made 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Poland-Exchange Rate, Ministry of Finance, Warsaw, 1997; IMF, Poland-The 
Path to a Market Economy, Occasional Paper no. 113, IMF, Washington DC, 1994, p. 46 
The purpose behind fixing the exchange rate was to break Poland's emerging 
hyperinflation - in the latter half of 1989, the monthly rate of inflation averaged 30 per cent 
(Th1F Report, Poland 1994:45-54). In May 1991, in order to reverse the outflow of foreign 
currency reserves and the loss of international competitiveness, the exchange rate 
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arrangement was shifted from the dollar peg to a peg based on a basket, given an increased 
concentration of trade with Western Europe, and the zloty was devalued by 14.4 per cent 
against this basket. The latter was composed of five main convertible currencies, roughly in 
proportion to the currency composition of the Polish trade turnover. Furthermore, to reduce 
the loss of competitiveness while at the same time maintaining the role of the exchange rate as 
a nominal anchor, a pre-announced crawling peg system was introduced on 15 October 1991. 
This active crawling peg policy was accordingly set below the projected inflation differential 
with trading partners. 
The rate of crawl has also been lowered once, which is consistent with the authority's 
determination to reduce inflation. Under the new system, the official exchange rate against the 
same basket would depreciate daily, so as to achieve a depreciation of 1.8 per cent per month 
(approximately 24 per cent on an annual basis); the daily correction was intended to lower the 
trade risk associated with sharp and unpredictable exchange rate adjustments. 
In 1995 the NBP continued with the exchange rate policy initiated in 1991. Its aim 
was to limit the impact of devaluation on inflation, ensure a safe level of foreign exchange 
reserves and protect the competitiveness of Polish exports. The main change which took 
place in 1995 was the introduction of a floating exchange rate mechanism on 16 May. The 
following considerations argued for letting market instruments play a greater role in the 
determination of the exchange rate: 
• sustained economic growth 
• a surplus in the supply of foreign exchange reserves 
• liberalisation of foreign exchange regulations. 
The move to a more flexible exchange rate mechanism was made with a view to 
reducing the influence of foreign exchange reserves on money creation. The exchange rate of 
the zloty against convertible currencies on the interbank market is allowed to float but with 
fluctuations confined within a 7 per cent band of the central bank rate. The new arrangement 
aimed at increasing the bank's freedom of action in disposing of foreign exchange reserves 
and in their exchange rate policies towards customers. The object of this liberalisation 
measure was to stimulate competition on the interbank market and to lower the costs of 
servicing customers (OECD Economic Survey, Poland 1997). The objectives of the exchange 
rate policy have been preserved thanks to the following elements of the new system: 
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• retention of the principle of monthly devaluation of the zloty 
• the possibility of influencing the market exchange rate through NBP intervention. 
The rules of the new exchange rate system provide for three kinds of rates: 
• the central (par) rate 
• the fixing rate 
• the exchange office rate. 
The central rate is fixed by the NBP every morning as a par rate on the basis of 
information from the Frankfurt market. It is subject to a monthly devaluation of 1.2 per cent 
against a basket of currencies. The fixing rate is the closing price on the interbank market 
expressed in terms of two currencies: the US dollar and the Deutschmark. The margin of 
permitted fluctuation around the par values is 7 per cent. It is used as the official rate for 
statistical purposes. The exchange office rate is freely determined on the currency market by 
each office. 
4.12 Labour Market Policy 
The major framework for labour policies is provided by the Law on Employment and 
Unemployment of December 1989. This law was changed so many times during 1990 and 
1991 that a replacement was needed (a new law is currently being drafted). Other 
supplementary legal Acts have been issued to establish the legal background for specific 
labour market policies. The Ministers of Labour and Social Policy share responsibility for the 
implementation of these policies. Labour market policies are financed by the "Labour Fund". 
Its revenues come from compulsory contributions paid by the employees (in 1993, 3 per cent 
of an employee's gross wage) and state budget transfers. Total revenues of the fund 
increased from 4,600 to 24,000 billion zlotys between 1990 and 1992, i.e. from 0.6 to 2 per 
cent of GDP (Gora, 1994; PAIZ, 1995). 
Similar to other CEE countries, until 1993 the Labour Fund was primarily utilised for 
paying unemployment benefits; roughly 86 per cent of the fund was spent on this sector. The 
share of unemployed persons receiving benefits among all unemployed has substantially 
decreased over time, from 70 to 40 per cent between 1990 and 1993 (Gora, 1994), although 
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the number of recipients has tripled. The decline of the coverage stems from the 
aforementioned change to the regulations. 
Companies with foreign participation can employ any number of personnel. There are 
no limitations either to the number of employees or to their remuneration. Recruitment and 
dismissal in labour contracts is free and based on international practice. Joint ventures can 
freely chose their own hiring and firing strategies as necessary. Companies with foreign 
participation can also determine their own organisational structures and personnel policies. 
Enterprises with foreign investment are obliged by contract to train Polish workers, 
but local labour offices do not interfere in the selection process for training. An employment 
contract may be concluded for an unspecified period, for a specified period or for the period 
required to carry out a specified piece of work. Such contracts may be preceded by a contract 
for a trial period which shall not exceed two weeks. In the case of a managerial or other 
independent post, or post carrying significant personal liability for property entrusted to the 
employee, the trial period can be up to three months. 
Labour policy regarding wages in enterprises with foreign participation is on an equal 
footing with normal entitlements in similar local enterprises. Insurance contributions to the 
social security scheme (ZUS) are 48 per cent of gross salary comprising 45 per cent for social 
security, 3 per cent for the Unemployment Fund, and 0.5 per cent for the Employee's Benefit 
Guaranteed Fund, for both Polish and foreign citizens. They are paid entirely by the 
employer. The employer must register with the ZUS department responsible for the region in 
which the employer is located within 10 days after the first employee has started work. In 
addition, employers of companies that are not covered by collective labour arrangements are 
required to establish social benefit funds. The mandatory annual contribution to the fund is 
37 .5 per cent of the average monthly salary in the national economy multiplied by the number 
of employees. 
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Table 4.12 Poland: Monthly Wages in the Economies in Transition 
Country 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Slovak Republic 
Russia 
Wages in $US/month 
114 
250 
221 
85 
317 
98 
65 
194 
82 
421 
201 
99 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 180; EU 
Commission, Poland Membership to EU, Commission of the EU, Brussels, July 1997, p. 119. 
Products and services produced or provided improperly by the employee due to his 
own fault can be penalised by the withholding of some or all of his remuneration. The 
employee is entitled to remuneration for interruptions in employment which are not his fault. 
Finally, if some problems arise with reference to an employment contract or other related 
matters, the case can be brought before the employment courts by either the employer or the 
employee. 
4.13 Privatisation 
Policies to deal with state enterprises had to take into account the influential position of Polish 
workers, both within the enterprises and in the legislature. In 1989 the Solidarity movement 
struggled with a fundamental debate over the role of workers in management. Many members 
of Solidarity, although supporting the freeing of markets, wanted a system of workers' 
management. The liberal intellectuals, however, argued that such a system would create too 
much rigidity, pointing to the unsuccessful Yugoslav policies to support their position, and 
were strongly supported by Western advisers, the IMF and the World Bank. The Polish 
government has tried hard to control the privatisation process. There was a political 
consensus when the Mazowiecki government came to power to prevent at all costs the 
continuing 'nomenklatura' privatisation. The cost of doing so was to re-centralise the process 
in the new Ministry of Ownership Transformation, however, government privatisation 
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programmes proved very difficult to implement, and the most effective forms of privatisation 
were those that depended the most on initiatives from below and required the least 
government control and decisions, such as the very successful privatisation of small shops 
and firms in 1990. 
There have also been debates over another important question: what should be done to 
promote good management in enterprises that may not be privatised, at least in the relatively 
short term, because of their functions (e.g, public utilities), the absence of buyers or the 
strong preference of their workers? Programmes were introduced in some industries to deal 
with such enterprises and legal forms for independent state firms do exist, but a general 
policy covering the remaining state sector is still in the process of being developed. Policies 
governing the remaining state enterprises are assessed in the following section. 
4.13.1 Methods of Privatisation 
Privatisation has been proceeding along three main routes. The first one, under the heading of 
direct privatisation or liquidation, covers small medium-sized enterprises. The second route, 
usually referred to as indirect or capital privatisation, concerns larger firms and involves open 
sales of shares and the search for strategic outside investors. The third route, mass 
privatisation, is meant to distribute ownership rights to all citizens. This only started recently 
and on a fairly limited scale. In addition, a number of SOEs have been commercialised i.e. 
transformed into wholly-state-owned joint-stock companies (for details about each 
privatisation see Appendix 4.6). 
By the end of 1995, privatisation or commercialisation had been initiated in less than 
half of the SOEs that existed in 1990, when the process began and privatisation had been 
completed in less than 20 per cent of cases (Table 4.6). Even in the latter, the state has 
sometimes retained a substantial proportion of shares, remaining the controlling shareholder. 
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Table 4.13.1 Poland: Progress of Ownership Transfer 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total Number of SOEs 8,453 8,228 7,245 5,924 4,955 4,357 3,987 
Bankruptcy (Article 19 of 
SOE Law) 
Started 18 540 857 1,082 1,245 1,358 1,780 
Completed 0 19 86 186 303 396 590 
Direct privatisation (Article 
37 of the Privatisation Law) 
Started 31 449 719 917 1,042 1,149 1,540 
Completed 0 182 475 707 945 1,054 1,280 
Converted into JSC* 38 260 480 527 723 958 1,240 
NIE-program 0 0 0 0 0 321 589 
Capital privatisation 6 27 51 96 147 219 280 
Public offerings 5 11 12 15 19 22 25 
Trade sales 1 16 39 81 110 132 156 
Mixed methods 0 0 0 0 3 5 7 
Tenders (j 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Debt-equity swaps 0 0 0 0 15 60 80 
Total 
Started 87 1,249 2,056 2,526 3,010 3,465 3,850 
Completed 6 228 612 989 1,395 1,669 1,790 
Income privatisation (flows 
in zl min) 
Total 170.9 484.4 780.4 1,594. 2,641. 
8 7 
Leasing/sales of liquidated na 46.4 171.8 287.0 322.9 406.2 186.6 
assets 
Capital privatisation na 124.5 308.7 439.4 846.7 1,714. 1,100. 
2 9 
Bank Erivatisation na 0.0 3.9 54.0 425.2 521.3 150.6 
Notes: Joint Stock Companies 
mln=million, zl=zloty 
Source: Centre for Eastern Europe, Poland-Economic Surveys, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 67; Ministry of 
Privatisation, Privatisation in Poland, Ministry of Privatisation and Central Statistical Office, 
Warsaw, 1997. 
Direct privatisation has followed two tracks. A substantial portion of enterprises were 
subject to Article 37 of the 1990 Privatisation Law, the assets and liabilities often being leased 
to insiders as the first step towards an eventual purchase. This method strengthens the control 
of the enterprise by workers and management. A large number of enterprises in poor financial 
condition were liquidated in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of the 1981 Law on 
SOEs, the assets being mainly sold to private entrepreneurs. This has proved an efficient way 
to put idle productive capacity back into use. The sale of immobile and social assets, 
however, has been more difficult and, as is evident from Table 4.13.1, this type of 
liquidation procedure usually takes several years to be completed. Capital privatisation has 
been the main source of revenue for the budget even though it concerned a much smaller 
number of firms. In 1994-95, the scope of capital privatisation increased, extending notably 
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to the tobacco industry. Many deals involved foreign buyers, who in 1995 accounted for two 
thirds of the revenue from capital privatisation. In a number of cases the foreign investor had 
to offer employment or wage guarantees to the incumbent work-force. Finally, a growing 
share of income from ownership transfer is coming from bank privatisation (OECD Report, 
1997; Staar, 1993). 
Assessing the merits of alternative privatisation methods with respect to corporate 
governance is complicated by potential selection biases: it cannot be ruled out that post-
privatisation performance was superior under one scheme or other because the pool of the 
firms covered by the latter was better to begin with. Nevertheless, a conclusion reached in 
many surveys is that the most impressive improvements in enterprise performance were 
obtained through capital privatisation especially when it involved foreign investment. Two 
advantages of this mode of ownership transfer are that it brings in an outsider motivated by 
the firm's future results rather than by the protection of insider rents, and that it is often 
accompanied by a significant injection of fresh human, physical and financial capital. It 
should also be noted that several new private firms started operations with assets that 
formerly belonged to SOEs and have prospered. 
In September 1996, after three years of tempestuous discussions and negotiations, a 
Law on the Commercialisation and Privatisation of SOEs was enacted. The Law does not 
alter the basic principles of multi-track privatisation but does include several new rules. The 
Law continues to provide for the commercialisation of large SOEs slated for subsequent 
privatisation, but the consent of enterprise insiders is not required any more. Such 
commercialisation involves the abolition of the workers' council as a management body, 
depriving it of the ability to block privatisation. A new option is commercialisation without 
subsequent privatisation, applicable in particular to enterprises requiring restructuring. In this 
case, commercialisation is to be decided by the government as a collective entity rather than 
by the Ministry of Privatisation (Dabrowski, 1995). 
Ownership transfers in 1996 were expected to involve the initiation of the direct 
privatisation of 150-200 enterprises and the acceleration of capital privatisation, which would 
embrace approximately 90 firms, including a number of very large ones such as Polish 
Airlines (LOT). the Katowice Steel Mill, and sometime in 1997, the copper producer Polska 
Miedz (the latter will constitute one of the biggest privatisation deals in the CEE). Capital 
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privatisation in 1996 was also scheduled to encompass firms in the chemical, pharmaceutical, 
food, machinery, building materials and trade sectors. 
4.14 Conclusion 
The foreign investment policies have been shaped by the general economic policies which in 
tum create the investment environment. China's import substitution policy push for advanced 
rather than appropriate technology and policy-induced price distortions, negative real rates of 
interest, high wages for unskilled labour and undervalued foreign exchange rates have been 
pervasive. The effect of policy distortions often led local governments to intervene, either by 
directly imposing decisions on recruitment and local market access or else by offering enough 
cheap credit or subsidised inputs to make the desired decisions profitable from an enterprise's 
perspective. The interest rate on bank loans was kept far below the market-clearing level. 
Some unfavoured firms cannot obtain enough of the credit they need. Not only was the 
interest rate low, but both interest and principal payments were normally tax deductible. The 
Chinese economic system favoured highly capital-intensive industries and technologies, 
resulting in the allocation of resources in very different directions from those seen in 
developing market-oriented economies. This kind of policy environment serves as an 
impediment to the export performance of enterprises with foreign investment in 
manufacturing, in tum, limiting the contribution of FDI to economic development in China. 
In contrast to China, Poland up to mid-1994 accepted a mixed policy of import 
substitution and export promotion dictated by a different economic environment. Prices for 
goods and interest rates were liberalised and set by the market, exchange rates were 
determined in terms of a basket of currencies to secure the profitability of Polish exports. 
Convertibility of the Polish zloty was introduced; the foreign exchange market for current 
transactions was unified; and the zloty was devalued to create a more competitive edge for 
Polish exports. Interest rates were reduced and the producer-price-based real effective 
exchange rate appreciated. The exchange rate of the zloty against convertible currencies on the 
interbank market was allowed to float but with fluctuations confined within a 7 per cent band 
of the central bank rate. The new arrangement was aimed at increasing the banks' freedom of 
action in the disposal of foreign exchange reserves and in their exchange policies towards 
customers. The objective of these liberalisation measures was to stimulate competition on the 
interbank market and to lower the cost of servicing customers. In addition to these exchange 
and interest rate policy actions, import tariffs and import surcharges were cut several times. 
The surrender requirement for export proceeds was abolished, which also reduced 
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conversion costs borne by the enterprises. These kinds of policy measures serve as 
stimulation for export performance for enterprises with foreign investment and as a 
significant contribution to the expanding role of FDI in the economic development of Poland. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Specific Policies Towards FDI in China, 1979-95 
General measures 
1.6.79. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese 
and Foreign Investment. 
30.1.82. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore 
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises. 
20.9.83 Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
1. 7. 85. Foreign Economic Contract Law. 
30.9.85. Provisional Regulations concerning Preferential Treatment for Port and Wharf 
Construction Projects Financed with Sino-Foreign Joint Equity. 
26.1.86 Provisional Regulations for the Control of Financial Trust and Investment 
Institutions. 
11.10.86. Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment. 
12.4.86. Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly-Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises. 
1. 7 .86. Provisional Regulations on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Designing of 
Engineering Projects. 
17 .12. 87. Notice of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on the 
Relevant Legal Problems in the Case of Establishing Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures 
13.4.88. Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-Foreign Cooperative 
Enterprises. 
3.7 .88. State Council Provisions for Encouraging Investment by Taiwan's 
Compatriots. 
4.4.90. National People's Congress, Decision to Revise the "People's Republic of 
China, Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law". 
Taxation measures 
14.12.80. Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law 
of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese 
Foreign Investment. 
9.12.80. Stipulation Concerning the Levy of Individual Income Tax on Chinese 
Personnel Who Work for Joint Venture Enterprises. 
10.9.80. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint 
Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
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10.9.80. Announcement of the State Council on Taxation of Joint Ventures and 
Cooperative Operations with Chinese-Foreign Investment. 
10.9 .80. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China. 
13 .12. 81. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China concerning Foreign 
Enterprises. 
8. 6. 81. Circular of the Ministry of Finance Concerning Some Questions About the 
Income Tax of Joint Ventures Comprising Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
8. 6. 81 . Explanation Concerning the Levy of Profit Tax Remitted from China. 
8.6.81. Stipulation Concerning Tax Exemption for Remitting from China the Tax 
Refund of Profit Reinvestment. 
8.6.81. Stipulation Concerning the Tax Reduction and Exemption Period for Newly-
Established Joint Business Enterprises. 
1.1.82. Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign 
Enterprises. 
21.2.82. Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic 
of China Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
17 .3 .82. Issues Concerning the Computation of Tax Payment in Renminbi Converted 
from Income in Foreign Currency. 
15.4.82. Provisional Regulations of the General Taxation Bureau/Ministry of Finance 
of the People's Republic of China Concerning Tax Registration by Foreign 
Enterprises for the Commencement and Termination of Operations. 
8.4.82. Decision Regarding Tax Cuts for Joint Ventures. 
21. 9. 82. Announcement of the State Council on the Taxation of Joint Ventures and 
Cooperative Operations with Chinese-Foreign Investment. 
1. 1. 8 3. Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance Concerning the Reduction of, or 
Exemption from, Income Tax on Royalties for Proprietary Technology. 
1.1.83. Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of 
China Regarding the Reduction of, or Exemption from, Income Tax on 
Royalties for the Use of Proprietary Technology. 
1.1.83. Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of 
China Concerning the Reduction of, or Exemption from, Income Tax to 
Interest Derived from China by Foreign Businesses. 
5. 6. 8 3. Provisional Regulations of the Ministry of Finance Concerning the Imposition of 
the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax and the Enterprise Income 
Tax on Foreign Commercial Contract Operations and the Provision of Labour 
Services. 
2. 9. 8 3. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Concerning Amendment of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of 
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China, Concerning Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures. 
1.12.84. Interim Provisions of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
Concerning the Reduction of, and Exemption from, Enterprise Income Tax 
and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the Special Economic 
Zones and 14 Coastal Port Cities. 
21.4.86. Notice of the General Taxation Bureau/Ministry of Finance Concerning 
Several Regulations Relating to the Levying of Income tax on Sino-Foreign 
Joint and Wholly-Foreign Owned Enterprises. 
30.8.86. Notice on the Question of Income and Payment oflncome Tax by Sino-
Foreign Joint Equity Ventures, Contractual Joint Ventures, Cooperative 
Production Enterprises and Enterprises with Only Foreign Investment. 
30 .1. 87. Measures of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China 
Regarding the Implementation of Preferential Tax Treatment in Provisions of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China for the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment. 
31. l . 8 7. Implementation Measures of the Ministry of Finance for Putting into Effect 
the Preferential Terms on Taxation Provided in Provisions of the State Council 
on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment. 
2.2.87. Ministry of Finance, General Administration of Taxation, Several Policy and 
Professional Questions Concerning the Levying of Income Tax From 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment. 
8. 8. 8 7. Provisional Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Reduction of 
Individual Income Tax on Wages and Salaries of Foreign Nationals Working in 
China. 
1.10.88. People's Republic of China, Stamp Duty Provisional Regulations 
Implementation Rules. 
5.12.88. People's Republic of China, Enterprise with Foreign Investment Income Tax 
Laws (Draft). 
15.6.88. Provisional Regulations of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of 
China Concerning the Reduction of, and Exemption from, Enterprise Income 
Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment in Coastal Open Economic Zones. 
15. 6. 8 8. Measures of the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China, 
Concerning the Reduction of, and Exemption from, Enterprise Tax and 
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment in Coastal Open Economic Zones, Tentative Provisions. 
18 .11. 8 9. Levying and Exempting Stamp Duty on Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
and on Foreign Companies, Enterprises and Other Economic Organisations 
and their Business Establishments and Premises, Circular. 
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·1;,,. 1 
Credit measures 
30.8.80. Regulations for Providing Short-Term Loans in Foreign Currency by the Bank 
of China. 
13 .3. 81. Provisional Regulations for Providing Loans to Joint Ventures of Chinese and 
Foreign Ownership by the Bank of China. 
26.11.86. People's Bank of China, Tentative Procedure for Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment Pledging Foreign Exchange for Renminbi Loans. 
12.12.86. The People's Bank of China, Provisional Measures of the People's 
Republic of China on Foreign-Exchange-Mortgaged Renminbi Loans for 
Foreign Investment Enterprises. 
5. l .87. The People's Bank of China, Measures of the People's Republic of China on 
Foreign-Exchange-Mortgaged Renminbi Loans. 
20.2.87. Provisional Measures for the Control of the Issue of Foreign Exchange 
Guarantees by Organisations within Chinese Territory. 
24 .4. 8 7. Regulations of the Bank of China on Providing Loans to Joint Ventures Using 
Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
24 .4. 8 7. Measures of the Bank of China on Loans for Foreign Investment Enterprises. 
23.3.88. China's Construction Bank, Provisional Measures of Short-term Foreign 
Exchange Loans (Trial). 
23.3.88. China's Construction Bank, Provisional Measures of Foreign Exchange 
Savings (Trial). 
11.4.88. China's Industrial and Commercial Bank, Provisional Measures of Foreign 
Exchange Loans. 
Foreign exchange measures 
1. 3. 80. Provisional Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic 
of China. 
19. 3. 80. Provisional Regulations of the Bank of China on the Control of Foreign 
Exchange Certificates. 
31.12.81. Rules for the Implementation of the Examination and Approval of Applications 
by Individuals for Foreign Exchange. 
1.3.81. Provisional Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic 
of China. 
10. 8. 81. Rules for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Foreign 
Institutions in China and Their Personnel. 
10.8.81. Rules Governing the Carrying of Foreign Exchange, Precious Metals and 
Payment Instruments in Convertible Currency Into or Out of China. 
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1.1.82. Detailed Rules Concerning Foreign Exchange Control Relating to Individuals. 
1.1. 82. Detailed Rules for Approval of Applications by Individuals for Possessing 
Foreign Exchange. 
1.1.83. Regulations of the Bank of China on Foreign Currency Deposits. 
1.1.83. Regulations on Special Foreign Renminbi Deposits. 
24.2.83. Administrative Regulations Governing the Use of Foreign Currency by 
Foreign Investment Enterprises when Computing Prices and Settling Accounts 
within China. 
24.2.83. Regulations for the Use of Currency in Contributing Tax to the State and in the 
Settlement of Accounts with Enterprises or Individuals Residing in China by 
Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
1.8.83. Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regulations Relating to 
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with Foreign Capital 
and Chinese and Foreign Joint Ventures. 
1.11. 84. Interim Procedures Concerning the Trial Implementation of Foreign Exchange 
and Renminbi Comprehensive Compensation. 
25. 3. 85. Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Penalties for Violation 
of Exchange Control Regulations. 
15 .1. 86. Regulations of the State Council Concerning the Balance of Foreign Exchange 
Revenue and Expenditure by Joint Equity Ventures. 
1.2.86. Regulations on Joint Ventures' Balance of Foreign Exchange Revenue and 
Expenditure. 
20.1.87. Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on the 
Purchase of Domestic Products for Export by Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment to Balance Foreign Exchange Revenue and Expenditure. 
1.10.87. Foreign Exchange Control Measures for Non-Banking Financial Institutions. 
17. 7 .87. Provisional Regulations on the Monitoring of External Debt. 
5.3.88. Administrative Regulations on Spot and Forward Foreign Exchange 
Transactions by Financial Institutions on Behalf of Clients. 
Trade measures 
1.4.82. 
10.1.84. 
Provisions of the Customs Administration and the Ministry of Finance of the 
People's Republic of China Concerning the Levying of, and Exemption from, 
Customs Duties and the Levying of a Consolidated Industrial and Commercial 
Tax on Imports and Exports of Goods by Joint Chinese-Foreign Ventures 
(Cooperative Exploitation of Off-shore Petroleum) for Exploiting Off-shore 
Petroleum. 
Interim Regulations of People's Republic of China Concerning the System of 
Licensing Import Goods. 
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1.2.84. Provisions of the General Administration of Customs, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Concerning the 
Supervision of, and the Imposition of, or Exemption from, Tax on Imports 
and Exports by Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises. 
1.2.84.2.1. Regulations on the Generalised System of Preference Certificates for Export 
Products of Businesses which Undertake Processing and Assembling for 
Foreigners, and of Compensation Trade, Sino-foreign Joint Equity and 
Cooperative Joint Ventures and Enterprises with Only Foreign Equity (for 
Trial Implementation). 
1. 5. 84. Provisions of the General Administration of Customs, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Concerning the 
Supervision of, the Imposition of, or Exemption from Tax on Imports and 
Exports by Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures. 
1.5.84. Provisions of the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic 
of China for the Administration of the Import and Export of Articles by the 
Resident Offices and Resident Personnel of Foreign Enterprises, News 
Agencies and Other Entities. 
15.5.84. Rules for the Implementation of Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China Concerning the System of Licensing Import Goods. 
1.6.84. Rules for the Implementation of Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China on the Inspection of Import and Export Commodities. 
10.3.85. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Import and Export Duty and 
Procedures. 
24.11. 86. Measures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China for the Control of 
the Import of Materials and Parts Required by Foreign Investment Enterprises 
for the Fulfilment of Export Contracts. 
1.12.86. Procedures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China for the 
Administration of Materials and Parts that Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
Need to Import in Order to Fulfil Product Export Contracts. 
1.12.86. People's Republic of China Customs, Administration of Imported Materials 
and Components Required by Enterprises with Foreign Investment in Order to 
Fulfil Product Export Contracts, Procedures. 
12.9.87. People's Republic of China, Import and Export Duty Regulations 
20 .1. 8 7. Implementing Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade on Confirmation and Examination of Products Exporting Enterprises 
and Technologically Advanced Enterprises with Foreign Investment. 
22.1.87. People's Republic of China, Customs Law 
24.1.87. Implementing Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade on Applications of Foreign Investment Enterprises for Import and 
Export Licences 
24 .1. 8 7. Implementing Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade on Enterprises With Foreign Investment Applying for Import and 
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Export Licences. 
19.10.87. Measures Relating to Import Substitution by Products Manufactured by 
Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures and Contractual Joint Ventures. 
31.10.87. Procedures for the Control Over Import Substitution of Mechanical and 
Electrical Products Manufactured by Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
and Contractual Joint Ventures. 
31.10.87. Measures on the Control of Import Substitute Mechanical and Electrical 
Products by Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures and Contractual Joint 
Ventures. 
1.5.88. Administration of Bonded Factories Engaged in the Processing Trade 
Procedure. 
1.5.88. Administration of Bonded Warehouse and Stored Goods Procedures. 
15.5.88. Administrative Regulations of the Customs Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Import and Export of Goods into and out of Economic and 
Technological Development Zones. 
1. 7 .88. Administration of Imported Materials for Processing and Exported Goods 
Procedures. 
1.4.89. Administrative Regulations of the Customs Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Import and Export of Goods into and out of Coastal Open Zones. 
Labour measures 
19 .1. 84. Provisions for the Implementation of Regulations on Labour Management in 
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
11. 8. 87. Provisional Regulations on the Provision of Political Ideological Education for 
Employees in Joint Equity and Sino-Foreign Cooperative Enterprises. 
26.6.80. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labour Management in Joint 
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
28.11.86. Regulations on the Autonomous Right of Enterprises with Foreign Investment 
to Employ Personnel, the Wages and Salaries, and the Expenses for Insurance 
and Welfare Benefits for Staff Members and Workers. 
21.12.87. Notice of the State Council Concerning the Amendment of Paragraph 3 of 
Article 86 of Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
18.5.88. Opinion of Ministry of Labour and Personnel on Further Implementation of 
Employment Matters Concerning Enterprises with Foreign Investment. 
Administration 
1.3.82. Provisional Regulations of the General Administration of Industry and 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China on the Payment of Registration 
Fees by Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment 
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15.3.83. Procedures for the Registration and Administration of Resident Offices of 
Foreign Enterprises in China. 
4.3.85. The Accounting Regulations of the People's Republic of China for Joint 
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
20.1.87. Supplementary Regulations Concerning the Regulations on the Financial 
Control of Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. 
17 .12. 87. Notice of the MOFERT on the Relevant Legal Problems in the Case of 
Establishing Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. 
1.3.87. Provisional Regulations for the Proportion of Registered Capital to Total 
Amount of Investment of Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. 
1.3.88. Regulations on Investment Contributed by Each Party to a Chinese-Foreign 
Equity Joint Venture. 
12.8.88. Delegation of Authority for the Approval of Wholly-Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises to Local Governments of Provinces, Autonomous Regions, 
Centrally Governed Municipalities, Special Economic Zones and 
Municipalities with Independent Development Plans, Circular 
1.7.89. Provisional Regulations on Control of Foreign Associations of Commerce 
Other measures 
26.6.80. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Registration of Joint 
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. 
1.6.81. Additional Regulations Concerning the Registration of Resident Offices of 
Foreign Enterprises. 
2.6.82. Provisional Advertising Control Regulations. 
1.7.82. Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China. 
1.2.83. Provisional Regulations for the Establishment of Representative Offices in 
China by Overseas Chinese and Foreign Financial Institutions. 
1.2.83. Procedures of the People's Bank of China for Controls Relating to 
Establishing Representative Offices in China by Overseas Chinese and Foreign 
Banking Institutions. 
1.3.83. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China. 
1. 3. 83. Detailed Implementation Rules for the Trademark Law. 
30.10.89. Interim Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Control 
of Resident Offices of Foreign Enterprises. 
1.4.85. The Patent Law of the People's Republic of China. 
Special Economic Zones 
26.6.80. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Special Economic Zones 
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in Guandong Province. 
24.12.81. Provisional Regulations on Registration of Enterprises in Special Economic 
Zones of Guandong Province. 
24.12.82. Provisional Provisions on Land Management in Shengzhen Special Economic 
Zone. 
24.12.82. Provisional Entry/Exit Rules for Special Economic Zones in Guandong 
Province. 
24.12.82. Provisional Provisions on Wages in the Enterprises in Special Economic 
Zones in Guandong Province. 
1.8.82. Interim Provisions of the Special Economic Zones in Guandong Province for 
the Control of Personnel Entering and Leaving China. 
5.5.87. Measures of the Shengzhen Municipal People's Government to Implement the 
Policy of Preferential Taxation Treatment in the Provisions of the State 
Council on the Encouragement of Foreign Investment. 
18.5.87. Implementation Procedures for Examination and Confirmation of Exporting 
Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment in the Shengzhen Special Economic Zone. 
1.8.87. Provisional Regulations of the Shengzhen Special Economic Zone on Labour 
Management for Enterprises with Foreign Investment. 
3.9.87. Provisional Regulations of Shengzhen Special Economic Zone on Further 
Promoting its Economic Association with Inland Areas of the Country. 
3 .1.8 8. Regulations of Shengzhen Special Economic Zone for Land Management. 
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Appendix 4.2 
An initial tax holiday together with a low on-going tax rate are typical tax incentives, in 
practice, foreign-funded firms pay higher taxes than local enterprises. Before 1981, the 
enterprise income tax rate on equity joint venture and contractual venture income was 20 per 
cent. A local income tax of 10 per cent of the assessed income was levied on the Renminbi 
currency earnings. A withholding tax of 10 per cent was levied on remitted profits. From late 
1981, the enterprise income tax on contractual joint ventures, foreign wholly-owned 
enterprises and cooperative developments was set at a rate increasing with taxable income 
(Table 4.2.A). 
Table 4.2.A The Foreign Enterprise Income Tax 
Range of annual income (RMB, million) (%) 
up to 250,000 30 
250,000 to 500,000 32.5 
500,001 to 750,0000 35 
750,001 to 1 million 37 .5 
over 1 million 40 
Source: MOFERT, Economic Report, Beijing, Jan 1982; Wei Jia, Chinese Foreign Investment Law and 
Policies, 1994. 
Before 1988, staff and workers of a joint venture were required to pay individual 
income tax in accordance with the Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC. Chinese nationals 
and foreigners received the same treatment (table 4.2.B). On 8 August, however, the 
personal income tax liability of foreign investors in China was reduced by one half in 
accordance with the Individual Income Tax Law, 1980. 
Table 4.2.B Individual Income Tax Rates (renminbi yuan) 
Total monthly income percentage 
800 or less exempt 
801-1500 5 
1501-3000 10 
3001-6000 
6001-9000 
9001-12000 
Over 12000 
20 
30 
40 
45 
Source: Chinese government, Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Tax Law of PRC, Beijing, 
14112/80 
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Foreign investors who reinvest their profits for a period of not less than five years are 
refunded the total amount of enterprise income tax already paid on the reinvested portion. A 
joint venture in China that reinvests its share of profits for not less than five years is refunded 
40 per cent of the income tax already paid on the reinvested portion. Between 1986 and 1988 
enterprises which exported more than 70 per cent of their output (reduced to 50 per cent after 
1988 in some coastal areas) could obtain a two-year tax exemption and a concessional income 
tax rate of 15 per cent after the first two years of no tax payment. After the expiration of the 
concessional period of enterprise income tax, export enterprises were to pay 50 per cent of 
enterprise income tax for an indefinite period. The full rate of enterprise income tax is only 
10-15 per cent in special economic zones, in economic and technology development zones 
and most coastal open economic zones (Table 4.2.C). 
Table 4.2.C Tax Rates in Special Economic Zones, Economic and 
Technology Development Zones and Coastal Open Economic 
Zones, 1979-89 
Tax Payer 
Enterprise income tax 
Export enterprise income tax 
Local tax 
Withholding tax 
Depreciation 
Tax holidays 
and tax reduction 
Loss carryover 
Tax rebate (reinvested profit) 
Any foreign enterprise 
15 per cent 
IO percent 
may be exempted or reduced 
none 
from 5 to 20 years with 10 per cent scrap value 
first 2 years 
50 per cent for next 3 years 
5 years 
40 per cent of taxes paid 
refunded (less than 5 years) 
100 per cent of taxes paid 
refunded (equal to or more than 5 years) 
Source: Based on China's laws and regulations since 1979, see Appendix 4.1. 
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Major Tax Incentives for Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China's Special lnveshnent Zones 
"Manufacturing" Enterprise' 
Income T- Ra111s: 
Except for those in the petroleum, 
natural gas & rare metals seaors, 
manufacturing enterprises with terms 
of at least 10 years qualify for 
we exemptions for the fuse 
2 profit-making years, 
followed by a 50% reduction 
for the next 3 years 
Non-manufacluring "Service 
lndumy" Enlerprile Tax RaM: 
Service industty enterprises 
investing over $5 million with 
terms of at least 10 years 
qualify for taX exemption for 
the first profit-making year, 
followed by a 50% reduction for 
the next 2 years 
Foreign Joint-Venture Banks 
or Branches (investing at least 
$10 milion fur at least 
lOyeorsJ 
Income Tax Rates fur Enterprises 
Certified as Elcpor1-0rienled or 
Technologicany Advanced 
Income Tax Refunds For FIEs wilh 
Reinvested Profits 
local Income Tax Roles 
Wdhholding Tax Rales 
On dividends, interest, and other 
non-earned income; 
on repatriation of profits 
Nationwide 
Same 
30% 
No nationwide 
exemptions 
30% 
15% in any year 
they export more 
than 70% of their 
output 
40% tax icfund 
. paid on profits 
reinvested or used 
to establish other 
enterprises for 
at least 5 years 
generally 3% 
(10% of national 
we rate), but 
often waived 
by the locality 
10% for US 
companies; 
10% 
Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) 
(5 areas] 
15% 
Same as nationwide. 
Infrastructure and 
agricultural FIEs with 
15-yeartenns in 
Hainan receive 
additional benefits 
15% 
Tax exemption the 
first profit-making 
year, followed by 
a 50% reduction for 
the next 2 years 
C7 .5% tax rate). 
Additional incentives 
also may be provided 
15%, but we exemption 
for the first profit-making 
year, followed by 50% 
reduction for the next 
2 yeais 
10% upon the expiry of 
income ta:x exemptions if 
an expon-oriented 
enterprise; technologically 
advanced FlEs qualify 
for 50% reduction for 3 
years after expiry of 
exemption 0.5% rate) 
Same 
0%, but subject 
to locality 
10%; 
exempt 
Economic and 
Tedinological 
~} 
[30areas) 
15% 
Same as nationwide 
15% 
Tax exemption 
the first profit-
making year, 
followed by a 
50% reduction 
for the next 
2 years 
C7.5% tax rate) 
30%forbank 
representative offices; 
PudongN-
=rent 
Shanghai 
15% 
Same, but enterprises with 
15-:)iearterms engaged in 
eneigy or transponation 
construction are exempt each 
profit-making year for 5 years 
and receive a 50% reduction 
for the next 5 years 
15% 
Same as E'IDZs 
15% 
15% for bank branches 
approved by the 
State Council 
Same as E'IDZS Same as ETDZS 
Same Same 
0%, but subject to 0%, but subject to locality 
locality 
Same asSEZS Same asSEZs 
Source: MOFERT, Tax Incentives, Beijing, 1995; US-China Business Council, Investment in China, 
Washington DC, 1995. 
These provisions were extended by the State Council, in the Act on the Reduction of, 
and Exemption from, Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial 
Tax in Special Economic Zones and 14 Coastal Cities in 1987. To facilitate the expansion of 
economic and technological exchange in coastal open economic zones (Liaodong Peninsula, 
the Shandong Peninsula, the Changjiang and Pearl River Deltas and the Southern Fujian, 
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Xiamen and Quanzhou Delta Area), similar concessions were extended to the coastal open 
economic zones in 1988. Consolidated industrial and commercial tax, as on products 
produced and sold within special economic zones, are levied at half the tax rate. 
Table 4.2.D Capital Depreciation Rates of Enterprises with Foreign 
Participation 1982-90 
Types of fixed assets Rate of Service life 
House and buildings 
Railways rolling stock. 
machinery and other equipment 
Electronic equipment, means of transport other than 
railing stock and boats and ships 
depreciation 
(percent per year) 
0.05 
0.10 
0.20 
20 years 
10 years 
5 years 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, Tax Incentives, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relation and Trade 
(MOFERT), Beijing, 21 February 1982 
Depreciation was not considered in the regulations until 1982. In the depreciation of 
fixed assets, a 'scrap value' (communist concept - no accounting equivalent) was first 
estimated and then deducted from the original cost. Scrap value was in principle 10 per cent 
of the original cost. A very considerable body of research had concluded that tax concessions 
were not effective in attracting foreign investment. Survey studies of foreign investor's 
motives usually rate tax incentives as less important than key non-tax factors governing pre-
tax rates of return (Caves 1982). Studies suggest that at best they are of modest importance in 
influencing investment decisions in comparison to market consideration (Lim 1983). For 
example, for US firms these tax incentives in the form of exemptions, reductions, or refunds 
have no effect whatsoever upon their investment decision (Wei Jia 1994). 
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Appendix 4.3 
Poland: Basic Differences Between Limited Liability (Sp.z. 
o.o.) and Joint Stock (S.A.) Companies. 
No. of founders 
Polish and foreign 
·Minimum initial capital 
Capital to be paid in 
prior to registration 
Capitalisation of 
pre-operational period 
costs 
Increase of capital 
requires 
General Assembly 
approval minimum no. 
of Members of Board 
Supervisory Board 
and/or Auditing 
Committee 
Obligatory reserve out 
of after-tax earnings 
Obligatory audit 
General Assembly 
convenes if company 
bear loss 
Earliest time after 
liquidation announced 
for distribution of assets 
Notarial reports of 
General Assembly 
required 
Sp z o.o. S.A 
at least 1 person at least 3 person 
4,000 Zl 
100% 
not allowed 
66.7% 
1 
either or both may exist 
minimum 3 members 
no 
yes if: 
paying a dividend abroad: 
certain size criteria are 
met 
if loss exceeds reserve 
capital and 50% of 
share capital 
6months 
if company articles 
are altered 
100,000 Zl 
25% 
max. 5 years write off 
75% votes 
1 
at lease on must exist 
minimum 5 members 
8% 
always 
if loss exceeds reserve 
and 33.3% of share 
capital 
12 months 
always 
Source: PAIZ, Foreign Investment Guide to Poland, PAIZ, Warsaw, May 1996, p. 57 
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Appendix 4.4 
The Main Taxes are: 
• Personal income tax: effective January 1992, and levied on all personal incomes 
(except some agricultural income). Withheld at the source for wage income at a rate 
of 21 per cent (for incomes over Zl 1,212.000), 33 per cent (for incomes over Zl 
90,800.000), 45 per cent (for incomes over Zl 181,600). Tax rates were raised in 
1994 from 20, 30 and 40 per cent. Some deductions are allowed, and joint returns 
are possible. 
• Corporate income tax: effective January 1990, levied on all legal entities (whether 
state-owned, cooperative or private). Rate 40 per cent which is one of the highest 
corporate profit tax rate in Europe having negative implications for the Polish 
economy and foreign investors. According to The New Economic Strategy 
'Poland 2000' corporate tax should slowly be reduced and modified. 
• Value added tax (VAT)-introduced July 5, 1993 to replace turnover tax. Rates 22 
per cent (general rate), 7 per cent (energy products, construction, some 
consumption goods), 0 percent (exports and associated services). Further changes 
are expected in the sales of goods and services which attract 0 per cent tax: these 
are pharmaceuticals, books and press, means of production for agriculture, farm 
tractors, farm machinery and facilities, fertilisers, feeds and pesticides. 
• Small taxpayer turnover presumption--presumptive tax assessed as a proportion of 
sales if the previous year's turnover is less than Zl 1.2 billion (2.5 per cent for 
trade, 7 .5 per cent for services and 0.5 per cent for production). 
• Excises: introduced with the VAT and applicable to several luxury goods and to 
petroleum products. 
• Customs duties: The tariff code ranges from 0 to 40 per cent and there are 
exemptions and tariff quotes. Import tax was reduced from 6 per cent in 1992 to 3 
per cent in 1996 and will be abolished from 1997. The tariff on industrial goods 
should be gradually reduced starting from January 1, 1995, annually by 20 per 
cent and totally abolished by 1January1999, except on the import of cars; here the 
tariffs will be abolished by the year 2000. 
• State Enterprise-based taxes and duties: Dividend tax-compulsory from state 
enterprises based on the re-evaluated value of "founding organ" contribution to 
enterprise capital. Rates vary by class and age of assets. Tax on excessive wage 
increase (popiwek) abolished by 1April1994. 
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• Main Local Tax: Real Estate tax, levied on urban and rural property at a rate 
established yearly by the Ministry of Finance (but does not exceed 0.1 per cent for 
housing and 2 per cent for commercial buildings) on assessed value. 
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Appendix 4.5 
Poland: Country Withholding Tax Rates For Double Tax Treaty Relief 
Dividends Interest Licence fees 
Preferential Normal Copyright Other 
Austria 10 0 10 10 
Australia 15 10 10 10 
Belarus 30/10 15 10 10 10 
Belgium 10 10 10 10 
Bulgaria 10 10 5 5 
Canada 15 15 0 10 
China 10 10 10 7 
Cyprus 10 10 5 5 
Czech Rep. 20/5 10 10 5 5 
Denmark 25/5 15 0 10 10 
Estonia 25/5 15 10 10 10 
Finland 25/5 15 0 20 10 
France 10/5 15 0 0 10 
Germany 25/5 15 0 0 0 
Greece 20 10 10 10 
India 15 15 22.5 22.5 
Indonesia 20/10 15 10 15 15 
Italy 10 10 10 10 
Israel 15/5 10 5 10 10/5 
Japan 10 10 0 10 
Korea 10/5 10 10 10 10 
Latvia 25/5 15 10 10 10 
Lithuania 25/5 15 10 10 10 
Malaysia 0 15 15 15 
Malta 20/5 15 10 10 10 
Morocco 2517 15 10 10 10 
Netherlands 25/0 15 0 0 10 
Norway 25/5 15 0 0 10 
Pakistan 33/15 20 20 20 20 
Romania 25/5 15 10 10 10 
Russia 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 10 10 10 10 
Slovak Republic 20/5 15 10 5 5 
South Korea 10/5 10 10 10 10 
Spain 25/0 15 0 0 10 
Sri Lanka 15 10 0 10 
Switzerland 25/5 15 10 10 10 
Sweden 25/5 15 0 10 10 
Thailand 25/20 10 5 15 
Tunisia 5 10 12 12 12 
Turkey 25/10 15 10 10 10 
Ukraine 25/5 15 10 10 10 
United Arab Emirates 5 5 5 5 
UK 10/5 15 0 10 10 
us 10/5 15 0 10 10 
Uruguay 15 15 15 15110 
Vietnam 25/10 10 10 10 10 
Yugoslavia 25/5 15 10 10 10 
Zimbabwe 10 10 10 10 
Source: PAIZ, Foreign Investment Guide to Poland, PAIZ, Warsaw, 1996, p. 57. 
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Appendix 4.6 
Table 4.1 Poland: The Six Steps of Privatisation Through 
Liquidation ("Recasting") 
Step 1: Initiation 
Enterprises or Founding Body decides to initiate the process, often with a 
consulting firm. 
Step 2: SOE Decision 
Worker's council presents opinion on whether to privatise. SOE chooses its 
preferred method (i.e. buy-out, assets sale, contribution into company). Business 
plan is drafted and Ministry of Privatisation questionnaire regarding financial and 
legal data is completed. Documents are given to Founding Body (local government 
or branch ministry). 
Step 3: Founding Body's Decision 
Founding Body appoints Preparatory Team to examine documents and renders an 
opinion on the application. If not satisfied with valuation, can hire a different 
consulting firm. 
Preparatory Team discusses its opinion with SOE. Can choose a privatisation 
method other than that preferred by SOE. 
Founding Body examines results of documentation submitted by Preparatory Team 
and renders an opinion and drafts a decree on privatisation of SOE. 
Documentation and decree is submitted to Ministry of Privatisation. 
Step 4: Ministerial Decision 
Ministry of Privatisation reviews documents and evaluates the financial and legal 
status; approves or disapproves of privatisation plan. 
Step 5: Implementation 
Founding Body administers liquidation process, or resolves any problems in 
cooperation with Founding Body. 
Step 6: Methods 
Assets sale. 
Contribution into company. A new company is created between Treasury and 
domestic or foreign investors. 
Management/Employee Buy-out. Requires 20 per cent down payment, the rest on 
instalment. 
Source: Department of Privatisation, Privatisation Report, Ministry of Privatisation, Warsaw, 1996. 
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Table 4.2 Poland: Nine Steps of Privatisation Through 
Transformation 
Step 1: Initiation 
The enterprises approaches the government and expresses an interest. In some 
cases, the Prime Minister can order privatisation on proposal from Ministry of 
privatisation. 
Step 2: Feasibility Study 
Usually done by a consulting firm. 
Step 3: Decision 
To go ahead with process. 
Step 4: Complete Documentation 
Formal application from either management or worker's council. Opinions from 
workers delegation, founding body (e.g. Ministry of Industry). 
Proposal by worker's council on employee share ownership (up to a maximum of 
20 percent of total shares). 
Draft of company statues and proposed capitalisation. 
Decision of anti-monopoly office. 
Step 5: Additional Appointments (as required) 
Advisers (chosen by tender to work on: auditing, legal analysis, business plan and 
valuation, privatisation option. 
Step 6: Ministerial Decisions 
Minister decides on: 
Transformation with or without conditions. 
Company statues. 
Selection of 2/3 of supervisory board (1/3 chosen by employees). 
Capital structure. 
Step 7: Transformation 
SOE becomes a state-owned corporation governed by commercial code. Notary 
and court registration of company. 
Step 8: Decision of privatisation strategy. Options: 
Trade sale, to one or more parties 
Public offer for sale of shares 
Management/employees buy-out 
Some combination of above 
Step 9: Implementation 
Advisers assist in such matters as: sales documents, auctions, selections of short-
list of bidders, contract negotiations, prospectus, public relations, share distribution 
and marketing. 
Source: As for Table 4.1 
131 
Table 4.3 Poland: Mass Privatisation Program in Brief, circa 
1993-94 
• The programme gives all adult citizens the opportunity to obtain an equal stake in the 
privatised enterprises through the acquisition of Share Certificates (SCs) in National 
Investment Funds (NIFs). 
• NIFs will take the form of closed-end funds registered as joint stock companies. Up to 20 
NIFs will be created. Each of these will be managed by a firm or consortium selected 
through competitive bidding from among the most reputable investment banks, funds and 
management organisations from many countries. 
• NIFs will have supervisory boards representing the interest of their owners. These owners 
will be Polish citizens who acquire SCs, and the State Treasury, which will initially retain 
15 per cent shares for use as part of compensation package for fund managers. 
• MPP includes about 600 (now 450) large and medium-sized Polish enterprises, primarily 
manufacturing plants. 
• The commercialised joint stock companies formed from the original state enterprises will 
have the following share holding structure: 33 per cent by a "lead" NIFs; 25 per cent 
distributed evenly among all NIFs; 30 per cent retained by the state treasury; and 19 per 
cent distributed free of charge to enterprise employees. 
• The "lead" NIF in each company will be chosen through a draft line process by the 20 
NIFs; each NIF will have in its portfolio a "lead" shareholding in 30 companies. 
• The Fund Management Companies managing the NIFs will have a management and 
performance contract which provides strong financial incentives to managed these funds in 
such a way as to maximise the long-term value of the NIF in the interest of the 
shareholders through restructuring, modernisation, and re-financing. It is expected that 
NIFs will exist for 10 years. 
• After one year of operation and preparation of prospectus, the NIFs will be listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). Soon after that, Polish citizens will be able to obtain 
SCs in bearer from at a nominal fee of approximately $US 25 ( 10 per cent of an average 
monthly salary). These SCs give Polish citizens the right for at least four years to trade 
within and outside the official market for one share in each NIF listed on the exchange. 
The trading procedure for NIFs will be the same as for all WSE stocks. 
Source: As for Table 4.1 
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Table 4.4 Poland: The Sectoral Approach to Privatisation, in 
Brief, circa 1993-94 
Choosing a Sector 
Government identifies sector to be privatised. Selection criteria are: positive potential 
of sector; investors interest, eagerness of firms to privatise; and national economic 
importance of sector. 
Choosing an Adviser 
Sector assigned to project manager by Ministry; 
Project Manager drafts terms-of-reference outlining goals and questions to be 
addressed; 
Competitive bid is organised targeting investment banks and consulting firm, often 
forming consortia and joint ventures; 
Firms submit proposal; talks held to clarify proposal; 
Ministry chooses Sector Adviser from among competing firms; 
Ministry decides on financing, which may come from Ministry budget or foreign 
aid (e.g. PHARE, USAID, or World Bank). 
Phase I: Analysis 
Sector Adviser prepares a comprehensive analysis of sector, including a study of 
the individual companies, based partly on on-sites visit. 
Phase II: Strategy Development 
Based on previous analysis, Sector Adviser develops a restructuring/privatisation 
policy for sector; 
He also works out concrete strategies and action plans for individual companies, 
choosing between: Trade sales, IPOs, Auction; and Management/Employees buy-
out; 
Sector adviser contacts potential investors to ascertain the extent of their interest in 
this sector and helps them understand the privatisation process; 
He reports to the Ministry. 
Phase Ill: Implementation 
Adviser conducts privatisation of major companies in sector. 
He assists smaller companies in liquidation. 
He works with government agencies to developed ideas for restructuring other 
companies. 
He makes available his knowledge to interested parties and funding organisations. 
Source: As for Table 4.1 
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CHAPTER 5 
TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF FDI: AN OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines the patterns and trends of FDI inflow into China between 1979-96 and 
Poland between 1989-96, with particular attention to FDI in manufacturing. At the beginning 
of the chapter, a survey of global trends is undertaken in order to place the experience of 
China and Poland into perspective. Based on published official data it discusses the trends, 
investment sources, ownership, regional distribution and sectoral characteristics of FDI. 
5.0 Global Trends and Patterns 
After a brief decline during the early 1980s, global FDI flows have increased dramatically. 
During 1986-95, the amount of global FDI grew at an annual rate of 30 per cent, rising from 
$US 78 to $US 315 billion (United Nations, 1996:5-28). In 1995, the developed countries 
received 64 percent of this amount, with Western Europe (40 per cent) and North America 
(24 per cent) absorbing the largest shares (the amount of FDI received by Japan was 
relatively small, constituting only about 2 per cent of the global total). These figures point to 
the dense networks of cross-holdings of production and financial assets among the 
industrialised countries of the world. 
The developing countries have received increasing amounts of total global FDI 
inflows. In 1996 they received record inflows of $US 100 billion (32 per cent) of the total 
FDI. This amount, was concentrated among a few host countries, so that 32 per cent of the 
global total (or about 7 4 per cent of the amount received by the developing world) went to the 
top ten countries. These are newly-industrialising countries (NICs) that command large 
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domestic markets and/or serve as dynamic export platforms (Singapore, China, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Indonesia and Egypt). 
The sectorial destination as well as the country origination of FDI have undergone 
some changes over time. The relative share of FDI in the primary sector has fallen, whereas 
those in the secondary and tertiary sectors have risen. Among the major investor nations, FDI 
in the primary sector exceeded 14 per cent of the total FDI portfolio only in the case of the 
Netherlands and the UK (United Nations, 1996). The bulk of investment has gone to the 
manufacturing and service sectors in particular. Consequently, the traditional form of 
Western investment in the developing world's mineral and cash crops has declined in 
importance. 
Most of the FDI still originates from developed countries. In 1995, five countries, 
(Japan, the US, France, Germany and the UK) were responsible for 75.7 per cent of the 
value of the global FDI outflow (UN, 1996). However, motivated by concerns with rising 
labor wages, pollution cost and foreign protectionism, several NICs have also begun to 
invest more FDI. For instance, Taiwan invested $US 24 billion in FDI in 1989-1995 and the 
amount for Korea was $US 11 billion in these six years. They have become net capital 
exporters, whereas the reverse has been true for the US (whose FDI inflow has been several 
times larger than its FDI outflow in the recent past). Among the major home countries for 
FDI, Japan and the UK led the US in the value of net FDI outflow during recent years. 
The emerging patterns reflect recent and ongoing trends. Firstly, rising FDI 
emphasises the growing importance of intra-firm trade i.e. transactions among the 
subsidiaries of the same multinational corporations (MNCs). It has tended to displace arms 
length transactions, and thus to create comparative advantages due to domestic sourcing, 
economies of scale, transfer pricing and captive markets. Disparities in such advantages can 
in turn alter international trade balances and national industrial competitiveness. These 
considerations augment the traditional incentives for FDI that stem from the desire to prolong 
product cycle and to protect market share (Knickerboker, 1973; Vernon, 1977). 
Secondly, the ongoing process of globalisation as well as the regionalisation of 
national economies tend to spur FDI. The diffusion of production techniques, the 
standardisation of product design, the easing of transport and communication barriers and the 
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conventions of subcontracting and local sourcing have facilitated this investment, especially 
of the export-oriented kind. 
Thirdly, the diminishing amount of official development aid, the debt crises of the 
early 1980s and the examples of Asia's export-oriented economies have increased the relative 
acceptance of FDI in many developing countries. At the same time a process of privatisation 
has been evident in a number of capitalist economies, developed or developing, whereby 
governments deregulate industries and abandon the less efficient public enterprises. These 
trends as well as a general turn away from the import-substitution approach to 
industrialisation have opened up more opportunities for FDI. 
Fourthly, the development just noted have been most dramatic in the economic 
reforms of the former socialist economies. In an ironic reversal of the dependency theory, 
officials in Eastern and Central Europe, China and Vietnam have eagerly sought FDI in their 
attempts at market liberalisation and export expansion. Although starting from rather low 
levels, FDI inflow has expand rapidly for some. For example from 1986 to 1996 its value 
rose from $US 0 to 420 million for Vietnam, from $US 16 million to $US 12 billion for 
Poland and from $US 1.8 to $US 170 billion for China (World Investment Report 1996). 
The incorporation of those countries into the capitalist world,economy appears to augur more 
competitive bidding for FDI. 
5.1 Trends in FDI Inflow to China 
The growth of FDI in China is one of the most dramatic consequences of China's change in 
economic policy from a planned economy towards a market economy. Since the beginning of 
the open-door policy in 1979, China estimates 260,109 foreign investment projects have been 
contracted worth $US 440.7 billion. However, it is also true that almost 90 per cent of the 
total number of contracts were undertaken in the five year period 1991-1995, with 80 per cent 
of the total value accounted for in that same period. The total utilised amount of FDI rose 
from the initial $US 110 million in 1979 to 140 billion in 1995 with over 260,000 projects 
approved by the end of 1995, at an annual growth rate of 57.12 per cent. Since 1993, China 
has become the second largest FDI recipient in the world (following the US) and the single 
largest host country among developing countries (UN, World Investment Report, 1994 and 
1995:53). As Table 5.6.1 reveals, there was a slow inflow of FDI in early 1980s, (even a 
decline in 1985) with considerable fluctuations from year to year until the early 1990s. Up to 
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1986, foreign investors found it extremely difficult to undertake commercial transactions in 
China because of the lack of a legal framework and little attention being directed towards 
attracting foreign investors. 
In 1986 and 1987 more serious attention was given to the foreign investment 
environment: investment incentives were provided and the legal environment for FDI was 
better defined. Due to these changes there has been an increase of FDI inflow into China 
which has been growing continuously ever since (Table 5.1). There was, however, a halt in 
1989 after the Tiananmen incident as China was sanctioned by a number of Western 
countries. In addition, an economic retrenchment programm, initiated in 1988 to curb high 
inflation rates, had an adverse effect on FDI in 1989. According to the data published by 
MOFTEC, the pledged FDI projects declined from 5,945 in 1988 to 5,779 in 1989, 
representing a negative growth rate of -2.8 per cent. In the second half of 1990, FDI in China 
began to recover, as Western countries gradually normalised their relations with China and 
accepted China's tough stance on the pro-democracy movement. 
Table 5.1 China: Development of FDI (1979-95) 
Year No. of Contracted* Implemented* 
Projects ($US billion) ($US billion) 
1979-82 922 6.01 1.17 
1983 470 1.73 0.64 
1984 1,856 2.65 1.26 
1985 3,073 5.93 1.66 
1986 1,498 2.83 1.87 
1987 2,233 3.71 2.31 
1988 5,945 5.30 3.19 
1989 5,779 5.60 3.39 
1990 7,273 6.60 3.49 
1991 12,978 11.98 4.37 
1992 48,764 58.12 11.0 
1993 83,000 111.0 27.5 
1994 47,490 81.4 33.8 
1995 37,126 90.3 37.7 
1996 (forecast) 14,061 45.6 19.8 
Total 260,109 440.7 151.6 
* contracted-FD! based on singed contracts, but not always actual inflow 
implemented-FD! which actually was officially invested in host country 
Source: MOFfEC, Zhongguo Duiwai Jingi Maoyi Nianjian, South China Morning Post, 13 February 1996 
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Before analysing the data it is important to mention the reliability of the Chinese statistics and 
the vast differences between signed and implemented projects. As source materials the data 
should be interpreted with care because the various calculation methods, the lack of an agreed 
nomenclature for different categories, the absence of certain statistics and indeed the use 
sometimes of statistics in support of propaganda, make it often necessary to stand back a little 
from official figures and make some adjustment to the interpretation. The vast differences 
between signed and realised projects presented in the left hand column of Table 5 .1 is related 
to the foreign investment environment, particularly to the government regulations and laws. 
Long delays in the approval procedure, heavy government regulations, rigid laws and red 
tape force many firms to abandon many signed projects. Further obstacles encountered by 
foreign firms will be described in detail in Chapter Seven. 
Analysing Table 5.1 reveals the first big jump in FDI in 1992 when foreign 
companies established more projects (116 per cent), worth more in pledged investment (111 
per cent) than in the complete period 1979-91. Although there were increased commitments to 
larger projects in China, the average external investment contract continued to be relatively 
small at about $US 2.5 million in 1995 (South China Morning Post, 13 February 1996). This 
big increase in 1992 happened after the FDI environment was spurred along by Deng 
Xiaoping's visit to Southern China in January 1992, when he argued for a more rapid 
development of the open-door policy. It was also helped by the adaptation of the 'socialist 
market economy' doctrine at the 14th CCP congress held in October 1992. The high growth 
rates in 1992 and 1993 were partially related to the huge investments in real estate from 
overseas. 
Despite its steady long-term uptrend, FDI in China has experienced short-term 
fluctuations that tie in closely with the stop-go economic policy cycle of the Chinese 
economy. For instance, in terms of contracted value, FDI registered substantial increases of 
124 per cent and 43 per cent in 1985 and 1988 respectively, when the Chinese economy was 
growing rapidly. However, it dropped to 52 per cent in 1986 and recorded a marginal growth 
in 1990 as a result of economic reentrenchment. Moreover, the utilisation ratio (utilised 
amount/contracted amount) dropped steadily from 60 per cent in 1989 to 23 per cent in 1993, 
implying that the economic projects generated from FDI had slowed down. In other words, 
although the Chinese economy has maintained a double-digit growth over the last three 
years, the anti-inflationary measures have slowed down the process of economic projects, 
leading to an uneven distribution of resources and uneven economic development across the 
country. 
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There are several other indications of slow-down in inflows of FDI to China. This is due 
partly to investment policy changes in relation to the cancellation of many investment 
incentives and partly to the emergence of investment alternatives in East Asia, CEECs and the 
former Soviet Commonwealth Independent States. External investment decreased in 1995 to 
$US 90.9 billion, down 3 per cent on 1994s $US 93.7 billion and 26.2 per cent lower than 
the record $US 123.2 billion in 1993 (South China Morning Post, 13 February 1996). The 
number of contracts signed also fell to 37,126, down 22 per cent on the 47,490 in 1994 and 
less than half the record 83 ,000 contracted projects in 1993. This trend can also partially be 
explain by the changing government regulations regarding the FDI environment, where the 
government has slowly withdrawn preferential tax treatments and other incentives in 
accordance with the ''national treatment" strategy announced in the ninth Five-Year Plan 
(1996-2000), where foreign funded enterprises would be treated on an equal footage with 
domestic ones. It is also partly due to increased government experience in the selection of 
projects, becoming more targeted to the needs of the country's economic development and its 
economic development policy. 
5.2 Ownership Structure 
Chinese statistical authorities categorise FDI projects into five different groups: equity joint 
ventures, contractual joint ventures or cooperative joint ventures, joint development, wholly-
foreign-owned enterprises and other foreign investment (including imported inputs for 
processing and assembly). Table 5.7.1 indicates that equity joint ventures have been the most 
popular form since the mid-1980s, constituting about half of the foreign capital directly 
invested, but the growth of wholly foreign-owned enterprises has been the most rapid form 
in recent years. Contractual joint ventures started to decline in recent years. Joint development 
ventures pertain mainly to off-shore petroleum exploration. This form of FDI was extremely 
popular in the early 1980s, but its use has been declining in recent years. 
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Table 5.2 China: FDI by Institutional Form ($US bin) 
Year Contracted Utilised No. of projects approved 
CNs CNs WFOE CJVs ENs WFOEs CNs ENs WFOE 
1979 0.01 6 
1980 0.5 0.06 0.01 321 20 4 
1981 0.13 0.03 0.26 70 28 14 
1982 0.93 0.03 0.05 0.53 0.10 0.04 402 29 12 
1983 0.50 0.19 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.04 330 107 18 
1984 1.48 1.06 0.08 0.46 0.26 0.02 1,089 741 26 
1985 3.50 2.03 0.03 0.58 0.58 0.01 1,500 1,412 46 
1986 1.36 1.38 0.02 0.79 0.80 0.02 582 892 18 
1987 1.29 1.92 0.47 0.62 1.48 0.03 786 1,399 45 
1988 1.62 3.13 0.48 0.78 1.98 0.23 1,621 3,909 410 
1989 1.08 2.66 1.65 0.75 2.04 0.37 1,179 3,659 931 
1990 1.25 2.70 2.44 0.67 1.89 0.68 1,317 4,091 1,860 
1991 2.14 6.08 3.64 0.76 2.30 1.14 1,778 8,395 2,795 
1992 13.25 29.13 15.70 2.12 6.12 2.52 5,711 34,354 8,692 
1993 2.55 55.17 30.46 5.24 15.35 6.51 10,445 54,003 18,975 
1994 20.30 40.19 21.95 7.12 17.93 8.04 6,634 27,890 13,007 
1995 17.83 39.74 33.66 7.54 19.08 10.32 4,787 20,455 11,761 
Notes: CNs=Contractual Joint Ventures; EN=Equity Joint Ventures; WFOE=Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises. 
Source: Chyungly Lee, FD/ in China: Do State Policies Matter?, Issues & Studies, Taipei, no. 7, July 
1997, p. 61. 
Equity joint ventures (EJVs) have become increasingly important since 1985. By the 
end of 1995, 161,361 equity joint ventures had been approved with an intended investment 
of $US 185.5 billion, of which $US 15.2 billion had been invested by the end of 1990. 
Equity joint ventures thus played a central part in the government's strategy to attract foreign 
investment. Indeed, they were the government's preferred mechanism for introducing FDI 
into China during the 1980s, mainly because they allowed the Chinese government to retain 
influence through its ownership position, through which the Chinese state could arguably 
exert the greatest degree of control. These ventures were also relatively well established 
compared to other investment forms, which made it much easier to obtain comprehensive 
information about them. They are limited liability companies established by two or more 
partners that pool assets to create a separate legal entity for the purpose of undertaking a 
specific business (such as producing cars). The objective is usually to extend or complement 
the business of the investors. The size of most EJV s is relatively small, particularly those 
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from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Equity joint ventures can now be found in every province of 
China, and about 68 per cent of all joint ventures are found in manufacturing (Pearson, 1997; 
Kui-Wai-Li, 1997). 
In the first few years of opening up to the outside world, FDI in China mainly took 
the form of contractual joint ventures (CJVs) as well as joint development ventures and 
'compensation trade and export processing ventures'. Together, these accounted for 82 per 
cent of foreign investment during the period 1979-1984. CJVs in particular were generally 
smaller in scale and were found in low-skill, labour-intensive industries which were located 
mainly in the four SEZs and Guangdong Province. A majority of the investors took 
advantage of the low wages and cheap land prices in China. In addition, the forms of CN s 
were quite flexible and usually required no cash outlay by Chinese partners. As Table 5.2 
indicates, the number of projects and intended value of contractual joint ventures plunged 
from 1,500 projects with an intended value of $US 3.50 billion in 1985 to 582 projects with 
an intended value $US 1.36 billion in 1986, slowly recovering in 1988 after the first 
legislation for CJVs was enacted. It then started to decline again in 1993 from 10,445 
projects to 4,787 in 1995 (Chyungly, 1997). 
As shown in Table 5.2, ENs have become increasingly important since 1985. The 
number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) also surged after 1987 whereas CJVs 
and 'other investment ventures' declined. In 1987 WFOEs accounted for only 1.7 per cent of 
actual FDI. In 1995 there was sharp rise to $US 10.32 billion. These enterprises accounted 
for 24.6 per cent of actual FDI that occurred after China passed The Law of the PRC on 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, in April 1986. The increase of WFOEs was due mainly 
to three factors. Firstly, there was a huge surge of FDI from Taiwan in the late 1980s. 
Taiwanese investors are usually inclined to control their own companies rather than to 
cooperate with partners. Secondly, considerable cost and time problems involved in the 
coordination of technology and management deemed essential in EN s and CJV s were 
avoided by establishing WFOEs. Thirdly, there was greater acceptance by the Chinese 
government of WFOEs which are export-oriented and bring into China much needed foreign 
exchange earnings. Up to now, WFOEs have been small in size and mostly established in 
SEZs and coastal areas (Chyungly, 1997). As sole owner, the foreign investors bear all the 
risks and formally have rights to management and all (after tax) profits. 
During the 1980s and in the early 1990s, the average size of contracts in ENs and CJVs fell 
(Table 5.2.1). This may be because China is not as attractive to MNCs as initially thought 
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and there are more regulations of informal Overseas Chinese investments. The duration of 
contracts has been quite flexible, foreign investors theoretically being permitted to extend the 
duration of contracts at will, without any restrictions in most sectors. In January 1986, the 
Joint Venture Law was amended so that the duration of joint ventures could be extended from 
30 to 50 years or even more. It is interesting to note the sharp increase in average size of 
WFOEs. This development underlines the increasing confidence felt by foreigners seeking to 
make long-term commitments, in the wake of improvements in China's legal framework and 
investment environment. 
Table 5.2.1 China: Average Size of Foreign Firms, 
agreement) 
Type/year 1986 1987 1988 
EJVs 1.5 1.4 0.8 
CJVs 2.3 1.6 1.0 
JDVs 13.5 1.6 11.7 
WFOEs 1.1 10.2 1.2 
Note: JDVs=Joint Development Ventures 
mln=million 
1989 1990 1991 
0.7 0.7 0.6 
0.9 1.0 0.8 
20.4 38.9 26.7 
1.8 1.3 1.6 
1979-95 ($US min per 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 
21.6 18.9 16.7 10.3 
1.9 2.3 2.6 2.9 
Source: Data for 1986-91 are calculated from the Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Information & 
Consultancy Service Centre, Beijing, 1992, pp. 353-355,; Data for 1992-95 are calculated from the 
State statistical Bureau, China Statistical Publishing House, Beijing, 1996, p. 286 
5.3 Sectoral Composition 
The objective of China's economic policies in the early stage of transition was to attract 
import-substituting industries to the country. China tried to promote its development through 
highly protected import substitution. Thus, it attracted a significant amount of FDI in the 
industrial sector during the initial years (Table 5.3). On the other hand, it is clear that foreign 
investment has been skewed towards the tourism and hotel industry, whereas agriculture has 
received a minimal share of FDI. During 1983-84, the tourism and hotel industry accounted 
for 37.4 per cent of total FDI with a value of $US 103,440 million. By 1986 the amount of 
FDI in this sector reached nearly 60 per cent of all foreign investment. Foreign investors 
concentrated on the service sector during those early years because the investment climate in 
industry was less than satisfactory. At the same time, the payback period for investment in 
hotels was shorter than in industry, which was attractive to many investors. 
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Table 5.3 China: Value of FDI by Sector, 1983-88 (in %) 
Sector 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Tourism, real estate and services 4.7 32.7 35.9 57.1 39.7 10.0 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.0 2.7 2.0 2.2 3.4 3.9 
Light and heavy industry 13.7 21.5 37.6 27.7 47.9 75.9 
Communications, post and 3.2 2.9 1.7 1.2 0.4 1.7 
telecommunications 
Commerce and catering 2.1 3.8 8.3 3.5 0.8 1.2 
Finance and insurance 18.9 33.1 5.8 4.5 5.7 3.8 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, Foreign Investment in China, China Statistical Information & 
Consultancy Service Centre, Beijing, pp. 315-318 
Table 5.3 China: Value of FDI by Sector in 1989-1995 (%) continued 
Sector 1979- 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1989 
Tourism, real estate and services 25.2 6.8 12.6 31.1 39.3 29.4 26.4 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 3.1 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Light and heavy industry 52.9 84.4 80.3 56.9 45.9 47.4 54.6 
Communication, post and 1.3 0.6 0.8 2.7 1.3 1.8 2.1 
telecommunications 
Commerce and catering 4.7 1.7 1.4 2.5 4.1 5.3 5.8 
Finance and insurance 10.5 0.8 0.8 2.2 3.4 3.8 3.9 
Source: As for Table 5.3 
With the promulgation in 1986 of the Provisions · of the State Council for the 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment (the so-called Twenty Two Article Provisions), the 
industrial climate had improved. Also, the Regulations on Guiding Foreign Investment 
Operations, approved by the State Planning Commission in 1987, played a role in attracting 
investors to ventures in the industrial sector. Consequently, there has been a larger share of 
FDI to the industry sector ($US 17.76 million) or 47.9 per cent in 1987, (see Table 5.3) but 
FDI in the real estate and hotel sector was still substantial ($US 14.71 million) or 39.7 per 
cent in 1987. Due to the surplus of hotel rooms from earlier investments, China temporarily 
halted further investment in hotels in 1988. Thus, FDI in industry continued to increase 
significantly in terms of both relative share (over 80 per cent in 1990 and 1991) and absolute 
value (from $US 7.8 million in 1987 to $US 512.54 million in 1993) when it reached its 
peak (see Table 5.3.1). After 1993, however, we can see a slowly declining trend. 
By the end of 1987 the inflow investment into infrastructure, power generation and 
distribution had remained very low. These areas require relatively large amounts of 
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investment and are heavily regulated. Investors in these areas face difficulties in repatriating 
foreign exchange profits abroad. FDI in other sectors, such as commercial and financial 
service industries, was negligible. The official view is, however, that the sectoral balance of 
FDI since 1984 has improved toward more investment in manufacturing (Table 5.3.1). 
Table 5.3.1 China: Contracted FDI by Sector in ($US million) 
Sector 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
1.25 2.09 1.21 1.22 2.20 6.78 11.91 9.72 Agriculture 
Industry 
Construction 
0.62 
7.85 
0.53 
0.33 
17.76 40.21 46.64 55.69 96.23 326.67 512.54 439.53 
Transportation and 
telecommunication 
services 
Commerce, food 
service and material 
supply 
Real estate, public 
residential and 
tourism 
Health care, sports 
and social welfare 
1.00 
0.55 
0.16 
0.29 
16.17 14.71 
0.16 0.11 
Education, culture and 0.41 0.14 
arts 
Scientific research 
Others 
0.00 
1.26 
0.01 
2.11 
1.19 
0.91 
0.64 
5.30 
0.05 
0.44 
0.07 
2.04 
0.67 
0.52 
0.67 
5.24 
0.36 
0.07 
0.04 
0.58 
1.81 
0.36 
1.07 
1.34 
0.95 
1.74 
18.39 38.78 23.94 
15.43 14.90 20.30 
14.44 46.06 39.22 
4.52 15.04 180.8 437.71 238.62 
0.38 
0.05 
0.32 
0.53 
0.64 
0.56 
0.19 
0.89 
3.95 4.77 19.79 
0.97 4.52 6.08 
0.62 5.88 2.74 
13.17 37.82 26.87 
Source: Data for 1986-1990 are calculated from the State Statistical Bureau, Almanac of China's Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation 1990-1994, China Foreign Economic Statistics 1979-1994, 
Beijing, Published by China Statistical Information & Consultancy Service Centre, 1995, pp. 
320-350. 
The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 dealt a serious blow to tourism, and FDI in hotels 
shrank even further, but as people's memories faded, tourism fully returned to normal in 
1992. Notwithstanding the marked shift in favour of manufacturing, the service sector 
continued to be a substantial recipient of foreign capital at the beginning of the 1990s (Table 
5.3.1). 
Most of the FDI projects in China are in export-oriented manufacturing industries. During the 
period 1979-1993, the percentage share of the manufacturing industry by the number of 
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projects and contract value was the largest at 74.1 per cent and 52.8 per cent, respectively. 
However, with the structural changes in the Chinese economy, the pattern of investment 
began to change also. In 1989, for example, 83.3 per cent of FDI was in the manufacturing 
sector and mainly concentrated in the export sectors. However, by 1993, its share had 
dropped to 45.9 per cent while the relative share of real estate and public utilities had shot up 
to 39 .3 per cent from 9 .4 per cent in the same period. Although the manufacturing industry 
continues to capture a large amount of FDI, it is increasingly being targeted at the domestic 
market. FDI has begun to concentrate more on the infrastructural developments so as to 
maintain a longer economic life. This can also be confirmed by looking at the share of 
investment in different sectors in the last fourteen years (Table 5.3.1). The gap in the share 
between those two sectors has been narrowed, suggesting that the development of 
infrastructure has become the major task. FDI in manufacturing was concentrated in low-end, 
labour-intensive industries rather than capital or skill-intensive enterprises. This was 
generally demonstrated by the small size of projects. In 1995, the average size of an industrial 
project was $US 1.12 million. Larger-scale projects were normally found in the real estate, 
public utilities and services subgroup, which includes hotel development. 
There are indications that China has been able to attract more capital-intensive projects 
in recent years. According to Chinese officials, 'productive' (non-service-related) projects 
accounted for 90 per cent of total projects approved (Kui Wei Li, 1997). Also the Chinese 
government put forward the policy of exchanging market share for technology. Foreign-
funded enterprises (FFEs) could sell their products made by advanced technology and could 
also sell the products as substitutions for imports. This created many opportunistic spaces for 
the FFEs and the hope that the Chinese government would shift FDI to more capital-and skill-
intensive industries. The most recent five-year plan (1996-2000) gives priority to FDI for 
agriculture, energy, communications, imported raw materials, high technology and utilisation 
of resources, especially in the central and western provinces. Moreover, the manufacturing 
industry was to increase productivity and efficiency by better management techniques but also 
by a higher growth of engineering and high-tech industries like machinery, electronics and 
biotechnology. Export-oriented, high-tech FDI and import-substitution investments will have 
special preference, especially if they are shifted from coastal areas to the western and central 
regions, regions relatively neglected so far. 
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5.4 Source-Country Composition 
Since 1979 more than 40 countries or areas have invested in China (see Table 5.4). On the 
one hand, FDI in China by country of origin shows a significant concentration in terms of the 
total number of investing countries. On the other hand, it also reveals a greater concentration 
in terms of the amounts invested by the source countries and the changes in the shares of 
investment stock made by various source countries between 1979-1994. As shown in Table 
5.4 from the period 1979 to 1994, Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea have been the major investors, accounting for 73.9 per 
cent of the total accumulated FDI inflows into China. Among NIEs, Hong Kong and Macau 
have been the largest investor areas taking up to 62.2 per cent of total FDI inflows, followed 
by Taiwan (8.02 per cent), Macau (l.56 per cent), Singapore (1.45 per cent) and south 
Korea (0.82 per cent) (Chen Chunlai, 1996; Chyungly, 1997). 
Table 5.4 China: FDI Inflows by Source Country 1979-94 ($US million at 
current prices) 
Source country 1979-86 1986-89 1989-94 
Hong Kong 876 5693 48764 
Taiwan 
USA 
Japan 
Singapore 
Macau 
South Korea 
UK 
Germany 
France 
Developing countries 
Developed countries 
256 
247 
7 
54 
19 
33 
950 
684 
783 
1091 
134 
78 
67 
99 
44 
6466 
2435 
For further details about source countries and regions see Appendix 5.1 
8269 
5844 
5145 
1900 
1381 
1216 
996 
629 
409 
65279 
14863 
Source: Calculated from the various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China's Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, Beijing, (Zhongguo Duiwai jingji Maoyi Chubanshe), MOFERT, 
various issues, Beijing. 
It should be stressed that published FDI figures for Hong Kong are overstated. Part 
of the investment flow from Hong Kong in fact originated in South-East Asia. Some 
overseas Chinese and Taiwanese investors invested in the mainland through subsidiaries 
registered in Hong Kong to avoid scrutiny from their home countries. Investing in China by 
wealthy overseas Chinese businessmen was politically sensitive in some South-East Asian 
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countries such as Indonesia. In Taiwan, investors were legally prohibited from investing in 
China prior to 1990, although Taiwanese businessmen found ways to circumvent 
government restraints by registering ventures through Hong Kong. The rule was relaxed in 
1990 to allow Taiwanese firms to invest in the mainland through proper registration with the 
Taiwanese government. Consequently, future accounting for FDI through Hong Kong will 
be more accurate, but data on investment flow for previous years coming from Hong Kong 
include Taiwan and other South-East Asian interests. Moreover, there are some China-funded 
firms in Hong Kong and Macau that have established joint ventures with other domestic 
Chinese firms. The so-called "bogus blue-eyed" joint ventures were established to take 
advantage of the preferential treatment given to joint ventures. Clearly, the existence of this 
'reverse investment', as it often called by the Chinese, overstates the flow of foreign 
investment funds from Hong Kong (Chyungly, 1997; The Economist, 1996). 
After Hong Kong, the second largest foreign investor in terms of contractual FDI 
value for the period 1979-91 was the US (see Table 5.4) at over 9.6 per cent, followed by 
Japan (7 .5 per cent) then Germany (2.1 per cent) and Singapore ( 1. 7 per cent). The US and 
Japan have been by far the largest foreign investors among developed source countries 
investing in China. The annual FDI outflows of these countries to China far exceeded those 
of any other developed source countries. No other single developed country has invested 
more than 1 per cent in China, including the Western European countries even though they 
are main source countries in international FDI. Developing countries' investment in China is 
very small, 0.31 per cent for other Asian countries and 0.17 per cent for Eastern European 
countries. 
In the two periods of 1979-91 and 1992-95 the share of investment in China from 
various source countries changed greatly. The share of investment from the NIEs increased 
substantially from 61. 7 per cent to 77 .8 per cent, which was mainly the result of investment 
from Taiwan and South Korea. In the period of 1992-95, the share of Taiwan's investment 
stock in mainland China exceeded that of the US and of Japan. It rose from $US 3.12 million 
to $US 9.21 million in 1995. Taiwan is now the second most important investor in China. 
Investment flow from South Korea also become increasingly important. In 1992-95, South 
Korea's investment position climbed from obscurity to fifth place, its accumulated FDI in 
China reached $US 1.280 million, which was close to the total FDI inflows from the UK to 
China and was larger than those from any other Western European country. 
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Another significant increase in the share of accumulated FDI in China was made by the 
ASEAN countries. Their combined share increased from 0.52 per cent in 1979-91 up to 1.88 
per cent in 1992-95. Among ASEAN countries, Thailand has been taldng the leading position 
to invest in China, followed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. By contrast, the 
share of accumulated FDI in China for all developed source countries declined. From the 
period 1979-92 to the period 1992-95, Japan's share declined from 14.11 per cent to 5.45 
per cent, the US's share declining from 11.71 per cent to 6.87 per cent, and Western 
European countries, share also declining from 6.74 per cent to 3.56 per cent. 
Since the NIEs' investments, particularly Hong Kong's investments, have been the 
largest part of the story of FDI in China, it is worth looking at the NIE' s investment in a little 
more detail. The remarkable intensity of the NIE' s investment in China is explained both by 
factors which led to the rapid emergence ofNIEs as source countries of FDI, and by specific 
developments in China. Two factors are important in explaining the rapid growth of the 
NIE's FDI. Firstly, rapidly rising real wages in the NIEs rendered many labour-intensive 
industries uncompetitive, and FDI was seen as a means of utilising accumulated managerial 
and technical expertise ill those industries. Secondly, the NIEs are upgrading their technology 
and restructuring their economies as they accumulate human and physical capital relatively 
rapidly compared with other countries. FDI is an efficient means to transfer their labour-
intensive industries abroad to earn a return on their accumulated assets in these activities. 
Perhaps even more important in explaining the upsurge was the remarkable coincidence in 
timing of China's economic reform and the NIE' s economic restructuring. A gold rush 
mentality developed among NIE investors towards China's reforms. This occurred precisely 
as NIE firms were eagerly seeking out overseas investment opportunities. 
The rapid increase in FDI in China from ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Indonesia) in the late 1980s and early 1990s resembled the early pattern of 
NIE' s investments in most respects. In general, the changing domestic economic structures 
and extensive overseas Chinese business networks have led to and facilitated the companies 
of ASEAN countries to venture in to China. Investment from developed countries are 
somewhat different from that of NIEs and other developing countries. This is due firstly to 
the fact that the technological gap between the developed countries and China is relatively 
large and the transfer of technology is hampered to a certain extent by the appropriateness of 
technology. Secondly, the firms of developed countries usually posses more advanced 
technology and production techniques (Table 5.4.1). 
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Table 5.4.1 Relative Sector Investment Intensity in China by Source 
Countries in ( % ) 
Sector ASEAN NIEs Western Japan US 
Labour intensive 142 109 
Capital intensive 44 112 
Human-capital intensive 72 88 
European 
95 
77 
127 
76 
67 
161 
81 
75 
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Note: Table presents the relative sector investment intensity of source countries in the three 
manufacturing sectors. These indicators show the share of that sector in the total inflows 
from this source, compared with that sector's share in total inflows from all sources. 
Source: MOFERT, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing, various issues; State Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, 
1995-97. 
The differences between developed countries and NIEs as well as between developed 
and developing countries has been demonstrated very strongly in investment patterns of 
various source countries. Table 5.4.1 clearly indicates the differences in the evolution of the 
economic and technological level of various source countries, the relative sector investment 
intensity changes from labour-intensive industry to capital-intensive and to human-capital-
intensive industry, indicating the investment sequences as countries change their proportion 
of factor endowments and their economic and technological structure. 
Table 5.4.2 China: The A verase Size of FDI Projects ($US min), 1979-95* 
Countries 1979- 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1991 
Hong Kong/Macau 1.03 1.30 1.51 1.52 1.54 
Taiwan *0.90 0.86 0.91 0.92 0.89 
us 2.51 0.96 1.01 1.04 1.08 
Japan 2.07 1.20 0.85 0.89 0.90 
Germany 9.81 1.00 0.78 0.85 0.91 
Singapore 1.63 1.34 1.69 1.70 1.74 
UK 5.53 2.27 5.71 5.68 3.80 
Australia 1.88 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.85 
Canada 1.71 0.80 1.23 0.90 0.97 
*Note: Taiwan's data for 1983-1991 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Tongji Daquan, China Statistical Information & 
Consultancy Service Centre, Beijing, various years; Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, Beijing, various years. 
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As illustrated in Table 5.4.2, investment projects made by Taiwan and Hong Kong are small 
in scale, with an average value of $US 0.90 million and $US 1.03 million respectively. The 
average project size for Hong Kong investors increased in 1994 and 1995. The average size 
ofFDI from Germany is the largest with $US 9.81 million, followed by the UK $US 5.53 
million and the $US 1.51 million during 1979-91. The average Japanese FDI project is quite 
small (Table 5.4.2 ), but the Japanese FDI in China accounts for only 1.3 per cent of Japan's 
total overseas investment and 6.5 per cent of its total investment in Asia. In view of Japan's 
huge economic power, its proximity to China, and its traditional cultural ties with China, the 
relatively small total FDI has been disappointing. This can be explained partially by the 
relative difficulty in transferring Japanese technological know-how to China and partially by 
the huge bilateral trade surplus in Japan's favour. China has been critical of Japan's 
reluctance to invest more, particularly when the good performance of Japanese FDI is taken 
into consideration. 
5.5 Regional Distribution 
China's foreign investment policy has had an important geographical dimension: the 
reformers targeted China's coastal areas as the leading regions for the country's economic 
development and as the places from which the development process could spread to the rest 
of China. The Chinese government originally emphasised that FDI should flow primarily 
only into specially designated areas, hoping that by isolating foreign investment it could 
observe its activities and guard against any negative effects that might appear. This uneven 
development created huge conflicts between coastal and inland provinces, it also put pressure 
on the central government in terms of the huge influx of unskilled labour mainly from 
western rural provinces to urban areas of the east coast of China in terms of social 
accommodation in the cities. The close geographical proximity and tight cultural and linguistic 
links between southern China and the overseas Chinese communities in Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Macau have also directly contributed to the observed geographical pattern of China's 
FDI. 
Thus, locational benefits appear to be a prime consideration for investors 
contemplating participation in any FDI venture in China. In the fierce scramble to secure 
foreign capital, many municipalities have sought to by-pass central regulations by offering 
potential overseas investors additional benefits such as concessions on land rentals, labour 
charges and other local levies, both legal and illegal. Such preferential treatment often 
outweighs the advantage which the status of being an SEZ confers over other areas 
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designated for foreign investment, creating conflict of interest with the central government's 
development policies. 
Table 5.5 China: Actual Utilised FDI, by Province and Area (in $US min) 
1979-86 1986-89 1989-95 
Coastal Regions 
Beijing 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Fujian 
Shandong 
Guangdong 
Central Regions 
Shanxi 
Hubei 
Hunan 
Jilin 
Heilongjiang 
Henan 
Western Regions 
Sichuan 
Gansu 
Ningxia 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Qinghai 
1.40 
1.48 
0.18 
0.61 
0.19 
7.23 
0.12 
0.09 
0.01 
0.17 
0.06 
0.15 
0.02 
0.04 
9.16 
8.69 
2.44 
5.1 
1.98 
27.17 
0.18 
0.57 
0.15 
0.09 
0.73 
1.12 
0.53 
0.03 
0.11 
0.15 
-.03 
Note: Selected regions which have had some foreign capital inflow 
39.91 
93.26 
135.94 
127.9 
82.86 
339.1 
2.43 
20.43 
14.09 
9.81 
11.28 
12.65 
21.3 
1.66 
0.27 
3.44 
2.89 
0.08 
Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook, China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing, various years 
China's coastal areas were the first regions targeted for the country's economic 
development (Table 5.5 and Table 5.5.1). Up to 1992, they absorbed more than 80 per cent 
of the total capital. However, the inflow of FDI has taken place in three distinctive investment 
areas. The first areas were the five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which were created in 
early 1979 in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian 
Province and Hainan Province, all of them on the south-east coast. They accounted for over 
20 per cent of total FDI during the period 1979-1989. In the SEZs, foreign investors could 
expect preferential treatment with respect to tax incentives, flexible arrangements for land use 
with reductions in charges, reduced welfare contributions, flexible arrangements for 
employing labour and the possibility of preferential prices for raw materials and equipment. 
However, the unique role of SEZs as attractions for foreign investment declined after the first 
phase of the investment policy. 
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ID 1984, Chinese government designated 14 major coastal cities as 'open cities' and granted 
them many of the privileges it had earlier reserved for SEZs. These 'open cities' were given 
greater autonomy in policy making, were allowed to offer special incentives (such as tax 
holidays) to encourage FDI, and were authorised to set up special districts, so-called 
'Economic and Technological and Development Zones'. ID 1992, these 'open areas' received 
some 82.3 per cent of all contracted foreign investment. Guangdong Province attracted the 
largest amount of total investment, while Jiangsu, Fujian and Shandong provinces had 
increased their relative shares during 1990-1994 (see Table 5 .5). 
Table 5.5.1 China: Regional Share of Actual Utilised FDI ($US billion/%) 
Regions 1986-1991 1992-1995 
Coastal Region 
Central Region 
Western Region 
Amount 
14.51 
0.67 
0.60 
% 
91.93 
4.25 
3.82 
Amount 
95.04 
9.03 
3.76 
% 
88.14 
8.38 
3.48 
Source: Chyungly Lee, FD/ in China: Do State Policies Matter, Issues & Studies, Beijing, no. 7, July 
1997, p. 46. 
The next areas opened to foreign investment were the remaining inland provinces. 
They are backward in terms of both their economy and their infrastructure. ID terms of the 
growth trend of FDI inflows during the period 1979-1995 as shown in table 5 .5 .1, the three 
provincial groups have experienced different patterns. As FDI surged during the period 1991-
1994, there were some shifts in geographical distribution. The five SEZs remained important, 
but their share ofFDI had declined relative to that of the coastal provinces in 1992 and 1993. 
Of the 'open coastal cities', Dalin and Shanghai recorded the largest increase in terms of 
percentage share. Although Guangzhou's FDI increased in absolute terms throughout the 
period, its relative share remained rather stable at about 5 .5 per cent. Open coastal areas 
continue to absorbed the lion's share of FDI with larger percentage shares during 1990-1994 
(see Table 5.5.1) as compared to the period 1979-1989. On the other hand, Beijing's FDI 
declined in relative terms over the period 1990-1994. Another notable recent development is 
that inland areas have attracted more FDI, although their relative values are not very 
significant. Within the Eastern region, there is a shift of FDI inflows from the South-Eastern 
towards the North Eastern provinces. Guangdong's share in FDI inflows has declined 
steadily as FDI inflows into Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and Hebei provinces have 
increased. The proportion of investment to China's hinterland increased by 60.9 per cent to 
an overall contracted inward investment share of 17. 7 per cent. Traditionally, businessmen 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan have concentrated their investments in the Pearl River Delta 
and Fujian Province; there is a notable trend that more investors from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are seeking investment in the Y antze River Delta and some inland areas. 
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